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Executive Summary 
 
Objective, scope and method of the evaluation 
The main evaluation objective is to assess to what extent EU Budget Support (BS) operations in South 
Africa (SA) contributed to achieving sustainable results in the relevant sectors over the period 2000-
2011.  The  evaluation  covers  16  Sector  Budget  Support  (SBS)  operations,  for  an  amount  of 
€ 984 million, of which 32% were allocated to Employment and Private Sector Development, 25% to 
Water and Sanitation, 7% to Governance (Legislative and Justice), 17% to Health, 12% to Education 
and 7% to Urban Renewal. The OECD-DAC 3 Step approach was followed.  
Overall assessment 
Summary assessment 
EU BS to SA in the period 2000-2011 represents a positive experience that should be continued and 
further integrated into the SA-EU Strategic Partnership. BS has been adapted to the context,  while 
ensuring both Government of SA (GoSA) ownership and strategic relevance of the EU support. 
It has supported policy innovation by enhancing specific innovative GoSA programmes, often with the 
participation of civil society organisations (CSOs), within wider priority sectors, with a focus on fighting 
poverty and inequality and supporting democracy. 
The  supported  programmes  have  produced  tangible  development  results  in  water,  justice  and 
legislative sectors, some segments of employment and rural poverty, and other areas. Their success 
has, however, been limited when addressing some key structural bottlenecks that characterise the SA 
context and affect policy making processes. 
BS, through its various financial and non-financial inputs, has provided significant contributions in terms 
of enabling successful policy innovations although, especially in the first half of the period, it was only 
partially able to benefit from the opportunities provided by the comprehensive EU-SA partnership to 
expand  policy  dialogue  and  knowledge  sharing  between  the  partners  on  the  relevant  matters. This 
could  have  enabled  GoSA  and  EU  to  more  effectively  support  broader  and  better-informed  policy 
thinking in the areas addressed. 
Context 
SA is a middle income country with a well-diversified economy. During most of the evaluation period, 
the country has experienced significant economic growth. However, very high levels of poverty and 
unemployment, the low level of human development, as well as strong income inequalities - SA’s Gini 
Coefficient is one of the highest in the world - have still represented major challenges.  
In SA, official development assistance (ODA) constitutes just 1.3% of the government’s budget and 
0.3% of GNP. The GoSA considers ODA should be used to support new and more effective ways of 
implementing  government  policies  and  priorities  for  poverty  reduction  and  add  value  by  furthering 
innovation, piloting and testing new approaches, catalytic initiatives to unlock domestic resources or 
capacity building for sustained, long term implementation.
1. 
The  Trade and Development  Co-operation  Agreement  (TDCA)  drafted in 1999, partly implemented 
thereafter but ratified only in 2004, was  an important  achievement of  the EU-SA  partnership.  The 
Agreement provides the legal framework for relations  between the parties,  and was designed to 
strengthen co-operation and pursue several key common objectives, including: strengthening dialogue ; 
supporting  SA  in  its  economic  and  social  transition  process ;  supporting  the  country's  economic 
integration in Southern Africa and in the world economy; and expanding and liberalising trade in goods, 
services and capital between the parties, toward a Free Trade Area. Th e TDCA and, in particular, its 
Title V, formed the framework for development co -operation between the EU and SA  that has been 
further spelled out in two joint Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). 
In 2006, the partnership framework was also expanded through the  establishment of a  Strategic 
Partnership (SP), and a year later, through the related Joint Action Plan (JAP). 
The EU-SA co-operation has therefore evolved from the experiences of the nineties , when the priority 
was to support the post -apartheid efforts in  key areas and help obtain tangible results. The wish of 
                                                       
1 see also ‘Core principles for ODA management in SA’ section 1.4 of Annex 3 in Volume III.   viii 
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GoSA to strengthen SA’s ownership and to increase alignment in policy support, has brought most 
donors to review the level and modalities of their interventions, taking into account SA’s specific upper-
middle  income  country  features.  Some  donors  have  emphasised  working  with  CSOs,  others  the 
regional dimension. The EU has decided to shift to BS without neglecting other modalities as needed, in 
the early 2000s. By the mid-2000s, it has also developed an ambitious framework for strategic dialogue 
including on development co-operation under the TDCA and the SP. 
Shifting to BS has been a coherent decision, probably the only option compatible with keeping ODA 
focused on the key strategic challenges addressed by the GoSA while responding to its request for 
stronger ownership and alignment. This choice has been criticised by various sides, using the argument 
of the relatively low ‘quantitative relevance’ or low proportion of BS in the overall public expenditures in 
a MIC. Indeed, this evaluation and others show that the BS modality may be very relevant in a MIC 
context, when its policy relevance is high; this despite its low quantitative weight. In SA, the policy 
relevance of the programmes supported through this modality has been generally high: in most cases, it 
has allowed an accelerated and exhaustive experimentation of important policies and approaches that 
otherwise would have suffered delays, fragmentation and even resistances. 
Introducing the strategic dialogue framework on development co-operation under the TDCA and the 
SP/JAP was also an adequate decision vis-à-vis the established partnership. 
Budget support operations in SA present a number of specificities. For instance, BS:  
  is paid into the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Fund and then channelled 
to the executing government departments and agencies; as such, it is ‘on-Treasury’ but not ‘on 
parliament’; i.e. it is shown in the annex of the budget, audited by the Auditor General but is not 
voted on by Parliament.  
  represents a particularly low share of overall sector budgets; 
  supports policy partnerships within the EU-SA strategic framework, including piloting innovative 
approaches, knowledge-sharing, and capacity development; 
  is embedded in a long history and an evolving EU-SA partnership covering a wider range of 
policy areas. 
SBS contribution 
EU Sector Budget  Support (SBS) operations have supported policy experimentation and innovation 
through different contributions: 
  In  most  cases,  they  have  created  a  financial  opportunity  for  the  key  policy  actors  (GoSA 
departments, decentralised and/or specialised public institutions) to develop their own policy 
processes,  through  risk-taking  initiatives  and  innovation,  including  –  in  several  cases  –  the 
significant involvement of CSOs in the delivery of key services. 
  In various cases (e.g. Justice, Legislative, Water, Health, Science & Technology), the dialogue, 
building on previous joint experiences and exchanges of know-how, has helped shape and/or 
integrate innovative aspects within policy design and approaches. 
  Only in conjunction with more recent SBS operations (PrimCare in the Health sector and, partly, 
IPA  in  Science  &Technology  and  LSPSP  in  the  Legislative  sector,  but  not  ECF  in  the 
Employment  sector  or  PrimEd  in  the  Education  sector),  the  dialogue  has  gone  beyond  the 
single policies and programmes supported and has  paved the way for a wider exchange of 
policy experience profiting from - and feeding into - the existing partnership framework (TDCA 
and SP). 
In terms of policy processes, SBS has contributed to: 
  The creation of opportunities to enhance a South African owned process of policy innovation in 
the targeted sectors is the most original and successful contribution of SBS. 
  The occasional and/or limited links established between such policy experimentation and the 
wider SA-EU strategic partnership framework, in view of building joint learning processes to 
feed the development action of both partners at different levels (in SA and EU, at regional level 
and worldwide), is still a weak point of the SBS implementation, although improvements are 
visible in the recent years.) 
Results 
In most instances, the policies supported through SBS have determined - either directly or indirectly - 
significant development outcomes: 
  The approach launched and tested through MSB in the water sector has been a determining 
factor of the success in increasing access to clean water and sanitation facilities in the poorest 
areas between 2000 and 2007.   ix 
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  The GoSA programme Access to Justice and  Constitutional Rights has produced important 
results by mobilising local networks of intermediation in the most marginalised areas, which 
have started responding to the democratic needs of the poor. 
  Strengthened Legislative Assemblies, relying on stronger civic participation, access of the poor 
to advanced technologies, and improved access to primary health facilities, are all consolidated 
outcomes of the policies and programmes supported through SBS. 
In  other  cases,  however,  results  have  been  more  limited.  This  is  primarily  due  to  key  structural 
bottlenecks of the post-apartheid transition, which the supported policies and programmes have only 
been marginally able to address. These include the failure in infrastructure operation and maintenance 
and CSOs mobilisation in the water sector; the insufficient employment growth and strengthening of the 
SMMEs participation to economic activity; and the inadequate skills development resulting in low level 
of employability of the labour force. 
Apart from the structural difficulties of the SA transition, the more disappointing results highlighted in 
some areas can be linked to a complex political context and to conflicting social and economic interests, 
which influenced and hampered the policy-making process. 
Conclusions 
Cluster 1 - Development co-operation: priorities and modalities 
Conclusion  1:  EU-SA  development  co-operation  has  deep  historical  roots  and  reflects  the 
government priorities and the key objectives of the EU-SA partnership. 
Development co-operation between the EU and SA is built on a deep and solid history of relationships, 
since the days of apartheid, which ensures reciprocal trust and commitment. During the apartheid, the 
ANC, the democratic movements and CSOs found the EU to be an important partner in their political 
and civil battles. Since the official abolition of apartheid, the co-operation has fully reflected the GoSA 
priorities.  Over  time,  the  co-operation  has  continued  to  develop,  by  strengthening  government 
ownership  through  the  introduction  of  BS  and  by  expanding  the  scope  of  co-operation  through  the 
establishment of the TDCA and Strategic Partnership. 
Conclusion  2:  Budget  Support  has  become  the  key  modality  of  this  co-operation  and  has 
significantly evolved over time. 
BS was introduced in the early 2000s, to respond to a strong demand from both EU and SA partners. It 
rapidly became the most important modality of the EU-SA development co-operation, covering 72% of 
the total EU portfolio over the period 2000-11 with peaks of more than 90% in recent years. GoSA saw 
in BS a way to increase its ownership of ODA. The EU, as stressed in the CSP (2003), saw in BS also a 
way to “strengthen policy dialogue” and the EU value added in development co-operation. 
Conclusion 3: Budget Support has been designed and implemented with significant flexibility. 
Flexibility in the approach adopted by the parties in the design of SBS operations reflects the efforts 
made in ensuring relevance and alignment to GoSA needs and priorities. This is evident when looking 
at the different mix of inputs of SBS operations which were generally determined by sector specific 
considerations, and at the number of riders (amendments were made in relation to 13 of the 16 SBS 
operations).  While  some  of  these  riders  were  linked  to  over-ambitious  targets  and/or  delays  in 
implementation, in eight cases adjustments were made to the performance assessment matrix, with a 
view to enhancing alignment to changing national institutional and policy frameworks.  
Conclusion 4: Budget Support in South Africa has developed as a specific typology. 
The  specific  focus  of  BS  on  themes  and  policy  challenges  which  are  well  identified  (specific 
experimental policy programmes), instead of broad sector and macro policies, allows BS to enhance its 
value  added,  despite  its  relatively  small  financial  weight  compared  to  the  overall  SA  discretionary 
spending. Indeed, the financial resources mobilised are able to create real opportunities for the relevant 
government  departments  and  their  CSOs  partners.  In  addition,  the  focus  of  BS  enhances  the 
development of a strategic dialogue and knowledge sharing initiatives as the dialogue and exchange 
would otherwise become very general or overambitious and would thus lose their relevance. 
In most cases, the sustainability of the supported actions has been ensured both through a significant 
participation of the GoSA in the financing, and through the mainstreaming into the budget of successful 
pilots (e.g. IPA, Access to Justice, MSB, RCF, LSPSP, etc.). Mainstreaming has taken place thanks to 
specific mechanisms and procedures embedded within the GoSA budget preparation process.   x 
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Conclusion 5: SBS has shown strong comparative advantages vis-à-vis other modalities and 
significant capacities of complementarity. 
SBS has shown a strong comparative advantage toward alternative delivery modalities – namely, in the 
following areas: 
  ownership and reinforcing government internal processes; 
  flexibility and diversification in the use of resources; 
  appropriateness  to  address  complex  policy  experimentation  in  institutional  sensitive 
environments. 
In addition, in some cases, SBS has provided the opportunity for positive combinations with projects or 
facilities,  namely  to  enhance  capacity  development,  as  for  example:  the  contribution  of  the  TDCA 
Facility to PrimCare in the Health Sector, and the support project to a number of NGOs to complement 
the Access to Justice programme. 
Cluster 2 - Value added of the EU-SA development co-operation 
Conclusion  6:  SBS  funds  have  created  strong  opportunities  to  test  policy  and  institutional 
processes through innovative and risk-taking initiatives. 
The creation of financial opportunities to enhance a nationally-owned process of policy innovation in the 
targeted sectors is the most original and successful contribution of SBS. 
Overall, the weight of SBS funds is relatively low when compared to GoSA additional allocations across 
sectors for the whole period considered. It represents an average of 1%. However, it is estimated, that 
within targeted sectors, funds transferred have increased GoSA’s fiscal space through the provision of 
more significant additional resources. SBS funds represented approximately 8% and 7% respectively of 
the additional funds made available within the private sector development/ employment sector and the 
governance sector in the period 2000-2011. Through the provision of these additional resources, SBS 
operations have enabled line departments to finance innovative policies and programmes that had not 
yet found an allocation in the national budget. More specifically - and in line with the mandated function 
for development aid as defined by GoSA’s ODA guidelines - SBS has, in most cases, successfully 
supported policy innovation and piloting, including: 
  the testing of innovative models for service delivery in the health sector (e.g. outreach teams 
and mobile clinics),  
  the piloting of innovative institutional and policy frameworks (e.g. in the Water Sector) and of 
new forms of area-based governance and management (e.g. in the Urban Renewal Sector),  
  the launching of new mechanisms to deepen and broaden engagement with civil society actors 
(e.g. in the Justice and Water Sectors),  
  the launching, testing and subsequent mainstreaming of pilot initiatives and mechanisms (e.g. 
in the Water Sector, in the area of Science and Technology, and in the private sector in relation 
to the funding windows for SMEs provided through the IDC). 
Conclusion 7: In the absence of a mutually agreed definition of policy dialogue, the dialogue has 
mostly focused on programme management issues and has only more recently expanded at the 
broader level of the Strategic Partnership to generate exchange of experiences and know-how.. 
As knowledge sharing should be a key feature of the EU value added, policy dialogue is particularly 
important. Despite this and despite the multiple references to policy dialogue in the EU-SA strategic and 
programming  documents  since  2000,  the  evaluation  has  highlighted  the  absence  of  a  codified  and 
shared definition of policy dialogue
2.  
At  SBS  operation  level, policy dialogue  has  helped  to  identify the specific sector policy support 
programmes,  to  define  the  performance  assessment  framework  of  the  FAs ,  and  to  assess  the 
achievement of targets set for the   KPIs.  This operation-level policy dialogue has  been particularly 
important and has expanded to strategic themes in particular in the Governance Sector and partly in the 
Water Sector. 
However, in most cases,  the operation-level policy dialogue has remained focused on ensuring an 
appropriate management of the programmes. The  potential of the broader opportunities offered by the 
elaborated dialogue framework of the EU -SA TDCA and Strategic Partnership  was  not exploited, 
                                                       
2 See section 4.2 "EQ2 (Step 1) - Policy Dialogue, TA and H&A" (p.19)  in the main report and the extended 
formulation of Conclusion 7 (p. 103).   xi 
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especially before 2008, because of the lack of a clear and shared view by the parties on how to address 
and combine them in the BS framework, also in light of the lack of procedures and expertise. As of 
2008,  following  the  JAP,  these  opportunities  have  started  to  be  better  used  (e.g.  PrimCare,  IPA, 
LSPSP) with significant results, and SBS effects have been strengthened. It should be acknowledged 
however, that such new practice has not yet filled up the gaps of the pre-2008 period. 
Conclusion 8: Capacity Building and Capacity Development inputs strongly relied on existing 
national capacities and mainly focused on managerial and technical issues. They were rarely 
used for exchange of experience and know-how between the parties, according to the TDCA/SP 
framework, although the few cases where this happened showed a considerable value added. 
Although Capacity Building and Capacity Development (CB/CD) features are included in almost all SBS 
operations, the content or focus of the CB/CD inputs and the ways in which it is integrated within the 
SBS operations strongly varies, leading to conclude that they depend on – and respond to - sector/ 
context specific characteristics, rather than to temporal evolutions and broader lessons learned.  
In most cases, CB/CD has been: 
  aimed  at  facilitating  the  implementation  of  the  SBS  supported  programmes  and  at 
strengthening the capacities of the institution(s) and sector actors involved; 
  managed independently by GoSA and provided by national experts at various levels (scientific, 
managerial,  technical)  or  exceptionally  delegated  to  relevant  NSAs  (e.g.  Access  to  Justice, 
PrimCare);  
  included either as a condition in the performance assessment framework or just mentioned as 
an expected result without condition. 
Only rarely have CB measures been embedded within the SBS operations and only in the cases of 
RCF and PrimCare was CB/CD provided to exchange specific know-how based on EU or worldwide 
practices, with the support of international partners (respectively, EIB and advisory services managed 
by DFID). 
Conclusion 9: The strategic dialogue and the knowledge sharing processes combined with SBS 
are limited by the absence of specific tools and procedures. 
Even if the SBS parties would agree to expand the level of dialogue and address relevant knowledge 
sharing  initiatives,  they  would  be  hampered  by  the  lack  of  skills,  procedures  and  tools.  The  most 
suitable tool to address such level of exchange is presently the TDCA Dialogue Facility, but this has still 
a relatively limited scope and is under the Strategic Partnership. The development cooperation partners 
in the EUD and NT do not have a direct access to it. Furthermore, the programme managers in the 
EUD and NT do not have easy access to specialised expertise. On the EU side, access to the sectoral 
DGs of the European Commission and to the sectoral institutions of the EU Member States (EU MS) is 
not facilitated by agreed procedures. 
Cluster 3 - Outcomes and impacts at sector level 
Conclusion 10: While GoSA employment creation programmes supported by SBS have yielded 
considerable  achievements,  these  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  offset  by  persistent  structural 
bottlenecks. 
Despite the high political priority placed on private sector and employment strategies, which have led to 
the creation of two million new jobs over the period and to the significant growth registered in the rate of 
investments,  the  official  unemployment  rate  has  declined  only  marginally  and  remains  high  at 
approximately 25%.  
SBS funds have contributed helping GoSA to:  
  address complementary areas in the main sector policy framework (through SWEEEP); 
  launch a new and promising programme focusing on innovation for poverty reduction (IPA); 
  test new lending products to address market failures in the financing of SMMEs and/or risky 
projects (RCF); and  
  strengthen its employment creation programmes (ECF).  
Beyond the funds, other SBS inputs have been deployed as follows:  
  dialogue in the case of IPA, with a number of implications – partly still to be developed – in 
terms of strategic exchange on Science & Technology, and systematisation and extension of 
lessons learned;    xii 
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  CB/CD inputs, based on exchange of know-how between SA and EU have been used in the 
RCF, through the EIB involvement. 
GoSA  policies  and  programmes  supported  through  SBS  have  only  partially  tackled  some  of  the 
bottlenecks that constrain economic growth.  
Conclusion  11:  SBS  operations  have  supported  the  GoSA  in  the  implementation  of  crucial 
reform processes in the water and sanitation sector leading to significant development results. 
More recently, the declining intensity and quality of the SA-EU dialogue in the sector has limited 
exchanges on potential solutions to address important persistent bottlenecks.  
Over the last decade, important reforms took place in the Water Sector that took into account important 
transformation processes in terms of local governance and evolution in the national financial framework.  
SBS funds and dialogue – based on previous experience of collaboration – have combined at the right 
time to help the government design and implement a new institutional approach in the sector, with a 
focus on the poorest provinces and the recognition of clear progress made in the establishment of 
democratic local governments.  
The  implementation  of  the  SBS-supported  GoSA  programme,  combined  with  significant  public 
investment in infrastructure, has allowed the achievement of important results in terms of access to 
water and sanitation in the poorer provinces. However, other objectives of the programme - such as the 
involvement of CSOs - have been overlooked. 
While  the  EU  funds  remained  significant,  the  level  of  dialogue  has  fallen  in  recent  years.  The 
impoverishment of the dialogue has hampered the possibility for GoSA and the EU to exchange ideas 
on ways to address the new bottlenecks and potentially to identify solutions that could be supported by 
the EU. 
Conclusion 12: By building on existing policy partnerships in the Governance Sector, SBS has 
supported a successful DoJCD innovative programme to improve access to justice in the poor 
areas,  and  the  institutionalisation  of  the  Legislative  Sector  within  crucial  areas  for  South 
Africa’s process toward a stable and inclusive constitutional democracy.   
Over  the  years,  the  EU  has  established  a  firm  partnership  with  state  institutions  in  the  justice  and 
legislative sectors and with a variety of strategically important non-state actors in multiple sectors, which 
has  allowed  the  EU  and  its  government  partners  (DoJCD  and  SALS/LSS)  to  implement  two  SBS 
relevant and effective operations. The dialogue and financial inputs of these two operations, building on 
the  existing  policy  commitments  in  the  two  governance  sectors,  helped  shape  and  support  two 
important government programmes in justice and the legislative sector.  
In  the  case  of  the  Justice  Sector,  this  involved  innovative  approaches  of  DoJCD  to  strategic 
partnerships with key civil society actors to extend access to justice, sensitise on constitutional rights, 
and create policy feedback mechanisms for new cycles of policy innovation.  
In  the  case  of  the  legislative  sector,  the  pitfalls  of  fragmenting  Parliament  and  the  nine  Provincial 
Legislatures  have  been  avoided,  and  the  LSPSP  was  viewed  positively  for  its  contributions  to  the 
institutionalisation of the Legislative Sector. Consistent dialogue, combined with appropriate financial 
support, strengthened key stakeholders and sector actors in their efforts aimed at harmonising sector 
systems and procedures, at strengthening key functions (e.g. financial, managerial, human resources, 
etc.), and at developing capacities in vital areas such as research, public outreach and international co-
operation. 
Cluster 4 - Other key issues on the implementation of the SBS modality  
Conclusion  13:  SBS  has  contributed  to  policy  experiences  that  have  shown  how  CSOs  are 
essential actors in reaching socially excluded groups. 
Some SBS operations, such as Access to Justice, MSB (Water sector), and PrimCare (Health) have 
supported  GoSA  programmes  with  a  significant  involvement  of  non-sate  actors,  using  various 
modalities. In all three cases, SBS has contributed to policy experiences that have shown how CSOs 
are essential actors in reaching the most marginalised groups and build with them local networks for 
sustainable service delivery. In the case of water, there has been a negative lesson learned, as a result 
of CSO involvement being overlooked. 
The use of SBS instead of alternative modalities, has allowed GoSA to test out the partnership with 
CSOs  as  its  own  policy  and  build  on  its  own  experience.  In  one  case,  EU-funded  actions 
complementary to SBS have been put in place, with success (Access to Justice).   xiii 
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Conclusion 14: SBS has endeavoured to extend its support to local institutions with different 
modalities and results. 
SBS has endeavoured to support both national Government institutions with their CSOs partners and 
Local Governments with local level CSOs. Local partners have been supported in most sectors, namely 
in  Water,  Governance,  Health  and  decentralised  Urban  Development,  either  through  specific  BS 
components or through complementary GoSA actions. Cases of particular success are the support to 
local governments in the Water Sector and Health Sectors. In the Governance Sector, local authorities 
have been positively involved in the access to justice through an increase in the demand-side pressure, 
while  the  LPSP  has  favoured  the  coordination  between  the  national  and  provincial  assemblies.    In 
decentralised urban development, the two supported programmes had different results (rather positive 
in eThekwini and rather negative in URP Eastern Cape). 
Conclusion 15: The good quality of PFM acted as an enabling factor for SBS, rather than an SBS 
objective; at the same time, SBS contributed to reinforce PFM systems, namely at sectoral level. 
SBS has contributed to increasing the amount of aid integrated in the budgeting process and aligned to 
the  government  systems  (SBS  is  in  fact  ‘on  plan’,  ‘on  budget’,  ‘on-Treasury’,  ‘on  account’,  ‘on 
procurement’, ‘on report’ and ‘on audit’). This is not always the case with regard to other donor funds 
that are managed by the donors and not necessarily reported on (by donors), giving rise to what has 
been termed the ‘invisibility’ of aid in South African processes. 
Contrary  to  evaluations  carried  out  in  other  countries  (e.g.  Mali,  Tunisia,  Zambia),  this  evaluation 
concludes  that  SBS  operations  have  not  provided  important  contributions  to  the  substantial  PFM 
reforms introduced in SA after the end of the apartheid, although these have been supported since the 
late 1990s by the EU through the implementation of successive Financial Management Improvement 
Programmes.  In  some  cases,  SBS  operations  did  include  one  or  more  conditions  related  to 
improvements in PFM, and links between SBS operations and PFM improvements at sector level can 
be  drawn  in  the  Legislative,  Justice  and  Water  Sectors.  However,  no  complementary  CB/CD  was 
provided to this end (with the exception of the Water Sector), and nor were improvements in overall 
PFM explicitly included as expected key results of the SBS operations.  
Conclusion 16: With SBS funds, predictability of aid has markedly improved compared to other 
forms of aid. However, and despite the rather low proportion of SBS in the overall GoSA public 
expenditures,  delays  in  payment  of  some  tranches  have  had  negative  consequences  on  the 
implementation of specific SBS-supported programmes. 
Over time, predictability of commitments of EU-SBS funds over a multi-year framework has increased 
and is significantly higher than that recorded for other forms of aid.  
Despite this, and despite the fact that SBS funds represent a very small share of GoSA additional 
expenditure, the significant delays encountered in the payment of specific tranches have had important 
consequences  on  the  implementation  of  some  SBS  supported  programmes  and  even  on  the 
sustainability of the development actions. Indeed, the specific way in which GoSA uses BS funds (the 
transfers to line departments that are expected to be covered by SBS take place only if SBS funds have 
been  actually  received  on  the  RDP  Fund  account)  emphasises  the  consequences  of  disbursement 
delays in relation to budget implementation and project financing. These delays, however, are often the 
combined result of multiple causes. Among these: delays in the submission of payment files by the Line 
Departments to the NT and/or from the NT to the EUD; delays in actual payment/processing of request 
by  the  EU;  lack  of  compliance  with  established  conditions  for  payment  or  differing  views  on  the 
achievement  of  predefined  targets;  and  delays  in  the  transfer  of  funds  from  the  RDP  Fund  to  line 
department accounts.   xiv 
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Recommendations 
Cluster 1 - Development co-operation: priorities and modalities 
Recommendation 1: Priorities.  
Development co-operation should continue to be recognised as a key element of the EU-SA 
partnership and remain focussed on national developmental needs; at the same time, 
approaches should be developed and relevant experience and possible lessons identified for 
replication at regional and international level. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 1. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/DEVCO, EUD. 
It is recommended that development co-operation should be kept focused on national developmental 
needs– namely, building a prosperous and inclusive democracy – as these will remain for decades a 
key challenge for government and civil society in South Africa. 
 
Recommendation 2: Budget support modality. 
Budget support should be maintained as the key financing modality, to guarantee government 
ownership and strong links with the stakeholders involved in policy making and 
implementation. At the same time, enhanced dialogue and CB/CD components should be 
strengthened also through complementary actions to better reflect the value added of the SA-
EU co-operation. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/DEVCO, EUD. 
Budget support should remain the key financing modality of the development co-operation, with the 
integration  of  expanded  strategic  dialogue  and  new  capacity  development  components  including 
through enhanced complementary actions. Strengthening the link with the actual policy processes will 
facilitate  the  complementarity  of  BS  with  other  modalities  of  development  cooperation,  including 
specific capacity development initiatives and exchanges. This applies to  both existing projects and 
facilities (e.g. PSPPD, TDCA Dialogue Facility), and to new initiatives that might be launched in the 
future. Such initiatives, without a relation to  BS and the actual supported policy processes,  would 
easily become rather academic and isolated exercises. At the same time, the complementarity with BS 
may  reinforce  their  concreteness  and  continuity  and  help  the  partners  identify  new  themes  and 
approaches to inform policy research and debate on development matters in the respective countries 
and eventually inspire joint action at regional/ international level.  
 
Recommendation 3: Future budget support. 
BS operations should continue to support creative and innovative public institutions with an 
established tradition of co-operation with the EU, one of the key success factors to date, and 
should possibly involve new development partners. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 4, 5 and 6. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS and EUD. 
The implementation and management of future BS operations should draw on the lessons of past and 
on-going SBS with a view to build on the strengths and minimise the weaknesses. In particular, the 
formulation, implementation and management of future BS operations should ensure that:  
  the most positive features of the SBS experience are not lost, namely that BS remains an 
opportunity for creative and innovative public institutions and their partners in the civil society 
with an established tradition of co-operation with EU;  
  strategic dialogue in combination with sectoral policy support is expanded and strengthened, 
including  through  the  set-up  of  complementary  envelops  to  finance  specific  CD  initiatives 
aimed at facilitating the exchange of high-level know-how on policy experimentation. 
In  the  shorter-term,  linkages  with  existing  facilities  and  structures  (e.g.  the  TDCA-Facility  and  the 
PSPPD) should be strengthened, namely:  
  support  for  capacity  development  to  engage  in  strategic  policy  dialogue  and  leading  to 
increased institutional capacity provided in the framework of the Dialogue Facility should be 
better linked to planned and on-going BS operations; and 
  research  and  evaluations  on  policy  interventions  which  address  poverty  and  inequality, 
promoted by the PSPPD should be used also to feed the strategic policy dialogue and identify   xv 
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areas of particular interest for future BS support. 
The successful experience so far should help expand the collaboration to other development partners. 
In this respect, the EU should seek stronger complementarity and harmonisation of developmental 
actions including joint financing both with regards to EU MS and to other development partners. 
 
Recommendation 4: Budget support specific typology. 
The specific typology of SBS in SA should be considered as an option for cooperation with 
MICs, in specific cases. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 4. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  DEVCO. 
The  specific  typology  of  SBS  tested  and  fine-tuned  in  SA  should  be  viewed  as  an  option  for 
cooperation also with other MICs, as it ensures complete government ownership of the policies and 
programmes supported whilst – at the same time - it allows ample space for expanding the knowledge 
sharing processes between the partners. 
This typology seems particularly suited to those middle-income countries like SA, with which the EU 
has a strong partnership but has not established any association agreement that would allow more in 
depth political and policy debate on the domestic policies interested by the association. 
BS would be used to support specific policies and programmes owned by the recipient Government 
with a focus on shared policy objectives and innovative / risk-taking components: 
  the strong Government ownership and the relatively minimal financial weight of BS on the 
overall discretionary expenditure would minimise any negative tied-aid effect; while 
  the focus on key thematic areas and programmes, within broader sector policies, would allow 
to  better  exploit  the  value  added  of  the  EU  cooperation,  and  would  enable  significant 
qualitative contributions in terms of knowledge sharing to expand the knowledge base of both 
partners. 
BS could thus be provided in countries in which governments decide to utilise the funds for specific 
programmes and actions, but at the same time the performance indicators and the policy dialogue 
cover sector wide performance. 
The sustainability of the supported actions should be ensured through the participation of the recipient 
governments in the provision of the relevant financial and technical resources and the mainstreaming 
of experimentations, if successful, as happens in the case of South Africa. 
Cluster 2 - Value Added of the EU-SA development co-operation 
Recommendation 5: Policy dialogue. 
‘Programme-level’ policy dialogue should be combined with a broader ‘strategic dialogue’ 
according to the Strategic Partnership, based on peer-to-peer exchange of knowledge on key 
development issues. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 7, 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, Line Departments, DEVCO/EEAS 
and EUD. 
According to the Budget Support Guidelines (EC-DEVCO, 2012), policy dialogue includes two distinct 
features: 
  First, “it provides a framework to take stock of the respective commitments and to assess 
progress on both sides”. 
  Second, “it can be used as a forward-looking tool”. 
In South Africa, the second feature should be better developed and integrated with the first one. Such 
a ‘forward-looking’ or strategic approach should fit the dialogue framework promoted by the TDCA and 
the Strategic Partnership  
   xvi 
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Recommendation 6: Capacity development. 
Continue mobilising expertise for institutional strengthening and Capacity Building / Capacity 
Development (CB/CD), but expand CB/CD initiatives to support advanced policy exchange and 
knowledge sharing, according to the Strategic Partnership. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS, EUD, Programmes’ 
stakeholders. 
The use of expertise, under various forms, to strengthen the institutions involved in the implementation 
of the SBS supported programmes has shown to be effective and deeply  owned by the  SA side. 
Therefore, it should be continued. 
However,  when  designing  BS  operations,  the  CB/CD  component  should  be  expanded  to  include 
initiatives that allow the advanced policy exchanges and knowledge sharing processes mentioned in 
Recommendation 5. Such ‘extended CB/CD’ is possible, either by including within the BS package 
additional specific CB/CD components to respond to such need, or through the establishment of ad 
hoc complementary CB/CD actions be they financed by the EU or by other development partners. 
Such components and/or complementary actions may include, for instance: (i) workshops on relevant 
intervention  models  tested  worldwide;  (ii)  inter-institutional  meetings  and  specific  co-operation 
between SA and peer institutions from EU and/or other countries; (iii) study tours from SA to visit 
relevant peer institutions; (iv) accompanying studies and related analyses; etc. 
When planning a BS operation, specific knowledge sharing initiatives should be identified and the 
related  resources  allocated,  or  the  contribution  of  complementary  programmes  (namely  the  TDCA 
Dialogue Facility) required. In all the cases, however, the TDCA Dialogue Facility should include  a 
specific  component  to  support  ‘extended  CB/CD’  in  the  development  cooperation  programmes, 
namely BS. 
In an adapted form, this recommendation is replicable in other partner countries receiving EU BS.  
 
Recommendation 7: New exchange tools. 
Create tools in the framework of the Strategic Partnership and the existing dialogue 
architecture to foster enhanced forms of knowledge sharing. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  EUD, NT and DEVCO/EEAS. 
The development of strategic dialogue and the integration of what has been called above ‘extended 
CB/CD’  (for  knowledge  sharing)  with  budget  support,  either  as  a  component  or  a  complement, 
requires a better use of the complex dialogue structure established by the TDCA and the Strategic 
Partnership and the set-up of specific tools: 
  Instruments such as the TDCA Dialogue Facility could be used for this purpose provided that 
specific mandates, scopes and organisational arrangements are established to respond in a 
flexible and timely way to the demands arising from the design and implementation of the BS 
operations. 
  The twinning (especially twinning light) tool should be made available to South Africa, allowing 
for short- and medium-term inter-institutional partnerships between SA and EU institutions, 
which  can  originate  from  initial  exchanges  of  experience  in  the  framework  of  thematic 
meetings. 
  Specific facilities might be created. It would be difficult to imagine a specialised sector facility, 
given the range of themes addressed. A specific facility should be multi-sectoral, and should 
be able to tap into the expertise of the EU and the Member States (including public sector 
expertise), but also of other MICs. A specialised section of the existing TDCA Dialogue facility 
would fit the purpose. 
  Horizontal programmes (like the regional ones in Latin America or Asia, for social cohesion, 
private enterprises, etc.) should be considered as well.  
At the same time, lessons learnt from SBS operations at policy level should inform the agenda of the 
dialogue  fora  and  feed  wider  policy  thinking  and  dialogue  for  national  and  international  learning 
thereby opening up new areas of dialogue. 
In an adapted form, this recommendation is replicable in other Partner Counties receiving EU BS  
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Recommendation 8: Regional and international level. 
Extend lessons from co-operation at national level to regional and international level. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 1, 6, 7 and 8. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/ DEVCO and EUD. 
As stressed in Recommendation 1, the co-operation on national development issues is a base to 
expand on the regional and international dimension of the SA-EU partnership. 
Integrating policy exchanges on international  experience  within bilateral  budget support  operations 
would help strengthen the national approaches and build references that can be used at regional and 
international level. This would feed the partnership for international development, which is identified as 
a key area by the SA-EU Strategic Partnership. 
Regional  and  international  initiatives  may  be  launched  or  supported  as  an  extension  of  the 
development partnership within the country (e.g. Innovation for Poverty Alleviation, Access to Justice, 
Support to Parliaments, PrimCare). 
Cluster 3 - Sectoral issues 
Recommendation 9: Sectoral priorities. 
Keep the sectoral and thematic focus for BS operations, according to the SA demand, but open 
up dialogue and expand knowledge sharing to address relevant strategic themes. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 10, 11 and 12. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EUD, relevant SA stakeholders. 
Possible  future  sectoral  priorities  will  depend  upon  the  government  demand,  in  the  strategic 
framework  agreed  upon  between  the  partners;  it  is  possible,  however,  to  highlight,  in  the  sectors 
covered  so  far,  the  areas  that  might  or  should  be  addressed  by  specific  policy  dialogue,  CB/CD 
initiatives  and  other  knowledge  sharing  support  to  fill  the  gaps  that  have  been  identified  in  the 
evaluation.  
  In  the  Employment  Sector,  capacity  development  initiatives  should  integrate  the  ongoing 
programmes, namely to address the institutional framework of the labour market and the skills 
profile of the labour force, as well as the SMMEs. 
  In the area of S&T, the relevant experience should be open to a regional / continental network 
including African and EU specialised institutions. 
  In  the  Water  Sector,  a  dialogue  on  possible  CSOs  involvement  in  social  infrastructure 
maintenance, including examples from other development countries, should be implemented. 
  In  the  Governance  Sector,  both  supported  programmes  through  their  positive  experience 
could  feed  a  fruitful  dialogue  at  the  TDCA  level  on  the  lessons  learned,  with  possible 
extension at national, regional and continental level. 
  In the Health Sector, the integration between the SBS operation and the knowledge sharing 
initiatives at the level of the TDCA Facility on the health insurance models and other strategic 
themes should continue. 
  The promotion of a joint forum (instead of one-off initiatives) on fighting inequality, open to 
relevant third countries, would build on the experience of the ongoing programmes and highly 
complement them. 
Cluster 4 - Other key issues for development co-operation 
Recommendation 10: Civil society. 
Further expand the involvement of civil society actors. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 13. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS, EUD and CSOs. 
According  to  Conclusion  11,  the  involvement  of  CSOs  allows  to  ensure  an  inclusive  approach  to 
service delivery as well as an adequate level of advocacy and watch-dogging vis-à-vis GoSA action. 
The attention to civil society should be extended to new actors (e.g. Trade Unions, judges, press, 
representatives of the entrepreneurs) to favour their participation in high level dialogue and exchange 
of experiences, namely with their peers in the EU, through the different opportunities provided by the 
SP. Through the TDCA Dialogue Facility and/or other tools (e.g. twinning), specific initiatives involving 
SA  and  EU  partners  could  be  supported  in  order  to  facilitate  the  establishment  of  stronger 
relationships between peer actors of the civil society.   xviii 
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Recommendation 11: Local institutions. 
Integrate BS with complementary CB/CD support to Local Authorities to ensure their full 
participation in development actions. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 14. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EUD and CSOs. 
When the dialogue  identifies the need to  provide specific support to local  actors to enhance their 
participation in the supported programmes, complementary CB/CD actions should be put in place, 
either through specific SBS components / arrangements, or through separate support funded by the 
EU or by other development partners. The second approach should be preferred when specific gaps 
are identified that may be overcome through intensive, short-term CB/CD support provided either at 
provincial  or  municipal  level.  The  first  one  should  be  preferred  when  longer  term  institutional  and 
policy relations between national and provincial/local level institutions need to be addressed.  
In any case, considering the persistent weakness of municipal authorities, especially in poorer areas, 
as well as their focus on implementation and lack of mandate on policy formulation and testing, it is 
not recommended to implement BS at the municipal level, unless it is a limited and closely monitored 
trial undertaken in the framework of the piloting of centrally driven innovative policies.   
 
Recommendation 12: Other EU actors. 
Increase access to - and involvement of - the whole range of EU institutional actors. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 6, 7 and 8. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  EUDs, EEAS, DEVCO, other DGs. 
To feed the knowledge sharing processes that have been identified as the main outcomes of the SA-
EU development cooperation (JAP 2007), it is necessary to draw on the EU experience in the different 
sectors and on that of different EU MS. This means that not only specific tools must be available (see 
Cluster 2), but access to relevant information and resources must be ensured. 
In most sectors, SA is interested in the EU and EU MS experience and accumulated know-how, and 
ways  to  ensure  easy  access  to  such  experience  and  know-how  need  to  be  favoured.  Those  EU 
institutions which are supposed to own and catalyse a synthesis of this experience and know-how, 
such as the EU sectoral DGs, should be mobilised – under the coordination of DG DEVCO/EEAS - to 
facilitate such access and, when needed, provide information and help to approach relevant MS. 
In order to enable EUDs to access and involve DGs such as DG EMPL (Employment, Social Affairs 
and  Inclusion),  DG  REGIO  (Regional  Policy),  DG  SANCO  (Health  and  Consumers),  DG  RTD 
(Research  and  Innovation)  and  others,  as  well  as  on  the  experience  of  the  EU  MS  and  the  EU 
worldwide  partners,  specific  modalities  and  tools  must  be  established,  namely  organisational  and 
logistic arrangements should be ensured at country level, through existing and/or new facilities 
In an adapted form, this recommendation is also applicable to the cooperation with other countries. 
 
Recommendation 13: Predictability  
Enhance predictability of the flow of budget support funds. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 16. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO, EUD. 
Considering  the  effects  of  the  disbursement  delays  on  the  operations  of  the  GoSA  programmes 
supported by BS, specific agreements and arrangements should be established to avoid this typical 
project-type bottleneck.  
On the EU side, few arrangements should be adopted to reduce the actual delays in disbursement, 
such as the reduction of the number and simplification of KPIs used as disbursement triggers, so as to 
facilitate the disbursement assessments and negotiations.  
On  the  SA  side,  improvements  should  regard  the  submission  of  payment  files  by  the  Line 
Departments to the NT and/or from the NT to the EUD. According to the SA stakeholders, however, 
the persistence of the present SA rule of establishing a direct dependency between BS disbursement 
and  the  budget  of  the  GoSA  supported  programme  would  continue  creating  problems  during 
implementation, with possible negative consequences on the sustainability of the action. That said, 
this rule is not a matter of discussion between SA and EU and this is why the present recommendation 
cannot enter into detailed proposals, apart from encouraging the adoption of any practical solution to 
the evident bottlenecks created. 
   1 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation 
Objectives and scope of the evaluation are clearly defined in the sections 3 and 4 of the ToR (see 
Volume III – Annex 1). The main objective of the evaluation is “to assess to what extent Budget 
Support in South Africa contributed to achieve sustainable results on employment creation and poverty 
reduction with particular regard to inclusive and sustainable growth and the provision of social services. 
Indicators of success include the extent to which the support enabled the SA Government to implement 
its  sector  strategies  and  to  enhance  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  its  policies,  strategies  and 
spending actions.” 
The  period  under  evaluation  is  2000-2011.  The  assignment  considers  only  Budget  Support  (BS) 
operations financed by the European Union (EU). It is noteworthy that no General Budget Support 
(GBS) was provided until 2011 and thus the focus of the analysis is on Sector Budget Support (SBS) 
operations. Furthermore, the evaluation pays attention to other aid modalities used in South Africa 
(esp. projects) in order to assess the complementarities and synergy between them.  
Section  4.2  of  the  ToR  details  the  thematic  scope  of  the  evaluation.  In  the  context  of  the  3 Step 
Approach  to  evaluate  budget  support,  the  sectoral  scope  of  the  analysis  undertaken  in  Step 1  is 
narrowed down in Step 2 to allow a more detailed assessment of the effects of BS. More specifically, 
  In the Step 1, the analysis covers all sectors that have received BS
3; 
  In the Step 2, the evaluation focuses on the implementation of three in-depth case studies in 
the following three sectors: Employment/Private Sector; Water; Governance.
4 
Table 1 below provides an overview of the  SBS operations that fall within the scope of the evaluation 
and allows to distinguish between the SBS operations that are analysed under Step 1 (all of them) and 
the SBS operations that fall within the three sectors selected for the case studies for which a more in-
depth analysis, encompassing Step 2, has been carried out. 
Table 1  Overview of the SBS operations in the scope of the evaluation 
Title  Starting / 
end date 
GoSA
5 main 
stakeholders 
Allocated 
amounts (in M€)  Status  Step 1/ 
Step 2 
Employment / Private Sector Development    Sub-total: 313.9     
Risk Capital Facility I (RCF I)  2002-2005  dti &  IDC 
52.9 + 3.1 (TA) +  
2 (grants) + 0.9 
(other) 
Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Risk Capital Facility II (RCF I)  2006-2011  dti & IDC  46.3 + 2.5 (TA) + 
0.3 (other)  In closure  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
SWEEEP I & SWEEEP II  2003-2008  dti  25+50  Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Employment Creation (ECF)  2009-2014 
Economic cluster (incl. 
dti, DPE, DoL, DEAT, 
DOA, DST, DHET) 
100  Ongoing  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Innovation for Poverty Alleviation 
(IPA)  2008-2013  DST  29.68 + 0.32 
(other)  In closure  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Water    Sub-total: 242     
Water Services Sector Support 
Programme - Masibambane I 
(MSB I) 
2000-2004 
DWAF, DPLG, SALGA 
& their provincial 
counterparts as well as 
municipalities. 
75  Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Masibambane II (MSB II)  2004-2007  DWAF, DPLG, SALGA 
local stakeholders.  60   Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Water for Growth and Development - 
Masibambane III (MSB III)  2008-2012  DWAF, DPLG, SALGA 
local stakeholders.  107  Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
                                                       
3 The sectors are: Employment/Private Sector (incl. Science & Technology); Water (incl. Sanitation); Governance 
(incl. Legislative sector and Justice/Human Rights); Health; Education; and Urban Renewal. 
4 The ToR mention that the evaluation should comprise three in -depth sector case studies. The initial sectors 
mentioned in the ToR were: private sector, water and health. After consultation with key stakeholders, it was finally 
agreed with the MG to replace the case study on the health sector by a case study on the governance sector. 
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Title  Starting / 
end date 
GoSA
5 main 
stakeholders 
Allocated 
amounts (in M€)  Status  Step 1/ 
Step 2 
Governance: Legislative and Judiciary    Sub-total: 70     
The e-Justice Programme (e-Justice)  2000-2007  Department of Justice  25  Closed  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Legislative Sector Policy Support 
Programme (LSPSP)  2009-2013  Parliament  20  Ongoing  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Access to Justice  2009-2012  DoJCD 
20 + 4.5 (CSO) + 
0.25 (TA) + 0.25 
(other) 
Ongoing  Step 1 & 
Step 2 
Health    Sub-total: 171     
Partnerships  for Health II (PfH II)  2007-2011  DoH, DHSC, National 
Health Council  44 + 1 (other)  In closure  Step 1 
Primary Health Care Sector Policy 
Support Programme (PrimCare)  2011-2015  DoH 
110 + 10 (CSO) + 
5.3 (TA) + 0.7 
(other) 
Ongoing  Step 1 
Education    Sub-total: 122.7     
Primary Education Sector Policy 
Support Programme (PrimEd)  2010-2014  DBE & DHET  122.7  Ongoing  Step 1 
Urban Development    Sub-total: 64.8     
Urban Development Support to 
eThekwini Municipality (eThekwini)  2003-2008  EMA and EXCO
6  35  Closed  Step 1 
Support to Urban Renewal 
Programme in Eastern Cape (URP 
Eastern Cape) 
2006-2012 
Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality & 
Buffalo City 
Municipality 
28.6 + 1.22 (TA) + 
0.18 (other)  Ongoing  Step 1 
Note: Dates indicated correspond to the period between the commencement of the Financial Agreement and the 
end date of operational implementation.  
 
1.2  Organisation of the evaluation 
The evaluation process is led by a Management Group (MG), consisting of the evaluation departments 
of the European Commission (DEVCO) (lead) and the Department of the National Treasury of South 
Africa.  A  country  Reference  Group  (RG)  consisting  of  key  government  stakeholders  was  also 
established to serve as a resource, provide advice and feedback to the MG and evaluation team, and 
review the draft reports. 
1.3  Structure of the final evaluation report 
The report consists of three volumes. This volume corresponds to the main report and consists of five 
sections: 
  Section 1. Introduction: includes a brief overview of the evaluation objectives and scope; 
  Section  2.  Context:  presents  some  key  elements  of  the  national  context  and  the  EU-SA 
partnership and co-operation framework; 
  Section  3.  Key  methodological  elements:  details  the  conceptual  framework  used  in  the 
evaluation as well as some methodological challenges and limitations; 
  Section 4. Answers to the Evaluation Questions: provides the results of the analysis for each of 
the evaluation questions and correspond to the core of the report;  
  Sections 5 and 6 present the overall conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. 
Volume II of the report presents the detailed information matrix with the main evidence that underpins 
the findings of the evaluation.  
Complementary information is provided in various annexes which are compiled in Volume III. 
 
                                                       
6 EXCO refers to the Executive Committee of the EMA (main counterpart of the programme). The EXCO was 
responsible for the set-up of a Steering Committee that included a broader representation that went beyond the 
EMA to include provincial officials, and representatives from organised business and civil society.   3 
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2  Context 
This  section  provides  some  key  elements  of  context.  Annex  3  presented  in  Volume  III  provides 
additional information on: the national socio-economic context, GoSA priorities, the major evolutions in 
the  policy  environment,  the  policy  framework  and  management  of  Official  Development  Assistance 
(ODA) and the EU-SA partnership and cooperation framework. 
2.1  Key Elements of the South Africa Context 
South  Africa  is  a  middle  income  country  with  a  well-diversified  economy  and,  during  most  of  the 
evaluation  period,  the  country  has  experienced  strong  economic  growth.  South  Africa’s  policy  and 
institutional environments have significantly developed over the past two decades (see also sections 
1.2 ‘The priorities of GoSA and major evolutions in the policy environment’ and 1.3 ‘Institutional country 
context’ of Annex 3 - Volume III) and, since the transition to a democratic government in 1994, the 
country made progress in addressing the social inequalities. However, very high levels of poverty and 
unemployment, the low level of human development as well as strong income inequalities (illustrated by 
South  Africa’s  Gini  Coefficient  being  one  of  the  highest  in  the  world)  have  still  represented  major 
challenges.  
In South Africa, ODA constitutes just 1.3% of the government’s budget and 0.3% of GNP. GoSA vision 
of ODA is that it should be used to support new and more effective ways of implementing government 
policies and priorities for poverty reduction and add value by furthering one or more of the following:  
  Innovation: developing new and more effective approaches; 
  Piloting and testing: pioneering new approaches for replication purposes; 
  Risk taking: the willingness to invest in initiatives which have attendant risks; 
  Catalytic initiatives: unlocking domestic resources; and 
  Capacity building: ensuring that South African institutional capacity is enhanced for sustained, 
long term implementation. 
The real value of ODA is thus realised when aid is able to provide tools, instruments and solutions 
which contribute to stimulate development for the most disadvantaged sectors of the population and 
ensure that the country is able to use its own resources more effectively and is conversely not justified 
when it is primarily used as an additional source of finance or gap-filler replacing resources which, in 
most  cases, should  be  accessible  domestically”  (see  also  Core  principles  for  ODA management  in 
South Africa section 1.4 of Annex 3 in Volume III
7). 
Budget  support  operations  in  South  Africa  present  a  number  of  specificities  compared  to  other 
countries. Budget support:  
  is paid into Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Fund
8 and then channelled to 
the executing agencies; as such it is ‘on-Treasury’ but not ‘on parliament’; i.e. it is audited by 
the Auditor General but is not voted on by Parliament (see EQ 3).  
  represents a particularly low share of overall sector budget (see EQ 3); 
  supports policy partnerships within the EU-SA strategic framework, including piloting innovative 
approaches, knowledge-sharing, and capacity development (see EQ 2); 
  is embedded in a long history and evolving EU-SA strategic partnership covering a wider range 
of policy areas (see EQ 1). 
2.2  The EU-SA Partnership and Co-operation Framework 
In 2004, a first important achievement of the EU-South Africa partnership was the establishment of the 
Trade  and  Development  Cooperation  Agreement  (TDCA)
9.  This  Agreement  provides  the  legal 
framework for  the relations and was designed to strengthen cooperation and pursue several key 
common objectives, including: strengthening dialogue between the parties, supporting South Africa in 
its economic and social transition process, the country's economic integrat ion in Southern Africa and in 
                                                       
7  The  annex  presents  some  key  elements  related  to  ODA  outlined  in  the  Policy  Framework  &  Operational 
Guidelines for the Management of Official Development Assistance (2011, previous versions: 2003 and 2008). 
8 Central account at the SA Reserve Bank into which development partner funds for government projects are paid, 
and from which transfer payments are made to South African implementing agencies. 
9  Signed on 11 October 1999 in Pretoria, the TDCA entered fully into force on 1 May 2004. However,   some 
provisions which fall within Community competence have been applied since 1 January 2000.   4 
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the world economy, and expanding and liberalising trade in goods, services and capital between the 
parties, toward a Free Trade Area. The TDCA and, in particular, its Title V, has formed the framework 
for development co-operation between the EU and SA. This co-operation framework was further spelled 
out in two joint Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). 
In  2006,  the  partnership  framework  was  also  expanded  through  the  establishment  of  a  Strategic 
Partnership  (SP)
10. According to the re lated Action Plan of 2007, the TDCA provides an important 
framework for relations between South Africa and the European Union but  “furthermore, South Africa 
and the European Union's common interests provide a natural foundation for a strategic partnership 
that significantly enhances existing cooperation by moving from mere political dialogue to active political 
cooperation on issues of mutual interest, at bilateral, regional, continental or global level (…) enhanced 
political  dialogue  forms  the  very  cornerstone  of  the  Strategic  Partnership.  (…)  The  Joint  Country 
Strategy reflects critically on what value-added development cooperation can bring to South African 
government-led  poverty  reduction  and  development  programmes,  such  as  the  Accelerated  Shared 
Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA), the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) and 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE)” (Ibid). 
3  Key Methodological Elements 
3.1  Intervention Logic  
3.1.1  Intervention Logic and implicit theory of change 
According  to  the  3 Step  methodology,  the  intervention  logic  (IL)  of  the  evaluation  is  based  on  a 
comprehensive evaluation framework (CEF), which includes a specific theory of change. As shown in 
the basic diagram below, the IL has four main components (highlighted with different colours): 
  the government and civil society strategies/action (level 3); 
  the development results (levels 4 and 5); 
  the various inputs to the government and civil society strategies/action, namely BS, and their 
direct effects (levels 1 and 2); and 
  the  context,  including  EU  and  government  strategy,  country  and  sectoral  level  political 
economy, various political, economic and social factors intervening in the process (the context 
interacts with all the levels). 
Figure 1  Basic diagram of the 3 Step methodology 
 
The implicit theory of change of this IL is that government and civil society strategies/action (level 3), in 
their interaction with the context (which encompasses external / exogenous factors), play a direct role in 
the  determination  of  the  development  results  (levels  4  and  5).  The  inputs  and  direct  effects  of  aid 
(namely in the case of BS, where they support general policy and budgetary capabilities) may only 
provide a contribution to enhance the government and civil society strategies/action. 
                                                       
10  The  Strategic  Partnership  is  a  special  cooperation  tool  with  countries  outside  the  EU  enlargement  and 
neighbouring areas. There are ten country-level EU Strategic Partnerships so far, involving Brazil, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, South Korea and United States. These are all countries 
with  which  EU  has  special  relationships,  due  to  their  economic  and  political  worldwide  position  and  common 
interests. 
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3.1.2  The evaluation in three Steps 
Therefore, in the evaluation:  
  it is possible to establish a direct causality link between level 3 and levels 4 & 5, i.e. between 
government and civil society strategies/action, on one side, and development results, on the 
other side; and 
  it is possible to establish a direct causality link between levels 1 & 2 and level 3, i.e. between 
aid  (namely  BS)  inputs  and  direct  effects,  on  one  side,  and  government  and  civil  society 
strategies and action, on the other side; but 
  it is very difficult to identify a direct causality link between levels 1 & 2 and levels 4 & 5, i.e. 
between aid (and BS) inputs and direct effects, on one side, and development results on the 
other  side.  Indeed,  too  many  different  –  and  much  more  important  than  aid  –  determining 
factors  intervene  in  the  process  and  make  such  link  very  vague  and  almost  impossible  to 
isolate.  
As a consequence of the mentioned theory of change and its implications, the methodology splits the 
evaluation in two parts: Step 1 to evaluate the causality links between levels 1 & 2 and level 3 of the IL; 
and Step 2 to evaluate the causality link between level 3 and levels 4 & 5. A Step 3  establishes a 
transitive relationship between levels 1 & 2 and levels 4 & 5, via the respective causality links identified 
in Step 1 and Step 2.  
Given the different nature of the two exercises, the methodology adopts two different methods in Step 1 
and Step 2. In the first case, the evaluation consists of a contribution assessment, while in the second 
case a policy impact assessment is necessary. 
3.1.3  Comprehensive intervention logic  
The five levels of the IL are described below: 
Level 1:   Budget support inputs. It includes as well other inputs – provided either by the same donors 
or by others or by the government – with which BS may have synergies and/or overlapping. 
Level 2:   Direct  outputs  of  budget  support:  improvements  in  the  relationships  between  external 
assistance and the national budget and policy processes. 
Level 3:   Induced outputs: expected positive changes in the quality of public policies, the strength of 
public sector institutions, the quality of public spending (increased allocative and operational 
efficiency), and consequent improvements in public service delivery.
11 
Level 4:   Outcomes: envisaged positive effects at the level of final beneficiaries – service users and 
economic actors.  
Level  5:  Impact:  envisaged  positive  effects  on  sustainable  economic  growth,  poverty  reduction, 
empowerment of the poor  and improvements in their real incomes, and other issues and 
priorities specified in the BS operation(s) being subject of the evaluation. 
The IL is presented in a comprehensive version and in a sectoral version for the three focal sectors: 
  the comprehensive IL provides a framework for the whole budget-support-based co-operation 
between EU and South Africa. It is used to assess the general effects produced by the BS 
operations  in  their  synergies  and  interactions,  and  to  assess  the  sectoral  effects  in  all  the 
sectors; 
  the three sectoral IL are used to fine tune the identification of the inputs and the expected 
effects  in  the  three  focal,  sectors:  employment  and  private  sector  development,  water  and 
sanitation, and governance. 
                                                       
11 As explained in the Methodology, “according to the current DAC definitions, the accomplishment of a policy 
reform  has  to  be  considered  as  an  ‘output’  in  the  intervention logic. It  cannot  be  considered  as  an  ‘outcome’ 
because  it  does  not  represent  per  se  a  benefit  to  the  people  targeted  by  the  BS.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
accomplishment of a policy reform is not a direct output of the BS operation although the intervention may have 
been designed to promote it, but rather an accomplishment of national stakeholders influenced by a number of 
other factors including BS. That is why this crucial level of the CEF is called ‘induced outputs’”. 6 
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Figure 2  Overall intervention logic 
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complementary actions are connected 
to budget support according to the 
actual needs and feed the dialogue.
Domestic revenue  funding  and 
domestic policy inputs…
PFM and procurement systems, incl. 
decentralised level, are strengthened 
(namely with respect to flexibility for 
policy innovation, allocative and 
operational efficiency).
Improved public policy formulation 
and execution processes, incl. 
evidence-based policy making and 
M&E, and strengthened links between 
the GoSA, the Parliament and oversight 
bodies are improved.
Public institutions involved, namely 
(though not only) at decentralised level, 
are enabled to plan and implement the 
relevant policies.
Enhanced interaction between GoSA, 
the CSOs and the Private Sector in the 
policy processes.
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Social sectors (Water, Education, Health)
• Enhanced and sustainable provision of 
public services at both central and 
decentralised levels,
• Increased responsiveness of services to 
the needs of the population,
• Piloting of different models of service 
delivery.
Private sector / Employment:
ECF, RCF, Innovation & Poverty alleviation.
Governance: Access to Justice; Legislature.
Enhanced equitable 
access  and use of 
public goods in the 
Water sector.
Private sector / 
employment: 
• Increased 
employment (esp. 
among HDP),
• Increased business 
confidence, and
• Increased private 
sector investment 
and production.
Governance: 
• Improved access 
to justice by the 
poor/marginalised 
groups,
• Enhanced 
oversight and 
orientation capacity 
of the Parliament,
•Enhanced 
participatory 
democracy.
Enhanced equitable 
access  and use of 
public goods in the 
Education & Health 
sectors.
Enhanced 
sustainable and 
inclusive 
economic 
growth.
Reductions in 
income poverty 
& non-income 
poverty.
Empowerment 
& social 
inclusion of 
poor people & 
historically 
disadvantaged 
people (incl. 
women).
Consolidated 
governance and 
democracy.7 
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3.2  Type of assessments carried out 
As explained above, the evaluation includes: 
  a  contribution  assessment  (Step 1),  aimed  at  identifying  the  specific  contribution  of  the  BS 
operations  –  in  their  interaction  with  other  government,  non-government  and  donor  funded 
programmes  and  with  the  context  –  to  the  improvement  of  government  strategies  and  civil 
society action. 
  a policy impact assessment (Step 2), aimed at identifying the actual achievements in terms of 
development results in the policy areas supported by the BS operations, and the policy and 
non-policy factors that have determined such achievements. 
  a  synthesis  exercise  (Step 3)  that  brings  together  the  results  of  the  contribution  and  policy 
impact assessment, aimed at identifying to what extent the policies supported by the different 
BS  components  (as  shown  by  Step 1)  have  participated  in  the  determination  of  the 
development  results  (as  shown  by  Step 2).  Such  synthesis  allows  to  establish  a  ‘transitive’ 
relationship between BS and the development results. 
Such analyses have been structured according to a set of Evaluation Questions (EQs), formulated in 
the Inception phase. While EQs 1 to 5 concern Step 1, EQs 6 to 10 correspond to Step 2. The EQs 
include a number of Judgement Criteria (JC) which are assessed via a number of Indicators. The EQs, 
JC and Indicators compose the Evaluation Matrix. 
3.3  Challenges and Limitations 
3.3.1  Overall methodological challenges  
A strategy-level evaluation of this kind is a challenge per se. It goes beyond a mere summation of 
evaluations  of  multiple  operations  and  tackles  many  high-level  issues.  It  also  covers  different 
dimensions, periods and areas of support, and simultaneously focuses on individual operations. This 
challenge  has  been  tackled  mainly  through  the  specific  structured  methodology,  based  on  an 
adaptation of the methodological approach to budget support evaluation developed in recent years.  
3.3.2  Availability of information 
Information  available  in  EU  databases  was  not  always  easily  retrievable  (e.g.  information  on  the 
release of tranches in the earlier part of the period under evaluation). However, with the help of the 
Delegation of the European Union (EUD) and the National Treasury (NT), missing elements could be 
identified in archives or reconstructed so that an exhaustive database of project documentation related 
to the EU support could be established. 
The evaluation covers a rather long period (2000-2011). The evaluation team was confronted by a lack 
of  ‘institutional  memory’  at  both  EUD  and  GoSA  levels.  There  was  also  a  tendency  for  people 
interviewed to only focus  on on-going or up-coming projects and to  disregard those  that had  been 
implemented earlier.  However,  as the evaluation team used different information sources (including 
documents  and  information  provided  by  other  interviewees),  this  could  to  a  certain  extent  be 
compensated for by cross-checking and combining the information retrieved from the different sources. 
For  some  cases  covered  by  the  analysis,  the  evaluation  team  could  also  rely  on  a  strong  internal 
knowledge of the country context.  
The evaluation uses three types of quantitative data: 
  ‘Financial data’: data on sector budget and expenditure. 
  ‘Administrative data’: data on activities implemented under the various public programmes 
and related outputs. 
  ‘Data on development results’: sectoral trends. 
For all three types of data, it turned out to be particularly difficult to build comprehensive datasets (with 
disaggregated information) covering the earlier part of the evaluation period. The evaluation team faced 
some limitations in terms of comparability and classification when acquiring and analysing financial 
data from different sources, and reliability when analysing administrative data, which required regular 
cross-check to be utilised. With respect to data on development results, often an adequate level of 
disaggregation  (by  province,  by  group  of  beneficiary,  by  time…)  was  lacking  and,  in  some  cases, 
reliability  was  an  issue  for  the  earlier  part  of  the  evaluation  period.  In  general,  the  problem  was 
overcome by cross-checking indications on trends with qualitative information and using a variety of 
sources to reconstruct reliable and comprehensive datasets.  8 
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The insufficiency of data at disaggregated level has conditioned the application of quantitative policy 
impact assessments in many cases. The specific use of SBS to support experimental programmes, with 
often limited geographic incidence, could have allowed a wide use of the ‘double difference’ statistical 
methods.  The  lack  of  many  data  disaggregated  by  geographic  area,  although  in  some  cases 
compensated by the use of proxy, has limited the application of such methods. A large use of qualitative 
methods  (interviews  with  informed  persons  and  story-telling)  has  been  done  to  compensate  the 
quantitative limitations. 
 
 
   9 
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4  Answers to the Evaluation Questions 
Following the ToRs, and as agreed in the inception phase with the MG, the evaluation exercise is based 
on a set of ten Evaluation Questions (EQs) with a view to covering, as far as reasonably possible, the 
various  aspects  of  the  intervention  logic.  For  each  EQ,  a  number  of  Judgement  Criteria  (JC)  and 
Indicators were defined to guide data collection and analysis (see Volume III – Annex 2 Final Evaluation 
Matrix).  
Table 2  Overview of the Evaluation Questions 
No.  Evaluation Question  Step/Level 
EQ 1  To what extent did the design of the budget support operations respond to 
the specificities of the political, economic and social South African context, to 
the  government’s  policy  and  aid  framework  and  to  the  SA-EU  Strategic 
Partnership? 
Step 1,  
Level 01 
EQ 2  To what extent has policy dialogue taken place and evolved in the context of 
BS  operations,  including  exchange  of  information  and  experience  on 
respective commitments and forward looking issues, and to what extent has 
it profited from the wider dialogue structure provided by the TDCA and the 
Strategic  Partnership,  and  of  specific  Capacity  Development/Technical 
Assistance inputs integrated in the framework of the programmes? 
To  what  extent  has  it  led  to  greater  harmonisation  and  alignment  and 
reduced transaction costs of external assistance? 
Step 1,  
Level 2 
EQ 3  To  what  extent  has  budget  support  contributed  to  increased  alignment  of 
ODA  to  government’s  budgetary  processes  and  to  increased  additional 
expenditure at sectoral level and decentralised level? 
Step 1,  
Level 2 
EQ 4  How has the level and composition of public spending for innovation and 
experimentation changed, and with which consequences in terms of 
budgetary flexibility, allocative and operational efficiency, transparency and 
oversight, including the decentralised levels, and what was the contribution 
of BS to the observed changes? 
Step 1,  
Level 3 
EQ 5  Have  there  been  improvements  in  the  areas  supported  by  BS,  in  policy 
formulation/policy  review  and  implementation  processes,  and  related 
accountability, and to what extent and through which mechanisms (flow of 
funds, policy and institutional effects, others) has BS contributed to these 
improvements? 
Step 1,  
Level 3 
EQ 6  To  what  extent,  in  the  employment  /  private  sector  development  sectors, 
have  the  development  outcomes  pursued  through  the  policies  and 
programmes supported by SBS been (or are being) achieved? And which 
have been the determining factors of their achievement? 
Step 2,  
Level 4 
EQ 7  To  what  extent,  in  the  water  sector,  have  the  development  outcomes 
pursued through the policies and programmes supported by SBS been (or 
are being) achieved? And which have been the determining factors of their 
achievement? 
Step 2,  
Level 4 
EQ 8  To what extent, in the sub-sectors of access to justice and legislative, the 
development outcomes targeted by the policies and programmes supported 
by SBS been or are being achieved? And which have been the determining 
factors of their achievement? 
Step 2,  
Level 4 
EQ 9  What hypotheses can be made on the extent to which, in the other supported 
sectors,  the  development  outcomes  pursued  through  the  policies  and 
programmes supported by SBS have been (or are being) achieved, and on 
the related determining factors? 
Step 2,  
Level 4 
EQ 10  To what extent the outcomes achieved so far in the focal sectors have been 
sustainable and represent a potential toward consolidated inclusive growth, 
poverty eradication and inequality reduction? 
Step 2,  
Levels 4 & 5  
 10 
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The  EQs  can  also  be  linked  to  one  or  several  of  the  five  DAC  evaluation  criteria  (relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability), the coherence and EU added-value criteria and 
other key issues (3Cs or cross-cutting issues) identified in the ToR of this evaluation. These linkages 
are illustrated in the following table, and further detailed in the individual EQs. 
Table 3  Coverage of the evaluation criteria by the evaluation questions 
  Evaluation criteria  Other key 
issues 
Question 
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EQ1- Relevance and 
Design of SBS                   
EQ2- Policy Dialogue, TA 
and H&A                   
EQ3- Financial Inputs                   
EQ4- Public Spending / 
Budget management                   
EQ5- Policy formulation / 
implementation processes                   
EQ6- Employment & 
Private Sector 
Development 
                 
EQ7- Water                   
EQ8- Access to justice / 
legislative                   
EQ9- Other sectors                   
EQ10- Impact                   
 
 
 
   
                                                       
12  The  European  Consensus  for  development  identifies  four  “cross-cutting  issues”  of  major  importance  for 
development: democracy and human rights; environmental sustainability; gender equality; HIV/AIDS. Taking into 
account  the  scope  of  the  analysis,  this  evaluation  focuses  only  on  the  issues  of  environmental  sustainability, 
gender equality, HIV/AIDS and democracy. 
  The criterion is largely covered by the EQ 
  The criterion is partially covered in the EQ 11 
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4.1  EQ1 (Step 1) - Relevance and Design of SBS 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent did the design of the budget support operations respond 
to  the  specificities  of  the  political,  economic  and  social  South  African  context,  to  the 
government’s policy and aid framework and to the SA-EU strategic partnership
13? 
EU support provided via SBS has responded to the key priorities of GoSA strategy, as formulated for 
instance in the 2004-09 and 2009-14 Medium-Term Strategic Frameworks (MTSF), and reflected in the 
EU/SA CSPs (2003-06 and 2007-13). Specifically, the operations have focused on three broad areas 
that have been the pillars of the post-apartheid agenda:  
  private sector development and employment;  
  capacity development for basic service delivery (health, education and water);  
  good governance (justice, legislative and decentralisation). 
The SBS operations have built on specific demands of the GoSA departments, the Parliament and 
important Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), drawing on a significant track record of sector-level co-
operation.  
The design of SBS operations has taken into account the lessons of past EU-SA co-operation, including 
some initial sector support using the project approach. The SBS operations have also followed the 
evolution of the country strategic framework, to which they have responded by introducing changes at 
the  level  of  the  design  and  of  the  selection  of  indicators.  Overall,  the  SBS  operations  have  been 
strongly aligned to the national systems, being mostly embedded in GoSA programmes.  
The objectives of the SBS operations have also been consistent with the priority framework of the SA-
EU strategic partnership, which identifies development co-operation as a key area and establishes the 
Mogôbagôba  Dialogue  as  an  “overarching  umbrella  structure  for  all  existing  fora  of  co-operation”. 
However, the SBS operations have rarely explicitly referred to – and, as further discussed under EQ2, 
rarely directly profited from − the opportunities that the strategic partnership provides. 
4.1.1  Relevance to GoSA priorities and the country’s needs (JC1.1) 
The  GoSA  priorities  focus  on  sustainable  economic  growth  and  improved  service  delivery  to  fight 
unemployment and poverty, and on strengthening democracy and good governance. During the period 
under evaluation, such priorities have relied on an increasingly comprehensive policy framework. Key 
GoSA strategic objectives, as spelled out in the MTSF 2004-09, and confirmed and extended by the 
MTSF 2009-14, included: i) economic growth and sustainable livelihoods;  ii) access to services and 
comprehensive  social  security;  iii) crime  and  corruption;  iv) constitutional  rights  and  governance; 
v) international relations for growth and development. The extension in the MTSF 2009-14 concerned 
the identification of 10 priority areas: growth; infrastructure; rural development; skills; health; rule of law; 
social cohesion; African and international co-operation; environment; democracy. 
The main GoSA priorities were reflected in both CSPs covering the period evaluated. The CSPs clearly 
refer  to  specific  GoSA  policies  and  strategies  in  the  main  sectors/areas  of  co-operation  (see  also 
Volume II - Indicator 1.1.1). The table below shows the overall correspondence between the GoSA 
priorities,  the  main  areas  of  co-operation  outlined  in  the  CSPs,  and  the  areas  covered  by  SBS 
operations. It is interesting to note that SBS operations were implemented in almost all of the broad 
strategic areas of the GoSA. 
In all sectors reviewed, the documentary evidence gathered (including evaluation, monitoring, and mid-
term review reports) and the interviews  with relevant people confirm that there is a high degree of 
correspondence between the overall and specific objectives of the SBS operations (including general 
and specific conditions) and the overall sectoral or sub-sectoral priorities defined by GoSA. (Indicators 
1.1.2 and 1.1.3) 
For  instance,  in  the  area  of  Employment/Private  Sector  Development,  the  Employment  Creation 
programme is strongly in line with the GoSA policy implemented through the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative (ASGISA) and with the overall objective to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014. 
The  2010  ROM  monitoring  report  also  explains  that  the  programme  remained  relevant  to  the  New 
Growth Path, which replaced the ASGISA in 2010. The report further notes that the objectives of the 
                                                       
13 When used with normal letters, ‘strategic partnership’ refers to the overall partnership framework which entails 
the  TDCA,  the  2006  agreement  and  related  Joint  Action  Plan.  When  used  with  capital  letters,  ‘Strategic 
Partnership’ refers to the specific agreement of 2006. 12 
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programme  are  in  line  with  the  overall  goals  set  in  the  GoSA  Outcome  Approach
14  and  “are  well 
connected to the four Outcomes” relevant to the sector
15. Similar considerations hold true for the other 
sectors. (Indicator 1.1.3) 
Table 4  Overall correspondence between GoSA priority areas, areas of co-operation outlined 
in the CSPs, and areas covered by SBS operations 
In all sectors where the EU started to provide budget support, it had already been funding ‘project-type’ 
operations of significant size. Although not all SBS operations are a direct continuation of a previous 
EU-funded project, the experience  gained by the EU in the  various sectors certainly  contributed to 
strengthening the alignment of the SBS objectives with the most important country needs and GoSA 
priorities.  
The table below illustrates how most SBS operations have been built on the experience of, and have 
embedded the lessons learned from, a long history of sector-level co-operation. 
Table 5  Continuity of the support and transfer of lessons learned in the various sectors 
Sector  Elements of continuity of the support provided in the sector 
Private Sector/ 
Employment 
Continued support was given in a number of specific areas of this sector, with increasing financial 
allocations. This was explained by the successful execution of early SBS operations (e.g. 
SWEEEP and RCF), but also the recognition that the challenges to be addressed had not been 
fully met. As such, SWEEEP can be seen as a programme developed to complement the success 
of RCF 1: whereas RCF 1 contributed to a ‘fund’ to the private sector via fixed instalments, 
SWEEEP included agreed indicators for variable tranches directly related to the strategic 
objectives of the dti. Initially, the SBS operations were designed to focus their support on a specific 
department (i.e. dti)
16. In the Innovation for Poverty Alleviation (IPA) programme, the design 
emphasised the need to support multi-level sectoral dialogue in the Science and Technology 
Sector. This is also the case with the Employment Creation programme, which is supporting the 
programme of action of the GoSA Economic Sectors and Employment cluster.  
Water  Based on experience gained through the EU support to Eastern Cape and Northern Province (now 
Limpopo), the Water Services Sector support programme (WS-SSP, later MSB I) was designed to 
strengthen relevant structures at all three levels − including DWAF national office, DWAF regional 
offices, and the Water service authorities and providers at local government level − as well as 
improving implementation of existing policies and legislation, particularly those linked to the local 
government sector. 
Lessons learned from MSB I helped shape the design of MSB II, while MSB III also builds on 
lessons learned from earlier phases of MSB. In particular, the approach used in the three targeted 
provinces during MSB I was rolled out to all nine provinces in MSB II. This evolution was further 
pursued in MSB III. 
                                                       
14 In 2010, the Government of South Africa adopted 12 priority outcomes with a view to measurable performance 
and  accountable  delivery.  The  President  signed  performance  agreements  with  all  Cabinet  Ministers.  In  these 
performance agreements, Ministers were requested to establish and participate in Implementation Forums for each 
of  the  12  outcomes.  The  Implementation  Forums  have  developed  delivery  agreements  for  the  Outcomes.  All 
departments, agencies and spheres of government that are involved in the direct delivery required to achieve an 
outcome are party to the agreement. (http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=1905) 
15 The four outcomes are: Outcome 4:  Decent employment through inclusive economic growth; Outcome 5:  A 
skilled and capable workforce to support an inclusive growth path; Outcome 7:  Vibrant, equitable and sustainable 
rural communities with food security for all; Outcome 10: Environmental assets and natural resources that are well 
protected and continually enhanced. 
16  In  the  case  of  the  Risk  Capital  Facility,  dti  delegated  the  management  responsibility  to  the  Industrial 
Development Co-operation. 
GoSA priorities  CSP 2007-2013  CSP 2003-2006  Covered 
by SBS 
Economic growth and 
sustainable livelihoods 
Promote pro-poor, sustainable economic 
growth (Focus area 1) 
Equitable and sustainable 
economic growth (Focus area 2) 
Yes 
Access to services and 
comprehensive social 
security 
Improve the capacity and provision of basic 
services for the poor (Focus area 2) 
Equitable access to and 
sustainable provision of social 
services (Focus area 1) 
Yes 
Constitutional rights and 
governance 
Promote good governance (Focus area 3)  Deepening democracy (Focus 
area 3) 
Yes 
International relations for 
growth and development 
Regional and continental co-operation 
(Complementary area) 
Regional integration and co-
operation (Focus area 4) 
No 
Crime and corruption  Promote good governance (Focus area 3)  n/a  Yes 13 
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Sector  Elements of continuity of the support provided in the sector 
Moreover, the FA emphasises the need to build a strong monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
system in MSB II, having identified the shortfalls in this regard in MSB I. 
Finally, it can be seen that, whereas CSO was not a Key Result Area (KRA) in either MSB I or 
MSB II, it becomes a KRA in MSB III. Similar examples can be found with regard to the other cross 
cutting areas.  
Governance  The SBS support to Access to Justice builds on a decade of project support (1996-2007) to the 
Foundation for Human Rights, a grant-making mechanism, which, in its second phase, has funded 
more than 900 CSO projects operating in the human rights sphere.  
The LSPSP builds on some of the experience with supporting parliament through the project 
modality, starting as of 1996. The multiple administrative, financial and communication hurdles 
between the Project Implementation Unit and Legislatures provided additional incentives to move 
from project to budget support − a modality seen as a more appropriate vehicle for supporting the 
sector policies.  
Health  The Partnerships for the Delivery of Primary Health Care Programme was designed in 2001 and 
implemented in five of the nine South African Provinces in subsequent years. Building on the 
success of the programme, and taking into account the high level of relevance of the design 
highlighted in external monitoring missions, the SBS support to Partnership for Health II (PfH II) 
was launched to expand the current model of partnerships for health into the remaining four 
provinces. The SBS support to PrimCare was not a direct continuation of the Partnership for Health 
programmes, but nevertheless built on this experience. In particular, it has taken into account 
lessons learned from previous actions in terms of the relevance of developing partnerships at local 
level, the crucial dimension played by sectoral dialogue, the importance of carefully selecting key 
performance indicators, and the need to focus efforts on primary health care. 
Education  The previous EU-funded programmes carried out in the sector directly influenced the design of the 
PrimEd SBS operation. These programmes (e.g. Education Sector Support Programme or School 
Infrastructure Support Programmes) covered a variety of subjects (e.g. early childhood 
development, adult literacy, project management, school infrastructures) and all used a project-
type modality. Mixed experience with the project modality, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and 
impact, has prompted both partners to launch the PrimEd programme, which uses the SBS 
modality and focuses on primary education via a three-pronged approach (expanding access to 
early childhood development, ensuring effective implementation of the curriculum, and improving 
teacher training). 
Urban renewal  Experience gained throughout the implementation of the SBS operation ‘Urban Development 
Support to eThekwini Municipality’ and from local development programmes (project aid) pointed to 
the need to: i) disseminate learning within the municipality; ii) support links between programme 
managers and line departments, and ensure linkages between the three spheres of government. 
As a result, the design of the Support to Urban Renewal Programme in Eastern Cape foresees a 
complementary envelope of € 1.4 M for the provision of TA to provide “support to the functions of 
the National and Provincial Urban Renewal Programme, Learning and dissemination of lessons”. 
4.1.2  Consistency with the SA-EU strategic partnership (JC1.2) 
The first global agreement of the EU-SA partnership was the Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA), signed in 1999 and entering fully into effect in 2004. An important focus was trade 
and economic co-operation. However, it also addressed the area of development co-operation with the 
overall priority of fighting poverty.
17 
In 2006
18, the framework of  co-operation was consolidated through the establishment of a  Strategic 
Partnership  (SP)
19  and the subsequent implementation of a  Joint  Action  Plan.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
South Africa is the only African country with which the EU has a Strategic Partnership.  
The SP relies on a complex dialogue structure, including an annual presidential Summit, a Joint Co-
operation Committee (JCC) and different sectoral dialogue forums
20. The Joint Action Plan established 
a new “overarching umbrella structure for all existing fora of co-operation” – the Mogôbagôba Dialogue 
                                                       
17 The bilateral agreement also covers several other fields such as socio-cultural cooperation. 
18 See COM(2006)347 final - EC Towards an EU-SA Strategic Partnership. 
19  The  Strategic  Partnership  is  a  special  co-operation  tool  with  countries  outside  the EU  enlargement  and 
neighbouring areas. There are ten country-level EU Strategic Partnerships so far, involving Brazil, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, South Korea and United States. These are all countries 
with which EU has special relationships, due to  their economic and political worldwide position and common 
interests. 
20 The implementation of the  development co-operation strategy  is also reviewed in Annual Consultations. The 
discussions that take place during the Annual Consultations inform the annual SA-EU Summit. 14 
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− and sets the modalities for joint actions, in particular for enhanced political dialogue at summit level, 
and for specific co-operation forums for priority sectors. This is further discussed under EQ2. 
The CSPs explicitly refer to the broader framework of relations between the EU and SA, pointing to the 
importance of the SP and the TDCA. For instance, the CSP 2007-13 indicates (p.28): “Co-operation 
with South Africa needs to be developed into a strategic partnership, which will require wide-ranging, 
high-level dialogue between South Africa and the EU”.  
In addition, the objectives of the  SBS  operations have  been, overall, consistent  with the  objectives 
outlined  in  the  strategic  partnership  documents,  including:  economic  growth  and  employment, 
enhancement of living conditions, and democratisation, human rights, and good governance. 
However, very few SBS documents mention the TDCA (references were mainly found in the area of 
Employment/Private Sector) and an explicit reference to the SP was found in only one of the six SBS 
operations launched after the establishment of the SP
21. (Indicator 1.2.1) 
Interviews  carried  out  also  highlight  the  distinction  made  by  many  stakeholders  between  SBS 
operations, which are often seen as relating to ‘development aid’, and other ‘wider co-operation’, which 
deals with specific policy issues. In particular, from 2009 onwards, the implementation of the TDCA has 
been  supported  by  the  TDCA  facility
22. Under this programme, funds were made available via a 
dedicated ‘Dialogue facility’
23 to strengthen sectoral dialogue in a number of strategic areas. However, 
there is very little overlap between these areas and the themes covered by the SBS operations.  
Overall,  the  strategic  partnership  and  its  main  evolutions  have  clearly  influenced  the  EU-SA 
development co-operation structure and priorities, but have had only a limited direct influence on the 
design  of  most  SBS  operations.  More  generally,  concrete  efforts  to  link  the  broader  partnership 
framework and the response strategy for development co-operation outlined in the CSP do not appear 
particularly strong during the period evaluated. 
Despite  this,  a  strong  link  with  the  overall  strategic  partnership  can  still  be  observed  for  two  SBS 
operations: 
  The first case corresponds to the Legislative SPSP, in the Governance Sector. The 2007 Joint 
Action Plan indicates that both the EU and SA, “in line with their strong democratic values, 
recognize the importance of regular and institutionalised parliamentary interaction”. A rider to 
the financing agreement of the Legislative SPSP, signed in 2011, introduced a new result area 
that  “aims  to  strengthen  the  capacity  to  engage,  participate  in,  and  oversee  international 
relations” of the Legislative Sector in particular, with a view to improving and strengthening 
existing  relations  and  establishing  new  relations  with  international  Parliaments  and 
parliamentary Bodies, including the EU. 
  A strong alignment is also observed in the case of the Innovation for Poverty Alleviation SBS 
operation, with ‘science and technology’ being explicitly recognised as one of key areas of co-
operation in the Joint Action Plan. 
In both cases, it is noteworthy that the relevant EU and SA institutions involved in the programmes had 
already established a long partnership before the SBS operations were designed and implemented. For 
instance, in the area of science and technology, both partners were already engaged in a strong, high-
level dialogue in the sector − namely, a 10-year-old agreement called the Science and Technology 
Bilateral  Co-operation  Agreement,  which  facilitated  the  dialogue  in  the  context  of  the  strategic 
partnership between the EU and SA. Similarly, the European Parliament and South African Parliament 
have conducted bi-annual Inter-Parliamentary Dialogue meetings since 1994. (Indicator 1.2.2) 
4.1.3  Adaptation of the SBS design to the context (JC1.3) 
The design of SBS operations has substantially evolved during the period evaluated, responding to 
several dimensions of the context, in particular:  
  Evolution in the co-operation framework: an increasing recognition of budget support as the 
preferred  modality  can  be  observed  in  the  overall  EU  development  co-operation  policy 
framework (e.g. 2005 EU Consensus on development and, in the Development Co-operation 
Instrument established in 2007) and also in the SA-EU co-operation framework (e.g. 2003-2006 
                                                       
21 In the financing agreement of the programme ‘Innovation for poverty alleviation’. 
22 The expected results of the ’TDCA facility’ programme are: Result 1 - Improved sectoral policy dialogue and co-
operation between the EU and South Africa; Result 2: Increased institutional capacity to help implement the areas 
of co-operation of the TDCA and the Strategic Partnership Action Plan. 
23 http://www.dialoguefacility.org/  15 
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& 2007-2013 Joint Country Strategy Papers, 2007 Strategic Partnership). This evolution can 
also  be  linked  to  the  greater  attention  paid  in  the  overall  international  aid  framework  to 
modalities using country systems, as highlighted in the (Rome/Paris/Accra/Busan) High Level 
Forums. This evolution has led to an increase in the overall and individual allocations related to 
SBS operations in South Africa.  
  Evolution  in  the  national  policy  framework:  The  move  from  ‘institutional  support’  type 
programmes focusing on one department (e.g. MSB I or RCF) to broader sector approaches 
(e.g. MSB III or Employment Creation) led to changes in the organisation and implementation 
procedures of SBS operations, and the fact that the framework for conditionality and policy 
dialogue would apply to wider sets of national stakeholders and sectoral issues. Similarly, the 
increased attention paid to results in international co-operation and in the South Africa policy 
environment is reflected in a greater number of performance indicators focusing on the results 
level. 
  Development of EU standards and approaches to SBS: The BS guidelines introduced by 
the EU in 2002 and 2007 strongly shaped the design of SBS  operations − for example, by 
introducing the use of variable tranches or standardising the duration of the operations. In a 
number of cases, these evolutions were also taken into account in ongoing SBS operations 
through the introduction of riders. 
  Evolution  in  the  national  ODA  management  framework:  Together  with  the  2007  EU  BS 
guidelines,  the  national  ODA  framework  (draft  version,  2007)  contributed  to  the  fact  that 
sectoral dialogue and donor co-ordination became explicit general or specific conditions in most 
of the SBS operations launched after 2007. 
There is also some evidence that the evolution in the design of SBS operations is partially linked to the 
integration of lessons learned from previous experience of EU-funded SBS or non-SBS operations in 
South Africa and elsewhere. The integration of such lessons was especially important with regard to the 
definition of the scope of the operations, 
including thematic issues to be covered, 
and actors to be involved. (see JC1.1) On 
the other hand, these lessons learned do 
not seem to have affected the design of 
the  operations  in  terms  of  duration, 
overall  amount  allocated,  or  type  and 
number  of  conditions,  especially  when 
compared to the aforementioned factors. 
Changes  in  such  areas  have  indeed 
taken  place  (see  Table  6),  but  they  are 
primarily  linked  to  evolutions  in  the 
context  (including  the  co-operation 
framework and the EU approach to BS - 
see dimensions highlighted above) rather 
than  to  a  direct  transfer  of  lessons 
learned. 
In  terms  of  mix  of  inputs
24,  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  SBS  operations  have 
mainly focused on the delivery of financial 
inputs. Some form of dialogue is usually 
foreseen  in  the  SBS  Financing 
Agreements  (FAs),  but  references  often 
remain  general,  despite  the  CSP  (2003) 
stating  that  the  MIP  2000-2002  has 
introduced the BS modality, inter alia, with a view to ‘strengthen policy dialogue’. In several instances, 
reference is made to ‘sectoral dialogue’, ‘policy dialogue’ or just ‘dialogue’, without detailing what this 
would entail (see the discussion under EQ2).  
Finally, Technical Assistance/Capacity Development (TA/CD) aspects are often explicitly mentioned in 
the initial design of SBS operations, and this is addressed in a variety of ways − as illustrated in the box 
                                                       
24 In the case of SBS operations, three types of inputs are usually distinguished: transfer of funds, policy dialogue, 
and complementary support (such as TA/CD). 
Functional definition of key terms 
Definitions are functional to a correct understanding of the text 
and do not intend to replace international definitions where they 
exist or provide new interpretations of existing concept. 
Capacity  Development  (CD):  designates  the  process  of 
strengthening the targeted actors of a development action (final 
beneficiaries  or  institutions)  in  order  to  empower  them  and 
strengthen  both  their  operational  capabilities  and  their 
autonomous  initiative.  In  general  terms,  inputs  to  support  CD 
(normally TA, but not only) represent a basic component of a BS 
package, together with funds and policy dialogue. 
Capacity  building  (CD)  designates  approximately  the  same 
contents of Capacity Development, but putting less emphasis on 
its  dynamic  endogenous  processes.  Institutional  building  and 
institutional development are also used sometimes in the text as 
synonymous with slight differences. 
Technical  Assistance  (TA)  designates  the  mobilisation  of 
external expertise (be it national or international). According to 
the DAC and EU, TA should increasingly assume a CD function, 
and be run by recipient governments through the use of locally 
based resources.  Inputs and modalities other than TA may be 
used to support the acquisition of know-how in CD processes, 
such as: peer to peer inter-institutional exchanges, training, study 
tours, etc. The TA linked to the exchange of experience (see box 
next  page)  is  different  and  originates  from  the  Strategic 
Partnership and the objectives set for Development Cooperation. 16 
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below.  However,  TA/CD  is  not  mentioned  at  all  in  two  cases  (PrimEd  and  Innovation  for  Poverty 
alleviation).  Moreover,  TA/CD  is  foreseen  as  a  specific  SBS  component  (with  a  specific  financial 
allocation) only in a few cases (e.g. RCF I & II, PrimCare or Access to Justice). RCF and PrimCare are 
also the only cases where TA/CD is envisaged as a tool to facilitate exchange of high-level know-how 
on policy experimentation
25. In the other instances, it is usually envisaged that the TA/CD dimension will 
be dealt with directly by the department in charge of the supported programme, and, in these cases, 
TA/CD aspects relate mainly to the strengthening of the  capacities of the department or other sector 
actors (in areas such as M&E, human resources, planning & financial management). 
Box 1  How TA/CD features in the design of SBS operations in South Africa 
The  various  ways  in  which  TA/Capacity  Development  features  in  the  design  of  SBS  operations  can  be 
distinguished according to the content and objectives of the TA/CD action as foreseen in the FA and the actual 
way TA/CD was integrated in the design framework. 
In terms of content and objectives, four broad cases can be identified
26: 
  TA/CD provided to facilitate exchange of high-level know-how on policy experimentation − e.g. SARRAH 
programme supported under the PrimCare operation
27 or the EIB support provided under the RCF 
operations. 
  TA/CD provided to strengthen the capacities of the institution leading the SBS-supported programme 
(capacities in terms of, for example, M&E, HR & financial management) − e.g. MSB, Legislative or 
Access to Justice).  
  TA/CD provided to facilitate the actual implementation of a component of the SBS-supported programme 
(such as the preparation of calls for proposals) − e.g. Access to Justice. 
  TA/CD provided to strengthen the capacities of other sector actors (such as decentralised bodies, CSOs, 
service providers or private sector for planning, management) − e.g. PrimCare, MSB, RCF. 
In terms of the integration of this TA/CD support in the initial design of the SBS, there are also four broad cases:  
  TA/CD as a specific component: case where there is an explicit ‘component’ of the operation with a 
specific EU-funded envelope planned for it − e.g. PrimCare, Access to Justice, RCF. 
  TA/CD as a specific condition: case where there is no explicit financial allocation planned in the FA, but 
the FA mentions that a ‘TA/CD system’ should be established by GoSA during the implementation of the 
SBS-supported programme − e.g. MSB III. 
  TA/CD as a key result area (KRA): case where TA/CD is considered as a KRA with sometimes, in older 
SBS, an indication on the specific allocation of funds to achieve this result (the FA indicates that x% of 
the SBS funds should be used for this KRA); this case is very similar to the above but does not relate 
directly to a specific condition − e.g. eThekwini or MSB I. 
  General mention to TA/CD: case where the FA mentions a TA/CD dimension in the SBS-supported 
programme (which could be provided by consultants recruited by the lead department in charge of the 
programme, a national organisation or a CSO), but does not consider it either as an input or as an output 
of the SBS operation. 
It is worth noting that the classification proposed above is fully in line with the definition of technical assistance 
provided in the SA ODA Guidelines, i.e. “Technical assistance is the provision of resources aimed at the transfer 
of technical and managerial skills and knowledge and technology for the purpose of building capacity to undertake 
development activities. Most commonly, TA takes the form of the placement of technical experts in a recipient 
institution on a short or long-term basis.” 
28 
 
A major evolution in terms of mix of inputs concerns the various attempts to address the participation of 
CSOs in the supported programmes, to integrate and strengthen public service delivery and also to 
                                                       
25 It is noteworthy that the Legislative SPSP also implicitly envisages high-level exchange of know-how via co-
operation activities between international Parliaments and parliamentary bodies. 
26 The expertise to be  mobilised for ‘evaluations and reviews’ is sometimes referred to in the FAs as technical 
support, but this case is not included in this analysis. 
27 Support provided in the form of a contribution agreement (€ 6 M allocation) to DFID. 
28  Sources:  The  Policy  Framework  &  Operational  Guidelines  for  the  Management  of  Official  Development 
Assistance; IDC, National Treasury, 2011; p. 73; and Sector Budget Support in South Africa: Introduction to EU 
Funding Modalities; IDC, National Treasury, 2011, p. 11 “Where specified TA funds are included in the financing 
agreement specific component in the classification provided in the box, they may be managed by the EU under 
centralised management, or by South Africa under decentralised management using EU procurement procedures. 
This management of the TA budget line includes deciding on the TA requirements, preparing ToRs, procuring TA, 
managing  the  TAs  technically  and contractually  and  making  payments against  the  TA  contracts. Where  TA  is 
provided, not as a separate budget line but through specific conditions under the SBS portion of the financing 
agreement, then South African government procurement procedures are used.”  17 
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address  specific  governance  and  public  service  delivery  failures.  An  important  component  directly 
targeting CSOs was included in the SBS package of two recently-launched SBS operations (Access to 
Justice and PrimCare). A third SBS operation (MSB III) also integrated the participation of CSOs in the 
Water Sector as a KRA. This evolution can be linked to: 
  the importance of actively promoting the participation of this type of stakeholders in national 
development actions, as highlighted in the lessons emerging from previous programmes;  
  the significant decrease in the EU portfolio of the direct support provided to CSOs (which are 
traditionally important recipients in the ‘project aid’ approach). 
The table below provides additional information on the most notable evolutions in SBS design that took 
place during the period evaluated. It highlights three sub-periods. (Indicators 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) 
Table 6  Overview of major evolutions in SBS design during the evaluation period 
Phases and Main features of SBS operations 
2000-2003 − Period I: First experiences with BS modality  
SBS operations: MSB I; The e-Justice Programme; RCF I; Support to eThekwini Municipality; SWEEEP I  
During the period, five SBS operations were launched, covering the following four sectors: Water, Justice, 
Private Sector/Employment, and Urban Renewal. Average allocation: approximately € 40 M. 
They are all rather ‘focused’ programmes, paying special attention to an institution (e.g. DoJ, dti), a geographic 
area (e.g. MSB I focused on three provinces), or a policy instrument (e.g. RCF).  
Moreover, the original design of the operations closely resembled the design of a standard ‘project aid’ 
modality. The overall description of the programmes, as depicted in the FAs, details not only the objectives and 
results, but also activities (and a logframe). Details are also provided with regard to the organisation and 
implementation procedures to be followed (e.g. Steering Committee, Project Manager). The incentive 
dimension is not strongly developed. The use of variable tranche and performance indicators is only 
introduced in the last two operations (SWEEEP and through a rider in the case of eThekwini). Tranches are 
usually released upon the presentation of proof of compliance with general conditions, mainly related to the 
correct implementation of the programme, and the financial soundness of the institution/programme supported. 
That said, the design varies greatly from one operation to another, as illustrated by the different durations of 
the programmes (some programmes were planned to last five or even seven years) or the number of tranches 
(varying from two tranches in the case of RCF I to five in the case of the Support to eThekwini Municipality).  
This variety of design is largely explained by the fact that no standard approach to budget support had been 
developed at that time. These operations were part of the first ‘SBS’ designed by the EU worldwide and mainly 
built on the experience gained in the programme-based operations previously implemented in South Africa.  
2004-2007 − Period II: Adaptation & extension 
SBS operations: MSB II; RCF II; Urban Renewal Programme in Eastern Cape; Partnerships for Health II; SWEEEP II 
During this period, five SBS operations were launched, covering the following four sectors: Water, Health, 
Private Sector/Employment and Urban Renewal.  
As in the previous sub-period, the average financial allocation is around € 40 M.  
Four of the operations are actually an extension of previous EU-funded sector programmes (PfHII, SWEEEP 
II, RCF II, MSB II) and, for the Urban Renewal Programme in Eastern Cape, the design is a direct adaptation of 
the design of the Urban Development Support to eThekwini Municipality launched in the previous sub-period. This 
continuity explains why the design is still flavoured by ‘project aid’.  
That said, the use of variable tranches is more frequent, although still not systematic. Most SBS operations now 
clearly distinguish between general conditions (macro-economic stability, existence of a sector policy or sound 
PFM system) and specific conditions (e.g. M&E system in place or positive outcome of an MTR). 
These evolutions were mainly influenced by four elements: (i) the 2002 EU Budget Support guidelines
29; (ii) the 
“Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the Management of ODA” established by GoSA in 2003; (iii) the 
2003-2006 EU-SA country strategy paper; (iv) the experience gained in the SBS launched during the first period. 
2008-2011 − Period III: Standardisation & expansion 
SBS operations: MSB III; Innovation for Poverty Alleviation; Legislative SPSP; Access to Justice; Employment 
Creation; PrimEd; PrimCare. 
During this period, seven SBS operations were launched, covering  all focus areas of the EU-SA co-operation 
strategy. The sub-period is characterised by a substantial increase in the overall financial allocation, with four 
SBS operations having a budget over € 100 M. In addition, two of these programmes (MSB III and Employment 
Creation) are designed to cover a wider scope going beyond the realms of a specific line department. 
Participation of CSOs is ensured via the inclusion of a KRA (e.g. MSB III) or the integration of a specific 
complementary support (Access to Justice and PrimCare) in the SBS package. 
The design uses a standard duration (three or four years maximum) and follows a standard tranche release 
structure (‘three fixed + two variable’ tranches). All SBS operations include a variable component. 
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Phases and Main features of SBS operations 
The reference to financial audits of the supported GoSA programmes or other implementation procedures 
disappears, and there is a greater emphasis on results (with the last three programmes launched having a 
higher number of key performance indicators focusing on the results level, compared to indicators on processes 
and outputs).  
Finally, sectoral dialogue appears clearly in the design, with the majority of SBS operations using the existence 
of adequate structure for sectoral dialogue as a specific condition. 
These evolutions were mainly influenced by four elements: (i) the 2007 EU guidelines on SPSP and GBS
30; (ii) 
the 2007-2013 EU-SA country strategy paper; (iii) the further development of the national ODA framework (2008 
Treasury Guidelines for the management of ODA) and evolutions in the national policy framework; (iv) the 
experience gained in the SBS launched in the previous periods. 
Finally,  most  SBS  operations  have  been  implemented  with  an  important  degree  of  flexibility.  In 
particular, for 13 of the 16 SBS operations, the initial financial agreement was amended during the 
implementation period
31. In eight cases, the riders bring modifications to the performance assessment 
matrix (e.g. inclusion of a new result area, amendment of specific indicators, targets or sources of 
information). In five cases, the riders include a period extension. In four  cases, the riders introduce a 
budget re-allocation.  
While, in some instances (e.g. e -Justice, URP Eastern Cape), these changes illustrate an ambitious 
initial design of the performance matrix in terms of implementation period or targets, in most cases (e.g. 
IPA, ECF, MSB II), they reflect an adaptive process to a changing policy and institutional environment. 
(Indicator 1.3.4) 
   
                                                       
30 Precise references: 2007, EuropeAid “Tools and Methods Series - Guidelines on the Programming, Design & 
Management  of  General  Budget  Support”;  2007,  EuropeAid  “Tools  and  Methods  Series  -  Support  to  Sector 
Programmes (Covering the three financing modalities: Sector Budget Support, Pool Funding, project procedures)”. 
31 There was no rider for only the following three interventions: SWEEEP, MSB III and Access to Justice. 19 
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4.2  EQ2 (Step 1) - Policy Dialogue, TA and H&A 
Evaluation  Question  2:  To  what  extent  has  policy  dialogue  taken  place  and  evolved  in  the 
context  of  BS  operations,  including  exchange  of  information  and  experience  on  respective 
commitments  and  forward  looking  issues,  and  to  what  extent  has  it  profited  from  the  wider 
dialogue structure provided by the TDCA and the Strategic Partnership, and of specific Capacity 
Development/Technical Assistance inputs integrated in the framework of the programmes? 
To what extent has it led to greater harmonisation and alignment and reduced transaction costs 
of external assistance? 
This  EQ  looks  at  the  direct  effects  of  the  SBS  non-financial  inputs:  the  structure,  opportunities, 
management and contents of the policy dialogue and the performance framework; the quality and use 
of TA/capacity development inputs; and the direct contribution of these to harmonisation, alignment, 
reduction of transaction costs and co-ordination/complementarities among EU policies and actors and 
other donors. 
The  evaluation  work  has  highlighted  the 
absence  of  a  codified  definition  of  policy 
dialogue,  despite  the multiple references to 
policy  dialogue  in  the  EU-SA  strategic  and 
programming  documents  since  the  year 
2000 (see box on the right). 
There is a complex architecture for political 
and policy dialogue in the framework of the 
EU-SA  TDCA  and  Strategic  Partnership, 
which  presents  important  opportunities  for 
development  co-operation  that  still  need  to 
be  fully  deployed  and  optimally  exploited. 
There is no shortage of areas of co-operation 
that are highly relevant for policy dialogue, in 
terms of shared priorities, lessons learnt and 
innovation.  A  real  dialogue  on  policies  and 
related measures, however, is still limited to 
the  decision/identification  and  M&E  of  the 
SBS
32. Its level, scope and depth in most 
areas are not yet aligned to the potential of 
either  the  actual  EU -SA  political  and 
economic  relationships,  or  the  existing 
strategic  partnership   and  the  related 
instruments. 
TA and capacity development inputs are almost completely delegated to GoSA and , exceptionally, to 
the relevant NSAs (e.g. Access to Justice), in the framework of the SBS-supported programmes. TA is 
mainly considered as a tool for operational and technical support, which may easily be  deployed by 
GoSA at national level, where high-level TA is available. TA as an exchange of institutional, policy and 
research  experiences  between  SA  and  EU  partners  is  not  considered  by  the  two  parties  in  SBS 
identification, apart from a few exceptions in recent years. 
The  SBS  performance  assessment  frameworks,  as  their  overall  policy  and  institutional  set-up,  are 
strongly  aligned  to  GoSA  and  other  national  counterparts’  priorities  and  systems.  By  using  and 
reinforcing national systems, SBS contributes to strengthening sectoral approaches and, in this way, 
harmonisation. Complementarities with other EU policies are present in some SBS, but are not sought 
and  promoted  systematically.  Co-ordination  and  synergies  with  EU  member  states  and  other  main 
donors are not significant, apart from the existing government-driven consultation framework at sectoral 
level. 
                                                       
32 It is important to note that there is no codified definition of policy dialogue, despite the multiple references to 
policy dialogue in the EU-SA strategic and programming documents since 2000. A specific definitional framework 
was therefore agreed upon in this evaluation based on the policy dialogue to take place at the broader level of the 
strategic  partnership  and  the  specific  policy  dialogue  directly  linked  to  BS,  as  a  basic  component  of  the  BS 
package. In particular, at BS level, policy dialogue helps identify the specific sector policy support programmes, 
define the performance assessment framework of the FAs and assess their KPI.  
Definition issues on dialogue 
In general terms,  it is possible to define policy dialogue between 
development  co-operation  partners  as  being  the  exchange  of 
experiences  and  ideas  between  the  partners  about  development 
policies  and  measures  at  macro  and/or  sectoral  level,  to  be 
supported in a given development context
1. Political dialogue is a 
different matter: the attempts to define it on the basis of the subjects 
addressed are not convincing, as “it is difficult to specify exactly what 
should count for a political thing” (Political Dialogue: Theories and 
Practices, edited by Stephen L. Esquith, Rodopi 1996, p.11). One 
might say that the dialogue between co-operation partners becomes 
political when it affects  directly their interests and  positions. In all 
other  cases,  the  dialogue  remains  on  policies,  with  regard  to  an 
exchange of ideas and advice without global political implications − 
such as the establishment of a treaty, an international agreement or 
an official statement. According to such definitions, it is possible to 
have either a political or a policy dialogue on most of the subjects, 
including  economic  development,  peace  and  security,  trade,  and 
human rights. Of course, some of these areas are more politically 
sensitive  than  others,  so  a  frequent  shift  from  policy  to  political 
dialogue, and vice versa, is necessary. 
In South Africa, a wide use of the term ‘sector dialogue’ is made to 
refer to various policy dialogues carried out between the GoSA and 
its domestic partners at sectoral level. This dialogue is very relevant 
for − and even involves − the international partners, especially when 
they adopt a sector-wide approach. It remains, however, mainly a 
national exercise and should not be confused with policy dialogue 
between national and international partners. 20 
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4.2.1  Dialogue architecture (JC2.1), different processes and approaches (JC2.2) 
The dialogue structure 
The development co-operation between SA and the EU relies on a broader partnership framework. 
Over time, both parties have put in place a rich policy and institutional architecture (see Figure 3) to 
manage the partnership. 
Figure 3  EU-SA Dialogue Framework 
 
Source: Adapted from TDCA facility (2010): Study on the EU Institutional and Policy Framework, and its link with 
the dialogue areas under the SA-EU Strategic Partnership 
The TDCA (which was proposed in 1999, and entered into force in 2004) provided the legal basis for a 
multifaceted co-operation in a wide range of areas, and was underpinned by a regular political dialogue 
at  various  levels.  In  2006,  a  qualitative  leap  forward  was  made  with  the  Strategic  Partnership  and 
related Joint Action Plan (JAP, 2007). It sought to reflect the enhanced role of South Africa at regional 
and international level, and to move from “political dialogue to active co-operation on issues of mutual 
interest  at  bilateral,  regional,  continental  and  global  levels”  (JAP,  p.  2).  The  Strategic  Partnership 
stresses that “in view of the special circumstances in South Africa, the real value added by ODA is not 
only the finance itself, but what comes from it − namely, best practice, innovation, risk-taking, pilot 
programmes, systems development, capacity building and, above all, skills and knowledge” (JAP, 2007, 
page 5). To respond to such challenges, the development co-operation has largely focused on policy 
dialogue since the beginning, as shown by the Regulation 1726/2000: “the Community shall implement 
financial and technical co-operation with South Africa to support the policies and reforms carried out by 
the South African authorities in a context of policy dialogue and partnership”. According to the CSP 
(2003), the MIP 2000-2002 has introduced the BS modality, inter alia, with a view to “strengthen policy 
dialogue”. 
Levels and types of dialogue 
What is, in practice, policy dialogue in the EU-SA context? Since the launch of the first BS operations 
(early  2000),  there  are  mainly  two  venues  (or  entry  points)  for  policy  dialogue  in  development  co-
operation between SA and the EU. Both affect BS operations, either directly or indirectly: 
  the TDCA-related policy dialogue, including its introduction in 1997 in the area of Science and 
Technology (S&T)
33; 
  the policy dialogue linked to BS, as a basic component of the BS package. 
                                                       
33 The S&T Cooperation Agreement was concluded in 1996 and entered into force in November 1997. 
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At the TDCA level, there are a lot of references to policy dialogue (PD) in the JCC since its inception 
and  in  the  Annual  Consultations,  and  PD  in  development  co-operation  is  very  much  promoted  in 
Education and Training, Health, Employment and Social Affairs, Crime and Justice, Energy, and ICT. 
Some  of  these  dialogues  continue  over  time  and/or  generate  specific  development  co-operation 
initiatives, as in S&T and Health. 
At the level of BS, a strong dialogue has taken place since the outset in the phases of programme 
design and performance assessment, even though the FAs − especially in the earliest phases − contain 
few explicit references to the PD. According to the BS guidelines, dialogue is a core element of the BS 
package and a centrepiece for mutual accountability. It has two distinct features: 
  First,  “it  provides  a  framework  to  take  stock  of  the  respective  commitments  and  to  assess 
progress on both sides”. 
  Second,  “it  can  be  used  as  a  forward-looking  tool”
34.  This  feature  must  be  adapted  to  the 
context. 
In SA, the focus of such a ‘forward-looking’ approach may be intended as: “exchanging experiences 
and  information  on  the  worldwide  best  practices,  models  and  approaches  regarding  the  policies 
supported, so that the partners can learn from each other and eventually strengthen the respective 
knowledge base and capacity”
35. This definition demarcates an area where the evaluation team has 
found common ground among the parties. It can be used to look at both the past opportunities and the 
future challenges. 
SBS-related dialogue: features and constraints 
a.  The features 
The dialogue at the level of BS has materialised and evolved in different ways according to the different 
programmes  and  periods.  The  ‘First  feature’  has  been  interpreted  more  or  less  dynamically  (for 
example, in the Water sector, until 2006, there was a strong informal dialogue, less so in SWEEEP and 
ECF, and there has been a rich exchange in the Governance sector). The ‘Second feature’ has been 
partly addressed in the Governance programmes, in Health, and S&T, and more specifically in most 
recent SBS programmes such as LSPSP, PrimCare and IPA. 
Matching  the  two  features  (TDCA/Partnership  and  BS  operations)  is  a  big  challenge  with  a  lot  of 
implications for the future. Until now, there are only two main examples: 
  The Health programme PrimCare (2011-2015), where a well-designed SBS has allowed a high 
level  of  transfer  of  know-how  on  the  national  health  insurance  (NHI)  system,  involving  the 
TDCA and SARRAH facilities. 
  The IPA programme (2008-2013), which has followed the opposite route (from the TDCA to 
SBS)  and  represents  an  application  of  a  high-level  dialogue  in  S&T.  As  the  Joint  S&T 
Committee  of  2011  states:  “regular  policy  dialogue  in  science,  technology  and  innovation, 
[supports] mutually beneficial learning to be gained from these exchanges. Both sides agreed 
that  South  Africa  and  the  European  Union  shared  a  significant  number  of  science  and 
technology policy priorities and challenges, especially with regard to harnessing innovation for 
economic competitiveness and increased social cohesion.” 
b.  The constraints 
Combining two such features should have been the consequence of both the dialogue architecture and 
the BS implementation, but several factors explain the gap between the institutional arrangements for 
dialogue ‘on paper’ and ‘in reality’: 
  High-level ambitions versus day-to-day realities and expectations of actors on the ground. A 
number  of  factors  limit  the  actual  implementation  of  policy  dialogue,  among  them:  (i)  the 
Government  of  South  Africa  is  reluctant  to  address  sensitive  issues  related  to  policy 
                                                       
34 New Guidelines (2012) op. cit., p.31. The previous Guidelines (2006/7) do not change very much on dialogue, 
compared with the 2002/3 version. They stress that BS “will be accompanied by dialogue on the overall policy and 
strategy,  and  on  the  functioning  of  public  financial  management.  Furthermore,  dialogue  frequently  leads  to 
agreement on support for capacity development as an important accompanying measure” (page 11), and SBS − 
namely, “focus on the sectoral development and reform policy and strategy” (page 14). Dialogue is seen as an 
input of BS, together with, for example, disbursement criteria or capacity development. (page 25).  
35 This definition found a preliminary consensus among the relevant stakeholders in the RG meeting of Monday, 
May 20
th. The definition keeps the wide scope of the dialogue (policies and strategies) as in the aforementioned 
Guidelines, but highlights two issues that are considered very important in South Africa: reciprocal learning, and the 
fact that the dialogue on policies should avoid any donors’ intrusion in national implementation processes. 22 
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implementation  with  external  actors  –  preferring  to  refer  to  ‘sectoral  dialogue’,  which  is  a 
process involving the national stakeholders in a given sector, extended to external partners for 
co-ordination  purposes;  (ii)  the  proposals  for  policy  exchanges  and  dialogue  from  the  EU 
partners in charge of development co-operation are, in many cases, limited to the shape and 
contents of the individual support programmes; and (iii) apart from the TDCA facility, there are 
few  instruments  and  incentives  to  facilitate  the  identification  and  actual  implementation  of 
opportunities for policy exchanges between national and EU partners, including the know-how 
of Member States and DGs. 
It  should  be  considered  that  the  Strategic  Partnership  is  different  from  an  Association 
Agreement (such as the ones the EU undertakes with some South-Mediterranean countries), 
where the co-operation on, for example, policy reforms and regulatory standards is part of an 
interstate treaty. In such cases, the EU and the partner country are required to work together 
towards selected joint policy objectives. In the case of the EU-SA Strategic Partnership, the 
possible  value  added  of  the  dialogue  on  policies  and  strategies  should  be  demonstrated 
through in-depth exchanges of experience to produce mutual benefits (see the experience of 
the highly relevant − although still at an initial stage − EU-funded ‘Dialogue Facility’). 
  Unclear status of policy dialogue. As both a consequence and a cause of the issues raised 
above, there is lack of clarity on what policy dialogue really entails. Strategic and programme 
documents  are  relatively  detailed  on  political  dialogue  (including  themes,  objectives  and 
venues),  while  policy  dialogue  is  generally  addressed  in  vague  terms,  and  there  is  no 
orientation on how it translates into specific sector policy dialogues. 
  Delivering effective policy experimentation. The strong traction and interest on the part of South 
African side in widening the scope of policy innovation and experimentation opens a window of 
opportunity to discuss policies and programmes with the EU in the framework of development 
co-operation. Yet, it has proved challenging to use this potential optimally, although practices 
vary widely across sectors. The task at hand for both parties is to clarify the linkages between 
policy experimentation, budget support, and policy dialogue. 
  Unclear  mandate.  Although  the  dialogue  is  supposed  to  be  dealt  with  formally  within  the 
structures of the NT (annual consultations) and the South African government’s DIRCO (JCC, 
Summit and their related dialogue processes), at programme level the situation is less clear. 
Key policy documents regarding SBS operations do not always provide sufficient guidance as 
to what is expected from policy dialogue or the way in which the process should be conducted, 
including  how  to  address  the  various  dialogue  instruments  theoretically  available.  Thus, 
financing agreements tend to differ substantially in terms of: (i) incentives provided for dialogue; 
(ii) clarity on the scope and functions of dialogue: (iii) specification of process modalities. (see 
Indicators 2.1.1 & 2.1.2) 
The EUD has recently started to adopt a more ‘structured approach’ to policy dialogue by introducing 
the practice of compiling an overview of dialogue instances linked to ongoing SBS operations, which 
highlights a mixed track record. This stock-taking exercise at programme level is a starting point, but is 
not sufficient to strengthen policy dialogue, as the EU should demonstrate to its national counterparts 
that it has interesting and relevant sectoral experiences, policy solutions and proposals to share with 
the South African side, before asking to discuss any specific application at programme level. 
c.  The dialogue in the preparatory phases 
The dialogue has been instrumental in the preparation of the SBS, permitting the consolidation of the 
common ground for confidence and shared experience on  which  SBS has been built, according  to 
various ways: 
  A  long  history  of  co-operation  in  the  Water  sector  and  a  good  understanding  (dialogue) 
between the operational partners has led to the launch of the first SBS operation, with a view to 
testing  new  institutional  and  policy  approaches.  The  EU  side  brought  in  models  and 
experiences in the design phase that contributed to the strategic relevance of the supported 
programme (MSB). Then a climate of close collaboration and informal dialogue facilitated the 
implementation  and  the  learning  process,  at  least  in  the  first  phases.  A  long,  positive 
experience  of  co-operation  through  different  projects  was  also  brought  to  the  SBS  in  the 
Education sector, although the effects on strategic exchanges have been greatly limited. 
  In the Governance Sector, the EU experience and dialogue with NSAs on sensitive issues and 
project support to government in complex matters (Access to Justice and LSPSP) have created 
a special trust between the partners, and have gradually  triggered  a  bilateral  (LSPSP) and 
tripartite (Access to Justice, with the participation of NSAs) dialogue, leading to SBS operations 
in the Justice and Legislative sectors, with significant strategic implications. 23 
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  The traction and dynamism in a specific area linked to wider thematic/political co-operation has 
triggered the definition of an SBS in the area of Science and Technology (IPA), and has opened 
up perspectives for strategic extension of the dialogue. 
  Political dialogue has identified Employment as a key priority and has triggered specific SBS 
under the development co-operation umbrella (SWEEEP, RCF, ECF), but the policy dialogue 
following the launch of these operations  has not translated such political  priority  into actual 
exchanges of experiences and expertise. 
d.  The dialogue as a tool to enhance the learning process 
The dialogue has been a tool to expand the lessons from SBS supported programmes: 
  In Justice, Legislative, and Health, there are clear opportunities and some attempts to extend 
the  scope  of  dialogue  from  the  SBS-supported  programmes  to  encompass  wider  sector 
performance and strategies, including international models and cross-sector issues, but there is 
a limited range of tools and procedures to achieve that. 
  In the Private Sector Development and Employment area (e.g.  ECF, SWEEEP), there is little 
connection  between  the  wide  strategic  priorities  addressed  in  the  political  dialogue  and  the 
rather  narrow  operational  dialogue  at  programme  level.  Opportunities  and  modalities  to 
enhance such connection are not identified. 
  There are cases where the EUD has tried to improve the link between SBS dialogue and the 
broader  strategic  partnership  dialogue  by  increasing  the  internal  co-ordination  between  the 
Operational Section, which co-ordinates the SBS operations, and the Political Economic and 
Trade Section, which operates in similar areas (e.g. Justice and Legislative). 
  There are also cases where SA has pushed for the inclusion in the SBS of a wider strategic 
component, as in the Health sector (Health Insurance and Regulatory Health models). Such an 
extension has been made possible by the existence of several opportunities, such as expertise 
on Health Insurance systems made available via a DFID TA mechanism, and the contribution of 
the TDCA Dialogue Facility to organise thematic workshops. 
In general, the experience of the SBS operations generates lessons that may feed wider policy thinking 
and dialogue for national and international learning (e.g. Water, Innovation for Poverty Alleviation, and 
the significance of their lessons for other African countries), but such a task goes beyond the scope and 
resources of the individual programmes. (see Indicator 2.1.3) 
Interests at stake, and evolution over time 
The key policy documents related to TDCA and Strategic Partnership stress the existence of a wide 
range of common interests between the two partners at bilateral, regional, continental or global level. 
This  is  based,  among  others,  on  economic  grounds,  including  the  fact  that  the  EU  is  SA’s  main 
economic trade partner, with 27% of the total SA trade value in 2011
36. The common interest in Africa’s 
development and stabilisation is another strong driving factor of the EU-South Africa relationship. The 
aid envelope provided in the last planning period, 2007-2013, although relatively marginal compared to 
the GDP, also provides incentives for setting up particular forms of dialogue. On the other hand, there 
are also divergent interests and positions, related to various historical and geopolitical factors
37. (see 
Indicator 2.2.1) 
The JAP (2007) recognises that: i) the objective of dialogue is not necessarily to reach an agreement on 
each and every issue, but to better understand the other’s position; and ii) that policy dialogue is, by 
definition, “an evolutionary process” (JAP, p. 3). 
Apparently,  the  will  and  interest  to  engage  in  policy  dialogue  on  both  sides  of  the  partnership  are 
diversified, particularly in development co-operation (see Indicators 2.2.1 to 2.2.5): 
  South  Africa  seems  rather  interested  in  attracting  know-how  and,  partly,  funds  for  policy 
experimentation: (i) with respect to know-how, there is a wide interest by GoSA, at the higher 
levels,  and  among  policy  researchers  and  academia,  for  new  methods,  approaches,  and 
exchange of experiences with other countries to feed the ongoing country-wide policy research 
and debate − the success of the EU Dialogue Facility and the PSPPPD illustrating the high 
demand in this area; (ii) with respect to funds for innovation, the main interest comes from the 
GoSA departments, which seek the possibility of testing and developing the outputs of their 
                                                       
36 The EU is South Africa’s leading trade partners, with trade values double that of China, which is the second 
partner. In 2011, the EU provided 31.1% of the imports and absorbed 21.9% of the exports (EU/DGTRADE data). 
37 Inter alia, SA is part of the BRICS group, the interests of which do not always coincide with those of the EU. 24 
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internal policy research processes. Most SBS respond to this second type of demand, which is 
very strong and important, although it is less open to policy debate and exchange. 
  The EU seems interested in providing two major types of inputs. First, policy support inputs to 
strengthen  selected  objectives  and  priorities  in  government  policies  (e.g.  employment  in 
disadvantaged areas; CSOs participation; gender equality; building participatory democracy). 
These  are  the  CSP  priorities,  which  –  within  the  EUD  and  in  Brussels  –  are  particularly 
supported  by  DEVCO/EEAS.  Second,  there  is  also  a  certain  interest  in  other  types  of 
contributions and supply, less directly linked to the actual policy support, but with a stronger 
‘strategic dimension’, such as: social cohesion policies and existing models to fight inequality; 
more  equitable  tax  policies;  competitive  and  equitable  higher  education.  The  institutional 
support (or, better, the mandate) for this type of supply is weaker compared with the former, but 
not absent, as shown by the existence of specific actions (Dialogue Facility and PSPPPD). Its 
delivery also depends on various actors, not limited to DEVCO, and including other DGs and 
Member States. Practice suggests that the EUD faces considerable challenges in mobilising 
expertise for policy experimentation and dialogue from these actors – thus potentially reducing 
the capacity of the EU to use policy dialogue as a fully-fledged co-operation instrument. 
The present development  co-operation is characterised by two features. First,  there  is a significant 
matching between the GoSA departments’ demand for funds and the policy support packages proposed 
by  EU/DEVCO,  mainly  in  the  form  of  SBS.  Despite  the  very  suitable  nature  of  SBS,  however,  the 
dialogue and exchange of experience in this type of co-operation is mainly limited to the management 
of the individual programmes (PAF, M&E, etc.). Indeed, the GoSA departments are reluctant to move 
towards a policy dialogue that could encroach on their policy choices and processes, and the EU does 
not have the means to make a broader dialogue appealing. Second, the other types of SA demand 
(development  know-how)  and  EU  supply  (strategic  themes  for  development)  materialise  in  specific 
programmes (Dialogue Facility and PSPPPD) which, despite their importance, do not find a connection 
with the bulk of the co-operation represented by the policy support programmes, SBS
38. 
There are meaningful examples, however, where such disconnection is partly mitigated. Water, Justice, 
Legislative,  the Private Sector ( RCF,  IPA),  Health  and  are  all  sectors  where,  especially  with  the 
development of sound ground for trust between the parties, broader policy issues have been addressed 
and partly developed in the dialogue, such as: institutional reorganisation at sectoral level (MSB in the 
Water sector); sub-sector strategies (RCF to finance Small and Medium Enterprises − SMEs); deep 
involvement of NSAs in pro-poor service delivery (Access to Justice); strengthening of the national and 
provincial representative  assemblies as pillars of the democratic process (LSPSP  in the Legislative 
sector); matching poverty reduction and applied research in science and technology (IPA); developing 
new approaches and models (PrimCare in the Health sector). 
In all such cases, the exchange of policy information and experience is significant, although it rarely 
goes beyond the scope of the implementation of the specific supported programmes, building on the 
opportunities provided by the Strategic Partnership (e.g. dialogue tables, Dialogue Facility), to identify 
and improve shared approaches and strategies. Indeed, the Strategic Partnership, with its focus on 
‘what  comes  from’  ODA  (i.e.  exchange  of  know-how),  would  allow  for  joint  strategic  thinking,  as  a 
complement  to  and  an  extension  of  the  supported  programmes,  with  a  view  to  strengthening  the 
respective positions on specific and general development matters, improving the knowledge base of the 
EU development co-operation policies, feeding the national policy debate, and sharing/extending ideas 
with/to  other  African  countries  (e.g.  innovation  and  poverty  reduction,  sectoral  reform  models  and 
experiences, participation of NSAs in service delivery). 
To do so, SBS should include, or should be combined with, explicit strategic dialogue components, 
including themes, expertise and work plans. So far, this has happened only with PrimCare
39, where the 
SBS has been closely combined with a Dialogue Facility initiative on the Health Insurance models, and 
with  high-level  expertise.  This  combination  has  not  been  planned  as  such,  but  it  has  been  the 
consequence of a strong initiative of the Ministry of Health, which has been able to use and put together 
various  instruments  and  opportunities  available  under  the  EU  co-operation.  The  very  good  results 
attained should provide a basis to systemise, and possibly replicate, the experience. 
                                                       
38 In the recent GBS, some advances in this respect have been made. The PSPPPD is integrated into the GBS 
package, although it is not yet clear if and how it will be a vehicle for effective policy exchange between the parties. 
39 In other sections of this report, Legislative and IPA are mentioned, as well as examples of combinations of SBS 
with other  partnership  instruments  (e.g. the Parliamentary dialogue, and the S&T dialogue) although, in such 
cases, the link is less direct than in PrimCare). 25 
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In the other mentioned cases, trust and opportunities are there, and the dialogue tackles matters that 
could be addressed at a broader strategic level, but there are no initiatives to materialise and expand 
such types of ‘forward-looking’ dialogue (see the dialogue categories according to the BS guidelines). 
The  attempt  to  match  SBS  with  high-level  exchanges  of  experience  has  been  hampered  also  by 
specific bottlenecks on the EU side, such as: i) often less than optimal understanding of the domestic 
policy processes, the relevant entry points, and interlocutors (including at decentralised level); ii) the 
lack of clarity on mandates and (facilitation) roles to be played by the EUD in policy dialogue processes; 
iii) the often limited possibilities to mobilise in a timely manner relevant internal and external expertise to 
engage in knowledge and exchange driven dialogue processes (reflected in the difficulties of getting 
effective support from other DGs); and iv) the way in which TA is addressed in SBS, which focuses on 
operational  issues  rather  than  policy  support.  On  the  GoSA  side,  constraints  other  than  the  ones 
mentioned above may relate to: (i) time constraints to prepare dialogue processes; and (ii) challenges 
to ensure internal co-ordination between various line ministries (e.g. Employment). 
4.2.2  The TA/CD component (JC2.3) 
Capacity development is very often one of the objectives pursued through the implementation of SBS-
supported programmes. That said, technical assistance or other capacity development measures are 
rarely included (embedded) within the SBS operations as one of the key components alongside the 
financial transfers. This is the case of: i) the RCF I & RCF II, which included an envelope for a TA 
facility whereby the EIB provided capacity development and supervision to the IDC; ii) the URP Eastern 
Cape,  which  included  an  envelope  for  a  Technical  Support  Facility  with  a  view  to  supporting  the 
functions of the National  and  Provincial Urban Renewal Programme; and iii)  in the  PrimCare  SBS, 
where a TA envelope has been included to acquire specific high-level EU expertise. (see Indicators 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2) 
In  all  other  cases,  although  capacity  development  is  a  key  focus  area  in  terms  of  priorities  of  the 
targeted government programmes, it is not addressed through a complementary – internal or external – 
input  of  the  SBS  package.  Since  most  of  the  supported  programmes  take  into  account  policy 
innovation, the TA and capacity development intensity is quite high in the majority of them. Apart from 
the mentioned cases (RCF, URP Eastern Cape and PrimCare, where it is a specific component, and in 
IPA, where there is no mention), the FAs refer to TA/CD in various forms. As described in Box 1 (see 
EQ1), TA/CD is sometimes mentioned in the FAs as a specific condition, an explicit objective in the 
KRA  or,  in  general  terms,  as  a  separate  TA/CD  support  which  could  be  provided  by  consultants 
recruited by the line Department, a national organisation, a CSO or another donor (in this case, TA/CD 
is not referred to as an output of the SBS operation in the FA). 
Overall,  technical  assistance  and  capacity  development  measures  directly  financed  by  the  EU 
amounted to € 15 M during the evaluation period − i.e. a small percentage (1.5%) of the overall funds 
provided by the EU in the form of SBS support,  with the bulk of funds taking the form of financial 
transfers to the Treasury. Only five of the 16 programmes considered included specific TA inputs. 
Looking at the content of the TA/CD as foreseen in the FAs, four broad cases can be identified
40 (see 
also Box 1 under EQ1). TA/CD can be provided to 
  strengthen the capacities of the Institution leading the SBS-supported programme/policy (M&E, 
HR & Financial management, etc.).  
  facilitate the actual implementation of a component of the SBS operation (e.g. preparation of 
call for proposals, etc.). 
  strengthen the capacities of other sector actors (such as decentralised bodies, CSOs, service 
providers or private sector for planning, management). 
  facilitate  exchange  of  high-level  know-how  on  policy  experimentation  –  e.g.  SARRAH 
programme under the SBS support to PrimCare or EIB support under RCF. In such cases, TA 
is closely linked to policy dialogue, especially to its ‘forward–looking’ dimension. 
In the FA of IPA, no specific mention of TA/CD exists, but activities during the implementation have 
actually been related to this aspect. For instance, the MTR mentions the organisation of workshops and 
the recruitment of experts from Europe to address specific issues, such as how to access funding. 
Moreover, the MTR mentions TA support being given by other donors. 
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In the Private Sector Development and Employment area, capacity development and TA activities were 
in-built  in  the  broader  GoSA  programmes  supported  by  SBS,  and  focused  on  specific  areas  for 
technical and institutional strengthening. However, only in the case of RCF I was the TA component 
financed through a complementary envelope of the SBS package and focused on matters of specific 
EU  value  added  (EIB  experience  with  SMEs).  As  a  result,  with  the  exception  of  RCF I,  the  areas 
addressed by TA did not lead to the exchange of know-how between the GoSA and the EU institutions 
involved but rather focused on the strengthening of the institutions involved (TA/CD mentioned either as 
a condition or as a KRA). 
In the Water Sector, no TA was provided as part of the SBS package, although TA was widely used for 
a  range  of  activities  throughout  the  government-led  (and  SBS-supported)  MSB  programme.  TA 
deployed  by  the  government  included  specialists  in  a  number  of  areas,  such  as  programme 
management,  monitoring  and  evaluation,  auditing,  financial  analysis,  economics  and  economic 
development, strategic analysis, business analysis, change management, organisational development, 
and policy analysis. In particular, in MSB III, TA extended its functions over all technical and institutional 
areas,  including  cross-cutting  issues.  All  such  TA  was  funded,  identified  and  managed  under  the 
responsibility of the GoSA. Again, there was no linkage between TA outputs and exchange of know-
how on policy experimentation. 
In the Governance Sector, technical assistance and capacity development show particular features: 
  In the case of Access to Justice, the largest part of the capacity development component is 
provided through FHR, which is a key partner in the programme and mobilises capacities with 
specialised civil society organisations for capacity development. Another capacity development 
component,  however,  is  provided  through  a  complementary  project:  the  EU-managed  CSO 
sub-component, which seeks to add value to the sector policy processes, but falls outside of 
government management systems. Strengthening capacities through both components of the 
Justice  to  All  programme  creates  synergies,  and  informs  policy  dialogue  and  partnership 
between the EUD, DoJCD and FHR. 
  In the LSPSP, TA and capacity development are an important input of the sector programme to 
strengthen  the  capacities  of  the  Legislative  Sector  (systems,  procedures,  policies)  −  for 
example, to improve public participation and fulfil more effectively oversight and law-making 
functions. There are no TA inputs within the SBS package, but there is space in the sector 
programme to benefit from expertise and exchanges with other legislative bodies, including the 
European Parliament. 
In the Health Sector, a specific allocation for TA is provided to finance the development of a model to 
involve General Practitioners in the District Health System (DHS). The TA has been contracted through 
a contribution agreement with DFID, which had initiated wider advisory support through its SARRAH 
programme. Interviews have highlighted a very positive role played by the TA, based on lessons from 
the EU and other international experiences. In addition, the TA is combined with some initiatives of the 
Dialogue Facility on Health Insurance and Regulatory Health. However, as the action started only in 
2012, it is too early for an evaluation. 
In the Urban Renewal Area, the EU-financed complementary TA provided as part of the SBS package 
in the URP Eastern Cape took the form of a Technical Facility with a view to supporting the national co-
ordination and support for urban renewal.  The TA facility was soundly grounded within the GoSA’s 
institutional structure and was managed by the Urban Renewal Unit within the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government (DPLG), with support being provided both in Pretoria and at provincial level in 
Bisho. As a result, the TA was indeed aligned with – and responded to –specific government priorities, 
although evidence collected points to the absence of linkages between the work of the TA and policy 
dialogue. It is also worth noting that the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality recruited – through the use of 
its own funds - a Technical and Operations Co-ordinator (TOC) responsible for the detailed planning, 
operation and management of the SBS operation and all related activities within the Municipality. (see 
also Indicators 2.2.3 and 2.2.4) 
In conclusion, TA/CD is a recurrent and significant component of the SBS-supported programmes, but 
is rarely addressed as a component (internal or external) of the SBS package. One of the reasons is 
probably because it is primarily aimed at the strengthening of the capacities of the institutions involved 
addressed through widely-available, high-level national resources and only exceptionally is it linked to 
an exchange of know-how between EU and South Africa. The actual exchange of know-how happens, 
through different modalities, in two sectors: (i) Justice, where the EU builds on its specific experience 
and historical links with CSOs specialising in  human rights; (ii) Health,  where a strong  and reform-
minded ministry,  with the  help of some favourable circumstances, has  been  able to combine  SBS, 
Dialogue Facility and high-level TA contributions towards strengthening the sectoral reform process. 27 
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4.2.3  Harmonisation & Alignment (JC2.4) 
In general, all ODA that flows to SA has to be aligned with the priorities of the GoSA. The government 
departments are always in the forefront and proactive in determining what they require ODA for, and 
ensuring that it is in line with their priorities. Co-ordination mechanisms among donors are also part of 
the sector co-ordination, and their effectiveness depends upon the role played by the GoSA to ensure a 
strong sector approach. 
There is evidence that SBS have established their performance indicators according to GoSA systems 
and  performance  matrices.  All  SBS  are  embedded  in  government  programmes  and  follow  their 
modalities in terms of institutional set-up, execution, monitoring, and control. The SBS alignment is 
stronger than in a project, as a project has its own institutional set-up (e.g. PIUs or PMUs, separate 
funds management) and, although it may be flexible and internalised, it responds to a direction chain 
and may reflect interests relatively external to the institutional framework in which it operates
41.  
That said, the contribution of SBS to improved harmonisation among donors i s limited. SBS does not 
influence the harmonisation framework per se . It may contribute to strengthen ing the sector approach 
(as in the Governance, Water and , partly, Health), and thereby contribute to the improvement of the 
harmonisation framework through its contribution to the policy processes, but this is not a direct effect of 
SBS. (see EQ5, as well as Indicators 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) 
The situation in the various sectors may be summarised as follows: 
  In  the  Private  Sector  and  Employment  area,  the  SBS  alignment  is  very  strong  and  the 
harmonisation is ensured by the economic cluster meetings and the sub-sector meetings, which 
are particularly frequent in the IPA area. 
  In the Water sector, the harmonisation among the donors is relatively strong, as a consequence 
of the GoSA engagement to ensure “high-level discussions on water sector progress between 
Government  and  donors”  (general  condition  4  of  the  SBS  support  to  MSB  III).  There  are, 
however, no separate formalised donor co-ordination mechanisms. Co-ordination was mainly 
done through the national sector co-ordination mechanisms, or bilaterally with GoSA. There are 
quarterly consultation and co-ordination meetings at national level, plus an annual water sector 
forum  in  each  of  the  nine  provinces.  Donors  did  participate  regularly  in  the  quarterly  MCC 
meetings, although their participation tailed off at the end of MSB. 
  In Access to Justice and LSPSP, the alignment and the harmonisation are a consequence of 
the strengthening of the sector and sub-sector approach. Through the co-ordination and lead 
roles that DoJCD has taken up in broader departmental clusters, the department’s co-ordination 
efforts  with  donors  become  more  relevant  as  this  also  creates  opportunities  for  cross-
departmental coherence. 
  In the Health sector, an aid effectiveness framework and an ODA Co-ordinating and Planning 
Forum, involving all relevant actors, were established in 2010
42. Such positive  developments 
cannot be attributed specifically to the SBS operations, although the adoption of this modality 
by the EU certainly has helped  to consolidate the direction taken by the GoSA, as stressed by 
the evaluation of the Paris declaration. 
  In the Education sector, as the EU is the main donor and most of the others have significantly 
reduced their engagement, the effects of SBS on harmonisation have been rather limited. 
  In the Urban Renewal area, donor co-ordination remains weak, and reviews of the relevant 
SBS  operations  often  called  for  improvements  in  this  area  –  together  with  improved  policy 
dialogue – as a condition for improvement of sector policy support programmes.  
4.2.4  Reduction of the transaction costs (JC2.5) 
It is generally assumed
43 that the use of SBS should lead to reduced transaction costs. 
                                                       
41 This may be a positive condition in some cases. There are important projects in SA that have performed well so 
far − for instance, PSPPPD. Such projects are useful to open up new policy areas, although their mainstreaming 
into the policy and institutional framework is complex. 
42 The aid effectiveness framework actually came into effect only on January 21st, 2011. 
43  See  ‘Harmonising  Donor  Practices  for  Effective  Aid  Delivery  -  Volume  2:  Budget  Support,  Sector  Wide 
Approaches  and  Capacity  Development  in  Public  Financial  Management’  (DAC  2006):  “Untying  aid  generally 
increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries and improving country ownership 
and alignment”, page 13. 28 
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In the Private Sector and Employment area, this general acknowledgement is shared especially for the 
alignment of the management systems (including reporting), but there is also concern that, in many 
cases,  there  may  be  a  potential/actual  increase  in  costs  to  some  departments  as  a  result  of  the 
following factors: 
  Delays  in  payment,  with  regard  to  the  Consumer  Protection  Commission  programme 
(SWEEEP). 
  Lack of clarity about procedures and conditionalities that have caused frustration, cash flow 
problems, and distrust (SWEEEP II). 
  Set-up of separate programme implementation units, as was the case for the implementation of 
the ECF and IPA within the mandated line departments − although, in the case of IPA, the 
implementation unit was later integrated into the main structure of the DST. RCF and SWEEEP, 
on the other hand, did not lead to the set-up of dedicated management units, and were both 
implemented  using  existing  government  structures,  thereby  leading  to  minimal  increases  in 
transaction costs. 
In the Water Sector, there is a strong evidence for the reduction of transaction costs − namely, for the 
alignment of MSB with the monitoring and reporting system of DWAF. For example: 
  PAF of MSB II and MSB III align to the Key Results Areas of DWAF and MSB reporting, thus 
feeding into DWA annual reporting. 
  Annual reports of MSB were a General Condition of the EC FAs for all three phases of MSB, as 
were annual sector plans. 
  All reporting was done by DWAF, with inputs from other key sector players; while the reporting 
on performance was shared (i.e. between sector players), there is little evidence that it was 
shared/joint with the EU Delegation. 
  All quarterly and annual monitoring reports and all independent evaluation studies conducted 
during all three phases of MSB were joint. 
In  the  Governance  Sector,  the  shift  from  project  support  to  SBS  modality  has  done  away  with  the 
separate PIUs in the Legislative Sector. This shift has also ensured EU alignment with functions and 
systems  of  the  DoJCD  and  the  Legislative  Sector,  such  as  administrative  and  policy  management, 
monitoring,  and  co-ordination.  It  has,  furthermore,  helped  to  rationalise  partnership  meetings  in  the 
Legislative  Sector,  as  communication  becomes  more  streamlined  and  there  is  less  ground  for 
confusion. Therefore, transaction costs of both SBS operations are probably lower than for projects with 
comparable features, given these more integrated management systems, the avoidance of duplication, 
the clearer lines of communication, and overall a stronger sense of ownership with the DoJCD and the 
Legislative Sector. 
In  the  Health  Sector,  although  the  shift  to  SBS  has  contributed  to  simplifying  and  aligning  the  EU 
support,  there  is  not  enough  evidence  to  show  that  it  has  significantly  reduced  the  duplication  of 
meetings or monitoring missions, especially because the other donors have kept their own procedures 
and modalities. In the Education Sector, combined evidence gathered from interviews and the 2012 
mid-term review shows that SBS has eased reporting procedures and has introduced flexibility in the 
use of funds compared with previous mechanisms used to deliver aid. In the area of Urban Renewal, 
the SBS FAs did not foresee the set-up of separate implementation units, and management functions 
were  to  be  assumed  by  the  dedicated  government  structures  set-up  for  the  broader  government’s 
Urban Renewal Programmes. In practice, however, the SBS operations were then managed separately 
through the set-up of dedicated implementation units, which, in the case of Nelson Mandela Bay, was 
managed  by  a  TA  recruited  by  the  Municipality.  In  both  cases,  the  SBS  have  required  additional 
administration  and  time  demands  for  engagement  for  the  city,  while  at  the  same  time  reducing 
transaction costs for the EU. (see Indicators 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3) 
Finally, since the EU is the only donor providing SBS, the shift to this modality did not have a specific 
direct  effect  towards  establishing  co-ordinated  and  joint  monitoring  processes  and  procedures  with 
other donors − the main exception being found in the Water Sector
44. 
                                                       
44 The only exception being linked to the support provided by Irish Aid to the multi-donor Water & Sanitation SWAp 
(MSB). In this respect the arrangement of pooled financing under MSB has proved to be a good mechanism for 
coordination of overall donor support to the Government of South Africa. While ensuring government leadership, it 
also reduces duplication and overhead costs at the same time as it gives the donors the possibility of supporting 
specific components of MSB that correspond to their priority areas. 29 
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4.2.5  Co-ordination and complementarity (JC2.6) 
Here, specific considerations are developed with regard to the capacity to ensure complementarities, 
synergies and co-ordination at the level of the various EU policies and instruments, among the main 
programmes  funded  by  the  EC  and  the  EU  Member  States,  and  between  the  EU  and  other  main 
donors.  
It should be noted that, during the period evaluated, many donors have phased out or significantly 
reduced their engagement, so the issue of co-ordination among donors has partly lost its complexity 
and  is  addressed  with  a  relative  ease  through  the  sectoral  dialogue  and  consultations  led  by  the 
government. 
In general, few references can be found in the SBS FAs to other donor support and, where this is 
included,  it  is  often  in  the  form  of  a  list  of  potentially  complementary  actions  with  the  caveat  that 
complementarities should be sought directly by the line department or other governmental counterpart 
in charge of the programme. This is the case, for example, with the URP Eastern Cape SBS. (see 
Indicator  2.6.1)  As  a  result,  while  other  programmes  undertaken  by  the  EU  or  other  development 
partners are often acknowledged, important complementarities or linkages are rarely actively pursued 
during the formulation stage. With few exceptions (e.g. Justice, and Legislative sector), no evidence has 
been found in terms of cross-fertilisation between various programmes. (see Indicator 2.6.2 and 2.6.3) 
In the Private Sector Development and Employment area: 
  The Donor Working Group, established in 2007, was no longer functioning properly by the time 
the ECF became operational (2010). This can be viewed on the one hand as a consequence of 
the reduced number of donors directly supporting the sector (DFID and EU) and of the GoSAs 
tendency to deal with donors on an individual basis, and on the other hand of the complexities 
linked to coordination in sectors where multiple national departments are involved.  
  In IPA, there is a case of complementarity among different EU policies: complementarities with 
the EU poverty alleviation engagement in the ACP countries are evident, but are only partially 
addressed, and there are complementarities with the EU Science and Technology programmes 
aiming at expanding the research area opened by IPA, mainly – though not solely – in other 
African countries. 
In the Water Sector, the strength of the sectoral approach has ensured a strong synergy among donors. 
As previously mentioned, the SBS contribution has been mainly on strengthening the sectoral alignment 
under GoSA leadership (JC 2.3 above) and contributing to the institutional and policy consolidation of 
the  Water  Sector  (EQ5).  No  donor  co-ordination  initiatives,  outside  the  GoSA  co-ordination,  are 
identified. The potential dissemination to other African countries of the lessons learned is an area of 
complementarity among the EU policies that presently is not exploited.  
In the Access to Justice and LSPSP, as in the Water Sector, the SBS contributions to co-ordination are 
mainly with regard to the sector strengthening. However, there was no evidence of solid levels of co-
ordination between donors in the Justice sector (in LSPSP, there are no other donors), which may be 
due to the fact that aid volumes are low, and donors operate in entirely different sub-sectors. There are 
possibilities  for  complementarities  among  the  EU  policies  and  instruments.  This  potential  has  been 
partially  exploited:  linkages between  LSPSP and  the European  Parliament external relations policy; 
linkages between the Access to Justice and the LSPSP and with other thematic instruments, such as 
the  EIDHR  Country-Based  Support  Scheme  for  South  Africa.  These  programmes  are  a  very  good 
example of complementarity between SBS and CSO support programmes
45, where there is a  strong 
cross-fertilisation between the two aid modalities. 
In the Health Sector, a case of complementarity within the EU framework is represented by the EC and 
DFID collaboration on the TA, mentioned above. 
 
                                                       
45 There is evidence of cross-fertilisation across the Justice and Legislative SBS operations, and of synergies within 
the Access to Justice programme, in which the EC applies two different aid modalities. The EC-managed civil 
society component of the Access to Justice programme reinforces capacities of civil society actors to engage with 
legislatures  at  national  and  provincial  levels.  Therefore,  the  EC  supports  the  supply  side  of  outreach  by  the 
legislatures to civil society (through the LSPSP) and the demand side by empowering civil society actors. The 
DoJCD and the Foundation for Human Rights also can rely on the research and capacity development outputs, as 
well as policy-relevant experimentation of those CSOs that are funded by the EC. 30 
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4.3  EQ3 (Step 1) - Financial Inputs 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has budget support contributed to increased alignment of 
ODA to government’s budgetary processes and to increased additional expenditure at sectoral 
level and decentralised level? 
Channelling external aid flows through the Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund (RDP) is 
the modality established by South Africa to manage the aid that donors agree to put under government 
control,  i.e.  ‘on-Treasury’,  although  not  ‘on  parliament’
46.  The  amount  of  funds  provided  by  the  EU 
through this channel has been high: an average of 69% over the period 2001-2011, starting from a low 
of 46% in 2000 and increasing in the following years with the start of SBS disbursements). This share has 
been much lower, instead, for the total aid received by South Africa in the same period (about 20%).  
The trends over the period as well demonstrate that the EU – by far the biggest RDP contributor – tends 
to increase that share, which is decreasing when considering all donors. Such considerations allow a 
positive appreciation on the role of SBS toward increasing the amount of aid integrated in the budgeting 
process and aligned to the government systems (SBS is in fact ‘on plan’, ‘on budget’, ‘on-Treasury’, ‘on 
account’, ‘on procurement’, ‘on report’ and ‘on audit’). 
The predictability of the SBS funds presents a twofold feature: 
  timeliness in the submission of forecasts with regards to EU-funded SBS operations is high, 
whereas information and predictability of other forms of aid is reported to be inadequate. 
  timeliness in overall amounts disbursed through EU-funded SBS operations is high overall (on 
average across the evaluation period, 95% of the total volume of EU SBS forecasted amounts 
were disbursed to the RDP Fund within the same fiscal year) but hides important delays in the 
disbursement of individual tranches and there is no clear trend towards improved timeliness of 
disbursements. 
The way GoSA uses budget support funds, whereby SBS disbursements are then transferred to line 
departments  in  order  to  finance  given  government  programmes  emphasises  the  consequences  of 
disbursement delays for programme implementation. In cases where the delays have been important 
due  to  complex  negotiations  on  programmes’  achievements,  the  relevant  departments  have  been 
directly affected in terms of suspension / slow-down of activities or lack of proper integration of the EU 
Funds within their Plans and Budgets (e.g. Urban Renewal). 
A broad estimate of the additional allocations and of the role played by SBS in increasing the GoSA’s 
fiscal  space,  i.e.  the  ability  of  government’s  budget  to  provide  additional  resources  for  a  desired 
programme without jeopardising fiscal or debt sustainability has been discussed with GoSA experts and 
formulated.  When  compared  to  the  total  additional  funds  (GoSA  additional  allocations  plus  SBS 
committed funds) across sectors, SBS funds have an extremely modest average weight of about 1%, 
which may allow a minimum flexibility, but remains negligible. If considered at sectoral level, however, 
such weight may become important and – in some sectors, in some fiscal years – it reaches 100% 
(employment  /  private  sector  in  2005/06,  of  the  governance  sector  in  2011/2012  and  of  the  urban 
development sector in 2002/03). Such estimates show that the SBS commitments, especially in given 
years,  represent  a  strong  financial  opportunity  for  the  departments  to  finance,  in  their  entirety  and 
complexity, policies and programmes that have not found yet an allocation in the national budget. 
4.3.1  External funds subject to the GoSA budgetary process (JC3.1) 
In South Africa, donor financing is not systematically  incorporated in the South African government 
budgetary appropriation processes and remains excluded from the appropriations.
47 This is the result of 
a specific choice of the GoSA whereby aid  – and more specifically aid for which the South African 
                                                       
46 See also section 4.3.1 and footnote 50.  
47 The “Development Cooperation Review III”, July 2010, p.4, indicates that “ODA programmes and projects are 
reflected in some strategic and operational plans of South African government institutions, but not consistently. 
ODA to South African national departments was however reflected in national budget documentation during the 
period under review, more consistently at the aggregate level. … departments have been providing information on 
ODA as part of the budget submission since 2000. This information however has not been published consistently.” 
This is confirmed by meetings with the National Treasury which indicate that throughout the evaluation period, aid 
has become increasingly part of the budgetary appropriation process although still weakly so. 31 
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government is at least partially responsible or accountable for management of the funds - is reported 
separately as extra-budgetary income to the respective government departments.
48  
As a consequence, reliance on th e commonly used definitions of  aid ‘on budget’ and aid ‘off budget’ 
cannot be applied in the case of South Africa as it would heavily underestimate the extent to which aid 
flowing to the government sector is actually captured by government systems. In light of this, focus has 
been placed on the evolution of the size and share of external aid ‘on-Treasury’ and ‘off-Treasury’. In 
South Africa, in fact, there are two main channels of disbursement for ODA:  
  ODA funds channelled through the Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund (RDP 
Fund), i.e. aid disbursed to the government’s finance ministry and therefore on-Treasury, from 
where it goes, via regular government procedures, to the government institutions responsible 
for budget execution. This channel is always used for SBS but can also be used for other sector 
programme support or project based support;  
  ODA funds that do not go through the RDP Fund (off-Treasury) but are either managed directly 
by the donor or transferred by the donor to a third party; in this case expenditure is undertaken 
by the development partner agency or by non-government agents (PIUs, CSOs) on its behalf 
and resources can or cannot be spent using government procedures. 
The  comparison  between  ODA  receipts  flowing  through  the  RDP  Fund  account  and  total  donor 
disbursements as recorded in the OECD database
49 shows that:  
  Between 2000 and 2011, the RDP Fund account received between 13% and 27% of total ODA 
to South Africa with an average of 22% throughout the period (see  Figure 4). Yearly ratios 
fluctuate throughout the period and there is no clear trend in one direction or another.  
  In the same period, on average, 69% of EU funds were channelled through the RDP Fund. 
Once again, no clear trend can be identified, although there is a clear relation between the high 
amounts  of  funds  transferred  by  the  EU  in  connection  with  the  implementation  of  SBS 
operations and the strong use by the EU of the RDP Fund: SBS funds account, on average, for 
70% of all amounts disbursed by the EU through the RDP Fund.  
  The EU is the donor that provides by far the most significant absolute amounts to the RDP 
Fund (between a low of R 381 M in the FY 2000/01 to a high R 1,274 M in 2008/09) leading to 
an average share of 62% of total RDP fund receipts over the period analysed.
50 
                                                       
48 Aid flowing to each Government department is accounted for and reported every year as extra-budgetary income 
in the context of the annual Estimates of National Expenditures (ENE). However, while aid is therefore reflected in 
the budget documentation at department level (though not always in a consistent manner) and  in the National 
Treasury RDP fund annual report, it is not reflected in the medium term expenditure framework Treasury’s Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (three year rolling budget estimate). 
49 While the team recognizes that a direct comparison between these two categories should be made with caution, 
it also believes that it is the best proxy available and can provide some insight into the absolute and relative 
amounts of donor funding ‘on-Treasury’ and ‘off-Treasury’ together with information on the preferences of donors, 
GoSA and the aid modalities used. Gathering of information through the OECD statistics was identified – together 
with IDC staff – as the best way to gain an insight on overall aid flows to the country, given that often government 
has little influence or information on the aid flows going directly to non-state actors, research institutes, foundations, 
private sector or project aid implemented directly by the Development Partners. 
50 Despite this, the South Africa 2011 Country Report, Monitoring progress of the P aris Declaration International 
Development Cooperation National Treasury Republic of South Africa (p.32-33) indicates that other donors show a 
higher percentage of ODA for government sector (more restricted interpretation of aid flows) going  through the 
RDP Fund: Flanders, 99%; Ireland, 94%; Canada, 73%. 32 
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Figure 4  Ratio of RDP receipts to total ODA flows to South Africa, for the EC and for all donors 
(including and excluding the US), 2000–11  
 
Sources: RDP audited reports and IDC data for RDP receipts reported on the basis of 
fiscal years and http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ for ODA data reported on the basis of 
calendar years. 
The bulk of ODA channelled through the RDP  – especially in light of the high percentage of funds 
transferred through the SBS modality - makes use of the South African government systems (i.e. it uses 
national budget execution modalities, national financial reporting systems,  national auditing systems 
and national procurement systems)
51. In addition, part of aid flowing to South Africa, despite not being 
channelled through the RDP, still makes use of  government PFM systems or procurement systems.  
Surveys on monitoring Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration
52 point to the fact that whereas 
in 2010, 13% of total aid flows to South Africa were channelled through the RDP,  higher – though 
declining - percentages were recorded in respect of aid flows making use of country systems. More 
specifically, despite the desire expressed by donors to increase the use of South Africa’s PFM systems 
to a greater extent, no progress has been registered in the past decade. On the contrary:  
  there has been a decline in donors’ use of South Africa’s PFM systems from 38% of aid for the 
government sector in 2005 to 25% in 2010 and a similar declining trend in the percentage of aid 
that made use of South Africa’s procurement systems from 44% in 2005 to 30% in 2010
53; 
decline which could be linked to the strong growth of US ODA funding when compared to all 
ODA (between 2005 and 2010, US ODA has grown by 350% (or fivefold) whereas all ODA has 
increased by 50%).
54 
  there  are  significant  variations  in  performance  across  donors  whereby  the  EU  scores  are 
relatively high compared to other donors. In 2010, 78% of EU aid disbursed for government 
sector  made  use  of  the  country’s  PFM  system  and  procurement  systems  (up  from  42%  in 
2005). (See details under Indicator 3.1.2) 
                                                       
51 “Whether development partners use South African procurement systems is determined on a case-by-case basis 
through the financing agreement. This means that funds that are disbursed through the RDP fund do not 
automatically use South African procurement systems.” The financing agreements of a number of programmes 
explicitly refer to the use of donor countries’ systems thereby limiting or excluding the use of the South African 
procurement systems. In the case of the EU for example, programme estimate payments (used in the project aid 
modality) are also channeled through the RDP account but funds are then to be used according to EU rules.  
52 Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing The Paris Declaration – Volume II Country Chapters / South 
Africa; p. 11-12. 
53 Similar findings emerge from the 2008 PEFA report which estimates that in 2007/08, only about 25% of donor 
funds made use of national systems,  
54 See details in Volume 2,  Indicator 3.1.2 as well as table 28 “Total ODA flows to South Africa, 2000-2011, USD 
millions” under Indicator 3.1.1.  
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Key reasons provided by donors for not using South Africa’s systems include:  
  restrictions  placed  on  donors  by  their  own  legislatures,  and  rules  and  policies  on  ODA 
management whereby transfer of funds through South African systems is either not possible or 
accompanied by heavy reporting obligations from donor headquarters; 
  concerns  related  to  the  slow  implementation  of  the  Public  Financial  Management  Act 
regulations  at  the  sub-national  level  due  to  weak  capacity  of  provincial  government 
departments;  
  slow transfer of funds through government processes and/or audit reports not always available 
on time or not meeting donor requirements;
55  
  preference for own project management units which are believed to be faster or provide for 
more flexible delivery.  
In other cases, the preference for a mixed approach (where part of the funds make use of government 
systems and others do not) was the result of an agreement between national counterparts and the EU. 
In some cases, in fact, the use of donors’ procedures and systems in the procurement of services 
facilitates  access  to  international  expertise  that  may  not  be  equally  accessible  using  the  SA 
procurement  system  (e.g.  the  case  of  the  EU  financed  ‘Financial  Management  Improvement 
Programme II (FMIP II)’
56.   
4.3.2  Predictability of aid flows (JC3.2) 
In the period covered by the evaluation, budget support was provided by the EU, by the Netherlands 
and by Ireland, although, in the latter cases, the transfer of funds came with a number of requirements 
that suggest that they do not fit in the category of budget support in its strict meaning
57. 
Timeliness in the submission of forecasts with regards to EU -funded SBS  operations is high and all 
funds transferred in the framework of SBS operations are recorded by the GoSA
58. The majority of SBS 
FAs  include  reliable indicative commitments of aid over a   multi-year framework, i.e.  forecasts for 
disbursements specifying  – in addition to the foreseen amount  - the month or quarter in  which the 
disbursement  is  expected  to  take  place  provide.  This  is  particularly  true  for  the  most  recent  SBS 
operations whereas in some of the earlier SBS a more generic reference to the fiscal year may be 
found. Overall, this ensures that forecasts are approved at least six weeks prior to the submission of the 
government budget, allowing SBS forecasts to be taken into account and planned prior to the start of 
the financial year by the GoSA and Line Departments. 
Rates of disbursement are very high as 99% of allocated amounts in the framework of EU-funded SBS 
operations which are now completed have been disbursed. Only two closed programmes (MSB III and 
SWEEEP II) present disbursement rates that fall below the 98% threshold and in both cases the de-
commitment of funds was based upon the variable tranche assessments, i.e. lack of compliance with 
targets set for the KPIs. 
Looking at timeliness of disbursements, the picture is more mixed. On average across the evaluation 
period, 95% of the total volume of EU SBS forecasted amounts (all programmes considered together) 
were disbursed (and credited to the RDP Fund) within the same fiscal year with highs of 112% in FY 
2009/10 (more funds disbursed than what forecasted) and 108% in FY 2004/05, and lows of 60% in FY 
                                                       
55  While  the  audit  reports  may  not  meet  the  timeline  required  by  donors,  they  are  mostly  released  on  time. 
Information provided by the IDC / National Treasury points to the fact that “on average, at national and provincial 
level, 99.9% of audit percent are 100% on time. This percentage however drops when looking at the local level, as 
it is estimated that between 5% and 10% of municipalities are – at times – late in submitting statements”. 
56  This  is  also  confirmed  in  the  DCR  III  (July  2010):  “available  data  does  not  allow  a  reliable  quantitative 
assessment of shifts in the use of the RDP fund and South African procurement and audit systems. Qualitative 
research however points to a possible shift with the increased use of sector budget support like arrangements and 
some donors moving to only using the RDP Fund. However some factors – such as SA departments preferring 
donor systems and policy decisions by some development partners – mitigate against such a shift”. p. 49 
57 This view is also shared by the IDC. In fact whereas in all cases, the funds are transferred to the RDP account 
for further transfer to the Line Departments, the FA s  signed by Ireland and the Netherlands  include  some 
accompanying conditions which go beyond what is normally foresee n in relation to BS. In both cases, the FAs 
contain specific articles which stipulate that funds are to be used exclusively for the programme and that Line 
Departments will have to report on the use of funds.  
58 This is not always the case for Irish and Dutch SBS where disbursements are agreed on the basis of yearly plans 
and actual disbursement forecasts are generally not available prior to the GoSA submitting its proposal to the 
legislature. 34 
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2007/08 and 62% in 2010/2011
59 
& 
60. These averages however hide major delays in the payments of a 
number of tranches and overall there is no clear trend towards improved timeliness of disbursements.   
Despite this good performance when looking at aggregated data across all programmes and years, and 
despite the fact that ODA constitutes just 1.3% of  the government’s budget and 0.3% of GNP thereby 
decreasing  the  importance  of  aid  predictability,  delays  at  programme  level  remain  important. 
Furthermore, the way in which GoSA uses budget support funds, whereby SBS disbursements credited 
to  the  RDP  Fund  are  then  transferred  to  line  departments  in  order  to  finance  given  government 
programmes  emphasises  the  consequences  of  disbursement  delays.  As  a  matter  of fact,  delays  in 
disbursements of individual tranches at programme level negatively affect the Departments in terms of 
budget implementation, accountancy and ultimately project financing as they rely on the SBS funds for 
the implementation of specific sector / sub-sector policies / programmes
61.  
Only one of the EU funded SBS  operations – the Partnerships for Health II - registered no delay in the 
disbursement  of  tranches.  In  all  other  cases,  some  delays  were  registered  although  these  varied 
between  minor  delays  (one  or  two  quarters  but  within  same  fiscal  year)  to  more  important  and 
continuous delays leading to disbursements in different years from those forecasted.  
Evidence  arising  from  the  analyses  at  sector  level  shows  that  delayed  disbursements  have  indeed 
affected effectiveness of programme implementation. This is the case for example of  MSB III in the 
water sector and of the URP Eastern Cape:  
  In the case of MSB III significant delays were registered in the disbursement of all tranches 
(often paid in different FYs from those forecasted). As a result, only 4% of forecasted SBS 
amounts in relation to water sector were disbursed in 2007/08 and an opposite high of 186% 
was disbursed in 2009/10, i.e. the last year of implementation
62. Documentation reviewed points 
to considerable evidence of significant delays in disbursements during  MSB III
63 which have 
arguably undermined effectiveness, leading to the finding that it represented a fatal blow for 
CSO participation in the programme and undermined trust and relationships between CSOs 
and other MSB water sector stakeholders, particularly the DWA
 64. The one year delay in the 
implementation of the proposed workplan led to unsustainable financial difficulties for a number 
of CSOs and/or to CSOs taking up other projects. 
  With regards to the Urban Renewal sector and in particular at the URP Eastern Cape, delays 
have  been  registered  in  the  payment  of  all  tranches  since  the  start  of  the  programme  and 
include delays of one FY or more.
65. The final report concludes that  “the fact that the funds 
                                                       
59 Delays have been measured by comparing the dates in which the disbursements have taken place with the 
dates for disbursements as forecasted in the original FAs (or the forecasted date as amended in the rider).  
60 To be noted that, in the PEFA report of 2008 which covered the period 2005/06 -2007/08, indicator D-1 received 
a ‘D’ score which means that ‘in at least two of the three consecutive years considered the actual budget support 
outturn fell well below the 15% of the forecasted amount’.  
61 The PEFA report (p.20) also notes that “officials state that in some cases donor activities have undermined the 
achievement of policy objectives by forcing the unforeseen reallocation of national resources to complete projects 
whose funding may have been suspended or delayed due to unmet conditionalities”, although data gathered by the 
team points to the fact that this has hardly happened and has led instead to delayed implementation of activities.  
62 Subsequent delays in the disbursement of the following tranches are also reported although in this case delays 
in timeliness of disbursements are partially offset as payments of previous delayed tranches take place in the same 
FY as the forecasted following tranche. 
63 Exchange of letters in respect of disbursement of tranches and notes to File re Request of disbursement point to 
the following reasons for delays: i) late submission of request by DWAF; ii) “heavy end of the year administrative 
burden” which delayed the analysis of the file by the EUD; iii) disagreement between the EUD and DWAF as to 
whether or not the proposed targets had been met; and iv) the complexity of assessment of the 3
rd condition of the 
general conditions and absence of supporting documentation.  
64 MSB III final evaluation. 
65 “The more demanding challenge has been the more than one year delay in receiving the start-up funds (first 
tranche) and the more than one and half year break that has elapsed since the presentation of the MTR”. ROM 
Report of the Support to Urban Renewal Programme in the Eastern Cape; MR-120520.02, 31/10/2010; p.3. 
For this programme, a 2Q delay (though same FY) was registered in relation to the payment of the 1st tranche 
when compared to the date forecasted in the rider but a more significant delay and different financial year when 
compared  to  the  original  FA  &  Significant  delays  in  2nd  and  3rd  tranches  (initially  forecasted  for  12/2006  & 
12/2007, later postponed by rider to FYs 2010/11 and 2011/12 and still unpaid). Reasons for delays vary and are 
often  the  combined  result  of  multiple  causes  including:  i)  difficulties  encountered  by  the  two  Municipalities  in 
complying with the established conditions for payment; ii) delays in actual payment / processing of request by the 
EU; iii) delays in the transfer of funds from the RDP Fund to the Municipalities’ accounts. 35 
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repeatedly  failed  to  timely  reach  the  Municipality  for  their  incorporation  in  the  annual 
IDP/Budget process, led to serious problems: lack of commitment, low spending, and further 
delays.”
66 (see details under Indicator 3.2.1) 
When looking at predictability of project support, a significantly different picture emerges. Data provided 
in the surveys of the Paris Declaration and in the 2008 PEFA report points to:  
  the  existence  of  substantial  off  budget  donor  assistance  the  precise  volume  of  which  is 
unknown but estimated at two to three times of what flows to RDP.  
  the current lack of a reliable and comprehensive information system on the actual value and 
composition  of  all  donor  assistance  provided  to  the  Government.  The  National  Treasury 
continues  to  face  problems  in  recording  all  aid  flows  often  as  the  result  of  incomplete, 
inaccurate or delayed departmental reports. Efforts are underway within  the IDC to address 
these data shortfalls including through the development of clearer requirements and guidelines 
for donors. 
  the fact that very few donors provide meaningful budget estimates for disbursement of project 
aid in a timely fashion at least three months before the start of the fiscal year and generally do 
not provide quarterly reports on the disbursements within two months of the end-of the quarter. 
However,  whereas  the  latest  survey  of  the  Paris  Declaration  indicates  an  impressive  improvement, 
though  hiding  marked  differences  across  donors,  the  relevant  indicator  under  the  PEFA  report  has 
scored a ‘D’, i.e. the lowest score. (See details under Indicator 3.2.2) 
The discrepancies between the finding of the two reports call into question whether indicator 7 of the 
Paris  Declaration  offers  an  accurate  assessment  of  aid  predictability  given  that  it  measures 
‘disbursements recorded by government’ and ‘aid scheduled by donors for disbursement’ but does not 
look into actual completeness and timeliness of budget estimates by donors. Issue that has also been 
raised by the GoSA.   
4.3.3  Size and share of the government budget available for additional expenditures (JC3.3)
67 
In order to assess the role of budget support operations in increasing the GoSA’s fiscal space, i.e. “the 
ability  of  government’s  budget  to  provide  additional  resources  for  a  desired  programme  without 
jeopardising  fiscal  or  debt  sustainability”
68,  reference  will  be  made  to  additional  allocations,  that  is 
additional  spending  made  possible  by:  i)  changes  to  the  macro-framework  (e.g.  higher  growth 
projections, reduction in the projected costs of servicing public debt); ii) drawdown of the contingency 
reserve; iii) savings on previously budgeted allocations. To ensure consistency in the type of amounts 
analysed, reference will be made to EU SBS funds committed rather than disbursed.  
While the team recognizes that this does not provide the exact picture, it has been agreed with the 
management group that – in the absence of data on additional expenditures which could be readily 
used by the team - this would be the best proxy. For a complete description of the methodology agreed 
with the MG, see Indicator 3.3.1 in Volume II.  
While  the  presentation  of  the  GoSA  budget  does  not  formally  include  the  category  of  additional 
expenditure in a form that could be readily used by the team, the analysis of the budget reviews in 
relation to additional allocations and total national expenditure point to the following (see also figure 
below and detailed data under Indicator 3.3.1):  
  A clear upward trend of total nominal GoSA expenditures over the 2000/01-2011/12 period. 
From a starting point of R 233,934 million in 2000/01 total expenditures register an average 
yearly growth rate of 13% and reach R 888,523 million in 2011/12. 
  The  absence  of  a  corresponding  continuous  strong  upward  trend  in  additional  allocations. 
These in fact vary significantly across the period analysed ranging between a low of R 8,430 
                                                       
66 EU SPSP Technical and Operation Coordinator Final Report, April 2013, p.9.  
67 The previous formulation of this JC, in line with the OECD/DAC methodology for the evaluation of budget support 
operations, referred to discretionary expenditures. However, in light of the fact that the pre sentation of the GoSA 
budget does not include this category of expenditures and following discussions with the Management Group of the 
evaluation, it was agreed to refer to the concept of additional allocations / expenditures. Discretionary expenditure 
is  defined  as  “spending  set  by  annual  appropriations  ..  which.  is  optional,  and  in  contrast  to  entitlement 
programmes for which funding is mandatory” (Mandal, U.C., 2007, Dictionary of Public Administration, Sarup & 
Sons, p.140), or in other words, new optional expenditure to be incurred in the year x to be decided and financed 
through unallocated revenue and/or budget savings from the year x-1. 
68 Source: GoSA, National Treasury Budget review Glossary (2011 and other years). 36 
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million in 2000/01 to a high of R 160,620 million in 2009/10. That said, with the exceptions of 
2004/05  and  of  the  2009/10-2011/11  period,  additional  allocations  have  consistently  grown 
reaching peaks well over R 100,000 million in the fiscal years from 2008/09 to 2010/1. 
  An  uneven but overall increase in the share of  additional  allocations  which, as of 2002/03, 
constitute between 10% and 25% of overall GoSA expenditures (see Indicator 3.3.1 for details).  
Figure 5  Trends in total national expenditure and additional allocations, Rand million (nominal) 
&  Trends  of  share  of  additional  allocations  as  %  of  national  expenditure  over  the 
period 2000/01-2011/12 
   
Source: Own calculations based on National Treasury, Budget Reviews 2001-2012 
NB: Figures provided for the FYs 2010/11 and 2011/12 correspond to preliminary National budget 
expenditure outcomes. Additional allocations: figures provided correspond to the additional amounts 
allocated in the given year's budget for the following three year MTEF period. 
When looking at the size and share of SBS funds committed in relation to total additional funds (GoSA 
additional allocations plus SBS committed funds) over the period 2000-11, the situation at the overall 
level is different from the one at the level of the specific sectors supported by SBS (see Figure 6). In 
fact, while the average for the whole period considered across all sectors is 1%, disaggregated data at 
sector level for those sectors supported by SBS shows: 
  Significantly  variable  shares  across  the  different  SBS  supported  sectors  with  no  clearly 
identifiable trend  
  A relatively high average of 8% in the employment / private sector development and of 7% in 
the governance sector, meaning that SBS committed funds have constituted approximately 8% 
and 7% respectively of the additional funds made available within those sectors in the period 
2000-2011.  
  In some years, the amounts committed through SBS operations correspond to the total amount 
made  available  for  additional  expenditure  in  a  given  sector.  This  is  the  case  of  the 
employment /  private  sector  in  2005/06,  of  the  governance  sector  in  2011/2012  and  of  the 
urban development sector in 2002/03. This means that in those years, SBS operations have 
provided a significant financial opportunity to line departments to finance, in their entirety and 
complexity, innovative, risk-taking policies and programmes that had not found yet an allocation 
in the national budget funds.   
Analysis  of  data  and  interviews  however  indicate  that  there  is  no  significant  relation  between  SBS 
commitments and the broader process whereby the GoSA plans and allocates additional allocations 
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across sectors. That said, as indicated in EQ 4 there is some scattered evidence that points to a role of 
SBS in such processes in attracting additional allocations to finance activities / programmes tested with 
success in the framework of SBS supported programmes, i.e. through the mainstreaming within the 
main  budget  expenditure  of  the  financing  of  activities/programmes  previously  supported  by  SBS 
operations (case of SBS supported programmes within the water sector) and / or through a leverage 
effect of SBS (SBS attracted GoSA additional expenditures to the sector) as seems to be the case in 
the Governance. 
Figure 6  Share of SBS committed funds as % of total additional allocations (GoSA additional 
allocations plus SBS committed funds), 2001-2011 
 
Sources: own calculations based on data retrieved from the Budget Reviews (2001-2011) for GoSA additional 
allocations and EUD data for SBS commitments. 
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4.4  EQ4 (Step 1) - Public Spending / Budget management 
Evaluation Question 4: How has the level and composition of public spending for innovation 
and experimentation changed, and with which consequences in terms of budgetary flexibility, 
allocative and operational efficiency, transparency and oversight, including the decentralised 
levels, and what was the contribution of BS to the observed changes? 
After  the  end  of  apartheid,  substantial  PFM  reforms  have  been  introduced  in  South  Africa  (MTEF, 
Public Finance Management Act, etc.). High levels of fiscal sustainability and strategic prioritisation of 
the public expenditure have been achieved. With specific reference to ODA, donor funds channelled 
through the RDP fund are budgeted for and reported on by GoSA in a comprehensive and transparent 
manner (as in the case of SBS). This is not the case of other donor funds which are not necessarily 
reported on (by donors) giving rise to what has been termed the ‘invisibility’ of aid in South African 
processes. 
In this context, SBS has strengthened Treasury’s capacity to provide rapid and flexible responses to the 
requests of funds for innovative policies and pilot initiatives coming from different government bodies - 
the identification of such bodies and the related programmes being driven by the dialogue between EU 
and  SA  counterparts.  In  the  meantime,  when  policy  innovation  has  produced  positive  results,  the 
mainstreaming and consolidation of the related expenditure in the national budget has been facilitated 
thanks to the ownership of the supported process. 
SBS operations have not provided important direct contributions to national or local PFM improvements, 
but  they  have  facilitated  the  access  of  the  departments  to  funds  for  experimentation  and  policy 
innovation. In most cases, without SBS, the departments would have not found an easy way to finance 
entirely  their  pilot  initiatives.  By  creating  such  a  facilitated  access  to  innovation  funds,  SBS  has 
contributed  to  improve  PFM  at  sectoral  level.  To  note,  however,  that  significant  support  has  been 
provided by the EU in the PFM area through the implementation of complementary actions, namely the 
two  phases  of  the  Financial  Management  Improvement  Programme  as  of  the  late  1990s,  and  the 
intensification of the dialogue around the importance of conducting a PEFA assessment in 2008.  
4.4.1  Improved budget management (JC4.1) 
The change in Government following the 1994 elections opened up the way to important reforms in the 
South  African  PFM  system  and  budget  process.  The  legislation  adopted  in  the  field  of  financial 
management reflects that there is a broad policy framework for effective public finance management, 
accountability and transparency in government’s spending.  
Starting with the introduction of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 1998, the South 
African financial management and budget process has undergone major reforms aimed at advancing 
and promoting growth and development. The main initiatives introduced during the period covered by 
the evaluation included:  
  The  adoption  of  the  Public  Finance  Management  Act  (PFMA)  in  2000  and  the  Municipal 
Finance Management Act (MFMA) in 2004.  
  Other important relevant legislations include the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act  (2000),  the  Broad  Based  Black  Economic  Empowerment  Act  (2003),  the  Division  of 
Revenue Act and the Appropriation Act.  
  Strengthening of institutional arrangements and capacity building programmes. 
Links between the GoSA’s strategic priorities and the budget processes are strong. Policy is generally 
developed and implemented on a medium-term rolling basis whereby each department is responsible 
for developing its own strategic direction. At the  provincial level, Provinces develop their Integrated 
Growth  and  Development  Strategies  whereas  Municipalities  develop  medium  term  Integrated 
Development Plans.   
The institution of the annual budget cycle provides a further mechanism for policy co-ordination. The 
introduction of a Planning Framework (Government Programme of Action) for government is designed 
to  integrate  and  synchronize  strategic  policy  processes  with  the  budget  cycle  whereby  every 
department and provincial administration is expected to develop their own planning cycles within the 
overall planning framework of Government as agreed by Cabinet.   
The  framework  links  the  electoral,  parliamentary  and  budgetary  cycles,  and  ensures  that  policy 
decisions taken by Cabinet inform planning throughout government. The planning framework includes: 
i) a Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), that sets out a limited but focused set of medium-term 
strategic objectives for five year periods coinciding with national and provincial elections, which are 
shared by all spheres of government and in turn inform the MTEF; and ii) a Medium Term Budget Policy 39 
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Statement  (MTBPS),  a  Cabinet  policy  statement  tabled  annually  in  Parliament  that  sets  out  the 
economic context and assumptions that inform the following year’s budget, as well as the framework in 
which the budget is prepared.
 69 (further details can be found in Volume II under Indicator 4.1.3). 
Documentation reviewed points to the significant success of South Africa in achieving the objectives of 
improved fiscal sustainability, alignment of spending with national priorities, improved accountability and 
increased levels of transparency and participation. The PEFA report, though slightly dated (published in 
September  2008  and  covering  the  FYs  2005/06-2007/08),  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  / 
benchmark of PFM systems, procedures and practices within the Central Government of South Africa 
and allows to highlight the significant achievements of the GoSA in terms of effective public finance 
management,  accountability  and  transparency  in  government’s  spending.  The  same  report  also 
identifies  some  weaknesses  as  a  basis  for  future  improvements  in  the  area  of  effectiveness  of 
expenditure in line with strategically allocated resources; other documentation reviewed and interviews 
also point to the need for improved financial management capacity at decentralised level. 
Evidence from the Water Sector case study suggests that the shift to a sector approach has improved 
PFM within the sector including through the funding of relevant capacity development activities. The 
sector approach has: i) enabled better planning through the support for Provincial Water Sector Plans 
and municipal Water Service Development Plans, which predated the municipal integrated development 
plans; and ii) enabled the sector to be prepared for the evolution of budgeting in South Africa towards 
outcome-based budgeting. Thus the SBS-supported Masibambane programme has most likely helped 
to improve absorption rates. However, the sector approach has not succeeded in engaging National 
Treasury substantively in sector development. The MTR of the MSB II (p.54) points to concerns about 
“the integration of the planning process(es) in the sector with the budgeting system. As a result of 
decentralisation in service delivery and the changing fiscal environment .., the water sector finds itself 
in  a  multi-sectoral  environment  with  a  more  complex  budget  process  and  where  the  sector  has  to 
compete with other sectors for attention in local and provincial planning process as well as the budget 
process.  Funds  are  no  longer  under  the  direct  control  of  DWAF  –  the  sector  leader.  The  new 
environment therefore necessitates a need to encourage integration of the planning and budget process 
to  ensure  (continued)  strategic  allocation  of  funds.  For  this  to  happen,  integration  needs  to  be 
encouraged at three levels: national, provincial and at local/ implementation level.” 
Evidence from the Governance case study also points to a number of improvements, including general 
progress by the DoJCD in the areas of comprehensive budgeting (shift to include functional budgeting 
and incorporation of donor funds on reports) and a move towards the quarterly monitoring of annual 
performance targets and the roll-out of the new PFM Capacity Development Strategy. With regards to 
the Legislative Sector, the case study points to positive assessments of SBS general conditions linked 
to PFM. More specifically to: i) an improved financial management environment in the legislative sector 
including the drafting of the consolidated Legislative Sector 2010/11 MTEF Budget and unqualified audit 
by the Auditor General’s 2009/10; ii) the development by the Legislative Sector of its own financial 
management legislation and the passing of regulations and policies to assist individual legislatures to 
review their regulatory environment so as to comply with the newly passed financial management acts; 
and iii) the establishment as of February 2013 (i.e. after the end of the period evaluated but linked to the 
SBS operation) of the Parliamentary Budget Office which could lead to a strengthened oversight role of 
parliament as it seeks to build up the analytical and research capacity in the Legislative Sector.
70 
Looking at accountability issues and with specific reference to ODA, a distinction needs to be drawn 
between ODA flowing through the RDP Fund (which includes all SBS funds) and other aid flows. In fact, 
all donor funds managed through the  RDP Fund (and therefore all funds provided through SBS) are 
budgeted for and reported on by government in a fairly transparent and comprehensive manner, unlike 
other donor funds which are managed by the donors and no t necessarily reported on (by donors). This 
has led to what is termed in the DCR III report (July 2010) as the “‘invisibility’ of aid in South African 
processes” (see also EQ3). As a result, there is a significant difference between aid that flows through 
the RDP Fund (on-Treasury) and other aid flows, although the specific institutional frameworks matter 
                                                       
69 The budget framework consists of the fiscal framework, government spending priorities, the division of resources 
between national, provincial and local government, and a tabulation of the major conditional grants. The budget 
framework enables national departments, provinces and municipalities to prepare their detailed budgets for the 
following year. South Africa has a multi-year budgeting process, so the framework covers the present year and the 
three subsequent years. The fiscal framework sets out government’s revenue projections, spending estimates, 
borrowing requirements and assumptions concerning debt interest costs over the period. Source: Medium Term 
Budget Policy Statement, 2009, National Treasury. 
70 Interviews point to the fact that in February 2013 the process of recruitment and staffing had not been resolved 
yet. 40 
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(national vs. local institutions). That said, provisions of funds through the RDP does not necessarily 
ensure mutual accountability in its broader sense as the reporting foreseen for the RDP fund does not 
include the onward management of resources. In this respect, it is to be noted that, in fact, all ODA 
(including SBS given its specific implementation features in the South African context) “is implemented 
as an add-on to programme managers’ duties, the part of their responsibilities that they will turn to only 
after disposing of the duties for which they are accountable in a way that will affect their careers and 
bonuses. and The reason why sector budget support and other arrangements for which there are 
institutional ownership (such as the support to Masibambane even if not sector support but very specific 
contributions in kind) work better, is because they result in some degree of local accountability at the 
programme level”
71.  
With regards to PFM capacity at decentralised level, documents reviewed and interviews highlight that 
while the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) of 2004 has provided an enhanced impetus for 
financial management reform at local government level and capacity building programmes have been 
put in place to strengthen capacities (also with the support of the EU through the implementation of the 
Financial Management Improvement Programme – FMIP II
72), there remains a “striking gap between 
the  sophisticated  national  budgeting  and  financial  management  structures,  and  great  capacity 
weaknesses in poorer provinces and weaker municipalities”
73.  
On  this,  evidence  from  the  water  sector  case  study  points  to  the  fact  that,  while  the  water  sector 
benefits from generally good PFM, the local government financial reporting systems do not facilitate the 
separate identification of spending on subsectors, and in the absence of better financial ring-fencing of 
the  water  services  function  within  municipalities,  it  is  difficult  to  properly  understand  the  financial 
performance of water services.  
In the health sector, specific measures to improve public spending and PFM especially at decentralised 
level, have been implemented in 2012 with a view to improve the country’s healthcare system and get a 
clean audit from 2012 onwards. Measures also include the set-up of a programme to deploy interns to 
the department’s offices in all nine provinces for capacity building purposes in the areas of financial 
management, human resources and information management. (further details can be found in Volume 
II under Indicator 4.1.5) 
4.4.2  Improved allocative capacity (JC4.2) 
Focus on policy experimentation. Most allocations to finance the  SBS supported programmes have 
explicitly  aimed  at  financing  policy  innovation  and  piloting.  More  specifically,  SBS  supported 
programmes  have  contributed  or  are  expected  to  contribute  to  the  implementation  of  pilots/risk 
taking/innovation and experimentation activities in line with the mandated function for development aid 
as defined by the ODA guidelines (see EQ5).  
  In the case of urban renewal and with specific reference to the e-Thekwini programme, a well-
designed pilot programme run by a well prepared management team was financed with a view 
to test new approaches to local development.   
  In the health sector, the allocation allowed to scale  up the experimentation of a number of 
innovative activities or models for service delivery (outreach teams, mobile clinics, etc.) which 
had been identified in the area of primary health care. 
  In the education sector, the SBS supported programme allowed the recruitment of ‘seeds’ staff 
in several universities for the development of new curricula as well as the establishment of a 
research  network  (incl.  a  national  research  association  and  a  scientific  journal  on  primary 
education).
74 
                                                       
71  Source:  DCR  III  report,  July  2010,  p.78.  This  also  holds  true  for  the  EU-funded  Financial  Management 
Improvement Programme II during its second period of implementation; see Indicator 4.1.2 for further details. 
72 The final evaluation of the FMIP II points to the significant support provided through the programme for the rollout 
of the PFMA and MFMA.   
73 Final Evaluation Report of the “Financial Management Improvement Programme II" – FMIP II (July 2010), p. 19. 
74 Interviewees highlighted that the amounts made available through SBS while representing a small fraction of the 
overall department’s budget, constitute an important amount when looking at the financing of pilot initiatives or new 
strategic programmes: amounts made available through the SBS almost reach the level of financial resources 
needed  to  implement  significant  components  of  important  programmes  planned  by  the  Department  of  Higher 
Education and Training (DHET) such as the development of teacher education campuses. 41 
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  In  the  justice  sector,  the  supported  programme  launched  a  new  mechanism  with  the 
Foundation  for  Human  Rights  to  deepen  and  broaden  engagement  with  civil  society  actors 
which has included public funding. 
  In  the  water  sector,  MSB  has  launched  and  tested  an  innovative  institutional  and  policy 
framework at sectoral level, including a number of pilot initiatives and mechanisms, which have 
then been streamlined / rolled out. (see Indicator 4.2.1 for details)  
Still in the water sector, SBS supported government programmes have seen an increase in 
budget allocations to NSAs in the water sector, even though NSAs only received a fraction of 
what was originally foreseen in the framework of the Masibambane programme
75.  
New prioritization in budget allocations. With respect to the mainstreaming of allocations  for innovation 
and experimentation, the most evident change recorded by the team is that as of 2012/13 each 
department has a ‘Science & Technology’ budget line amounting to a total of R10.7 billion for 2012/13 
thus  rendering  budgeting  for  innovation  a  priority  for  GoSA
76:  “The  SPSP  has  heightened  the 
prioritisation of the sector programme. Part of the explanation to the dramatic rise in national budgetary 
allocation to S&T, from R400 million, in the 2004 financial year, to R4 billion, in 2012, could be linked to 
the  work  of  the  SPSP”
77,  showing  that  a  positive  experimentation  made  possible  by  an  SBS  may 
contribute to wider strategic allocation processes.  
4.4.3  SBS contribution (JC4.3) 
No specific direct SBS contribution to PFM in general terms. Improvements in the area of PFM are 
primarily linked to the strong drive and efforts put in place by the GoSA. In fact, while most of the SBS 
operations have one or more conditions which are related to improvements in PFM (be it at national 
level, department level or decentralised level), no TA has been provided to this end (with the exception 
of the water sector), nor have improvements in overall PFM been explicitly included as expected key 
results of the programmes. Support has nevertheless been provided by the EU in this area through the 
successive Financial Management Improvement Programmes aimed at supporting the implementation 
of  government  initiatives  to  improve  public  finance  management  at  national  and  provincial  spheres 
through the implementation of the PFMA and at the municipal sphere through the MFMA. In addition, 
the adoption of a more structured approach to the assessment of progress in the PFM area by the EU 
in 2007 highlighted the absence of a comprehensive baseline. This led to intensive dialogue between 
the  EU  and  SA  on  conducting  a  PEFA  assessment.  The  ensuing  EU  funded  Public  Financial 
Management  Performance  Assessment  Report  (2008)  identified  measures  to  address  weaknesses 
which have then been integrated into the government's overall reform plans
78.  
Considering the reduced size of SBS compared to the ove rall budget, there couldn’t have been any 
reasonable  expectation  about  a  possible  role  of  SBS  in  facilitating /  improving  national  PFM.  This 
relatively low level of attention to  national PFM related measures in the  SBS operations is a direct 
consequence of the recognition by the EU of the high quality of PFM systems at country level; quality 
which the adoption of SBS contributes to strengthen although mainly in an indirect rather than direct 
manner  (i.e.  primarily  through  the  use  of  the  PFM  systems  rather  than  through  the  provision  of 
dedicated TA embedded in the SBS operations or through PFM-related conditionalities). As a result, 
SBS  operation  documentation  (financing  agreements,  monitoring  reports,  files  related  to  tranche 
releases and evaluations of SBS operations) often refers to:  
  the  soundness  of  the  GoSA’s  PFM  system:  e.g.  “High  standards  of  public  financial 
management  already  in  place,  as  well  as  the  improvements  underway  and  being  planned, 
South Africa remains eligible for continued Sector Budget Support from a PFM perspective.  
Significant improvements have been implemented during 2009 that continue to strengthen the 
public finance sector in South Africa”
79 and 
                                                       
75 The MSB III final evaluation noted that the Financial Agreement for MSB III valued the CSO component at 10% 
of the total programme, however actual expenditure on the CSO component totalled only 4% of total programme 
expenditure. MSB II final evaluation estimated that that R42 million of the proposed R100 million was transferred 
through CSO structures. 
76 http://www.info.gov.za/speech/Dynamic?pageid=461&sid=27370&tid=67948. 
Evidence collected also points to an increase  in the S&T budget expenditure from R3.7 billion in 2008/09 to R4.4 
billion in 2011/12, at an average annual rate of 6 per cent (National Treasury, Estimate of Expenditure, page 6).  
77 ROM Report MR-135682.02, 11/2012, p.4. 
78 See Indicator 4.3.1 for details, including EU headquarters view on the role of EU SBS support to improved PFM. 
79 Sector Budget Support Payment File: Sector Budget Support Payment Request: Masibambane III- 3
rd Fixed 
Tranche and 2
nd Variable Tranche, Ch1, p.11, October 2009, 42 
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  the absence of a direct contribution of the SBS operations to improvements of the GoSA’s PFM 
system:  e.g.  “The  efficient  use  of  the  medium  term  expenditure  planning  system  and  the 
improvements in PFM at the sector level is progress that has been achieved essentially by the 
SA government (the NT, the South African Revenue Service, the Department of Public Service 
and Administration and the Auditor-General’s Office), without the contribution of the SPSP” and 
“the SPSP has not contributed to the improvement of the expenditure planning processes given 
that the grant provided through direct, non-targeted Sector Budget Support is not integrated in 
the  National  Budget,  and  it  has  not  contributed  to  the  progress  registered  in  the  PFM 
improvements either.” 
80  
Contribution to PFM at sectoral level. These considerations hold true for most of the SBS operations 
with a notable exception in the Water Sector and to some extent also in the governance and health 
sectors where examples of a direct contribution of the SBS operations to improved PFM at sector level 
can be found. In the Water Sector, the sector case study points to the facilitation role played by SBS to 
improving PFM in the sector, including through complementary TA provided to strengthen PFM capacity 
at all three levels. Satisfactory progress in the implementation of the DWAF programme to improve and 
reform public financial management is reported at sectoral level (also on the basis of the AG issuing an 
unqualified report for DWA’s financial statements and performance for the 2008/2009 financial year).
81 
Achievements  made  possible,  among  others,  by  the  TA  provided  in  the  framework  of  the  SBS 
operation.
82 
Improvements in PFM at sector level have also been recorded in the governance sector, pointing to the 
fact that SBS (through the inclusion of specific conditions) has contributed or at least accelerated 
improvements  in  the  areas  of  comprehensive  budgeting,  enhanced  oversight  and  monitoring  of 
performance  targets,  and  roll -out  of  the  new  P FM  Capacity  development  strategy.  Similar 
considerations hold true with regards to the  Health  Sector  where donor involvement and dialogue 
processes linked to SBS have led to the adoption of specific measures aimed at improving public 
spending and PFM in the sector at decentralised levels (see above). 
With  regards  to  the  other  sectors,  the  contribution  provided  by  SBS  to  the  establishment  and 
consolidation of a sector approach (see EQ5)  has indirectly contributed to facilitating sector budget 
management. 
Finally, it is to be noted that interviews with the National Treasury have highlighted  that under given 
conditions, the use of project aid, is the preferred aid modality. This is the case for example of the FMIP 
(programme in the area of PFM supported by the EU). This preference is linked to the specific context 
and content of the support programme and   stems from two main considerations: i) the GoSA and 
National Treasury have a strong sense of the direction in which the PF M system should be d riven 
forward; and ii) advances require, in addition to the commitment of the GoSA, the provision of high-level 
expertise for short-term ad hoc inputs which can often be better accessed through a programme 
implemented with a project aid modality. Regarding this last point, interviews highlight that the project 
aid modality facilitates the timely recruitment of high level expertise which could not be possible  – or at 
least would be more difficult – should GoSA procurement procedures apply. 
Contribution to allocative capacity for innovation. Looking at issues of allocative capacity, no overall 
achievements  can  be  linked  to  the  SBS  operations  when  looking  at  changes  in  procedures  and 
systems.  However,  results  can  be  noted  in  terms  of  choices  made.  Evidence  indicates  that  SBS 
operations facilitated the financing of pilot and innovative policies. More specifically, in the absence of 
SBS, departments must follow a process of negotiation and coordination at national level, before their 
specific requests to finance pilot programmes and innovative policies can be included in the budget 
framework.  Normally,  such  a  process  takes  time  (even  when  financial  resources  are  available), 
particularly when relevant programmes and policies are not based on previous successful experiences. 
In  all  the  examples  of  allocation  for  policy  innovation  mentioned  above,  SBS  has  played  a  role  to 
accelerate the procedures and ensure a more comprehensive experimentation. In some cases, it has 
                                                       
80 Employment creation, Sector Policy Support to the Economic Cluster, MR-136102.01, 12/02010, pp.3 & 5 
81 Note related to the release of the 3
rd Fixed Tranche & 2
nd Variable tranche; March 2010. 
82  “It  is  reported  that  some  of  the  successes  for  the  financial  management  support  are  the  following:  i)  The 
completion of the scope and definition of the financial monitoring and reporting platform. ...; ii) Provision of support 
to regional offices to assist and train staff with regard to the upgrade of BAS and creditor reconciliations; iii) Review 
of head office and regional office’s accounting processes to support the financial strategy; iv) Support to drive for a 
2008/09 Clean Audit report (this has been achieved); and v) Review and update the departments financial policies 
and Procedures”. Sector Budget Support Payment Request: Masibambane III- 3rd Fixed Tranche and 2nd Variable 
Tranche, p. 23 (EUD,  October 2009) 43 
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been a significant source of funding: in the Urban Renewal sector (eThekwini), SBS has helped provide 
‘seed money’ or ‘oil’, as stated by interviewees, to run the programme. In the Employment Sector, “the 
SPSP has some added value in its assistance in developing innovative and pilot projects, considering 
that such projects cannot be funded through national budgets”.
83 The governance case study suggests 
that the SBS has contributed to ensuring both additional financial resources and flexibility to pilot and 
develop  a  funding  mechanism  with  the  Foundation  for  Human  Rights  to  deepen  and  broaden 
engagement with civil society actors, including public funding. In the Health sector SBS has allowed to 
expand  and  complete  the  experimentation,  avoid  dispersion  and  test  innovative  models  for  service 
delivery in primary health. SBS support to IPA has allowed the experimentation of a comprehensive 
approach (applying research and innovation to sectoral policies) that has been mainstreamed in the 
global planning process. In the absence of SBS, some departments either would have had to wait to 
launch the same initiatives, or would have needed to adapt the initiatives to the limited availability of 
funds. 
Alternative modalities would not have attained the same objectives. Findings indicate that SBS has 
acted as a facilitator of innovation: the role of SBS to facilitate the access of the departments to funds 
for innovative programmes, conceived within the departments and owned by the relevant institutions, 
would not be replaceable by a project or a facility. These could be an important complement to SBS but 
could  not  substitute  them:  a  project  –  even  in  the  best  cases  –  can  easily  represent  particular  or 
external interests and introduce rigidities in the budgeting and policy processes that would  induce a 
reduction of the ownership by the key sectoral actors. For such reasons in most sectors SBS represents 
an evolution of a cooperation, which started with project-type operations that showed their limits. 
Compared to projects, SBS increases as well ODA transparency and accountability: the provision of aid 
in  the  form  of  SBS  (RDP  and  other  conditions)  automatically  ensures  financial  accountability 
(incomes/expenditures  are  reported  on  by  the  GoSA)  and  enables  SBS  to  feature  highly  among 
government accountability documentation and planning, budgeting and reporting processes
84.   
   
                                                       
83 Employment creation, ROM Report MR-136102.01, 12/02010, p.2 
84 Currently the main central mechanism to enable political accountability of ODA funds is the annual report on the 
RDP  Fund,  which  however  only  covers  ODA  programmes  financed  through  the  RDP  fund  and  concerns  the 
management of the fund (deposits, disbursements and balance) but not the onward management of resources. 
DCR III report, July 2010, p. 81 44 
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4.5  EQ5 (Step 1) - Policy formulation / implementation processes 
Evaluation Question 5: Have there been improvements in the areas supported by BS, in policy 
formulation/policy  review  and  implementation  processes,  and  related  accountability,  and  to 
what  extent  and  through  which  mechanisms  (flow  of  funds,  policy  and  institutional  effects, 
others) has BS contributed to these improvements? 
In a number of sectors and sub-sectors, the capacity of the SBS-supported programmes to enhance the 
internal policy and institutional processes of GoSA and other state or non-state institutions appears to 
be significant. 
The availability of BS funds represents an opportunity for such institutions to design and implement, in a 
relatively short time, coherent programmes to test new policy and institutional approaches.  
The dialogue between the two parties is important to decide, shape and monitor these programmes, 
although it is rarely connected to wider strategic exchanges. While capacity development is a priority 
area in most programmes, the exchange of experience and know-how has remained relatively weak. 
The various components of the SBS package operate in different ways in each programme. The role of 
funds is always significant, while the strength and the quality of dialogue depends mainly upon: i) the 
actual level of trust and understanding among the main counterparts (positive examples: MSB I, Access 
to  Justice,  LSPSP  and  IPA);  and  ii)  the  specific  dynamics  and  initiative  at  sectoral  level  (positive 
examples: IPA and PrimCare). Finally, while most SBS supported programmes have contributed to the 
strengthening of the institutional and operational capacities of the institutions involved, only in the cases 
of RCF and PrimCare (and partly in IPA), was capacity development associated with an exchange of 
know-how between the partners, which built on the specific experience of EU and SA. 
The  BS  modality  shows  very  strong  comparative  advantages  vis-à-vis  other  modalities  in  terms  of 
ownership and capacity to reflect and adapt to the specific recipients’ dynamics. However, the way in 
which this modality has been implemented has limited the external contributions in terms of specialised 
know-how,  unless  specific  arrangements  were  put  in  place  (e.g.  high-level  TA  components, 
complementarity with other programmes). 
4.5.1  Strengthening of policies and policy processes (JC5.1) 
There is significant evidence of the contribution of SBS-supported programmes to the policy process in 
various areas. In the cases of MSB I, IPA, Access to Justice, LSPSP, PrimCare and other SBS, the 
contribution to the innovation of the policy process is strong and visible. The programmes contributed to 
an experimentation that, based on its positive results, has helped to shape the main policy framework of 
the  concerned  sector  (for  instance,  in  the  case  of  MSB)  and/or  establish  new  sector  priorities  and 
strategic budget allocations (for instance, in the case of IPA). In the case of Access to Justice, the 
programme has contributed to policy innovation through civil society participation in service delivery in 
strategic  areas  of  constitutional  development.  The  LSPSP  has  contributed  to  the  policy  process  of 
Legislative Sector development and institutionalisation. (see also Indicators 5.1.1 to 5.1.3 in Volume II) 
In  the  Private  Sector  Development  and  Employment  area,  the  strongest  contributions  may  be 
summarised as follows: 
  Mainstreaming of innovation in the policy and budgeting process (IPA) − namely, through the 
compulsory inclusion of ICT programmes in the budget across all departments, which reflects 
the strength of the lessons learned in the DST experience with the IPA programme. 
  Filling  specific  gaps  and/or  addressing  complementary  areas  in  the  main  sector  policy 
framework  (SWEEEP),  such  as:  research  to  support  the  strategic  framework  for  women 
empowerment; fast-tracking formulation of new policies, as in the case of consumer policies; 
contribution to legal and regulatory reforms to improve the business environment. 
  Testing and developing new implementation approaches (RCF), such as addressing financial 
market failures through IDC co-financing of risky projects. 
  In the case of ECF, there is no evidence so far of specific contributions to the policy process in 
the area of employment generation. 
In the Water Sector, the main contribution of the SBS-supported programmes was observed in the case 
of MSB I. The SBS operation allowed the provision of a comprehensive pilot experience, from which the 
lessons  were  consolidated  and  mainstreamed  in  the  2003  Strategic  Framework for Water  Services 
(SFWS)  and  further  developed  throughout  the  decade.  In  particular,  MSB  I  illustrated  the  need  to 
systematically shape the response to local and provincial governments around the key focus areas. The 
SFWS took into account local government transformation, new water policies, and the new financial 
framework. As stated by DWA, “by 2002 it became clear that the 1994 White Paper for Water Services 45 
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was outdated. It was necessary to put forward a vision for the water services sector in South Africa that 
took account of progress in the establishment of democratic local governments
85.” Moreover, the SFWS 
confirmed that, while DWAF would no longer be directly involved in operating any water infrastructure or 
funding any new infrastructure, it would continue to set policy frameworks, oversee and regulate water 
service  institutions,  and  support  the  functioning  of  those  services,  as  MSB  I  had  successfully 
experimented in doing. In MSB II and III, the contribution to improving policy process was less evident, 
and the focus was on widening and strengthening the implementation. 
In the Governance Sector: 
  The Access to Justice programme has helped DoJCD explore new strategies to better fulfil its 
constitutional  mandate  through  innovative  co-operation  with  civil  society.  The  department 
engaged in systematic ways with one key non-state interlocutor, the Foundation for Human 
Rights (FHR), which fulfilled various core functions in a number of strategic areas. It developed 
credible and effective systems to operate as a grantor and engage with civil society for service 
delivery  in  priority  policy  areas.  These  areas  included  pilots  both  for  testing  out  extending 
service  delivery  and  for  providing  alternative  services.  In  doing  so,  FHR  also  sought  to 
strengthen  capacities  and  leadership  of  civil  society  organisations.  The  department  also 
involved FHR in seeking innovative ways to sensitise citizens on their constitutional rights and 
to strengthen organised forms of citizens’ demands for improved public service delivery and 
accountability. The positive DoJCD experience with FHR has demonstrated the relevance of 
such targeted engagement strategy with civil society and has provided a basis to mainstream 
such  a  partnership  approach  through  the  interdepartmental  Justice,  Conflict  Prevention  and 
Security Cluster in GoSA policies. 
  The Legislative Sector support has become fully integrated into the sector architecture, and has 
effectively facilitated the co-operation and interaction between the multiple components of the 
sector  in  the  four  key  result  areas.  The  LSPSP  has  supported  the  complex  and  gradual 
institutionalisation of the Legislative Sector, as shown by its contribution to ensure continuity 
when the key political actors (most of the members of the Speakers’ Forum) changed in 2009. It 
also contributed to the establishment of sector co-ordination and co-operation arrangements, 
capacity development (for example, through specialised training and tertiary training packages), 
and development of transparent, harmonised and consensual rules of operation in areas such 
as oversight functions or ‘people-centred democracy’. 
In  the  Health  Sector,  both  SBS-supported  programmes  (PfH II  and  PrimCare)  have  contributed  to 
shaping and strengthening DoH strategy to PHC services and to further developing the existing policy 
framework (e.g. on Community Care Worker Management). In particular, the programmes have had 
notable effects on: 
  the successful experimentation of new initiatives and ways of delivering services at local level, 
with the results of enhancing the sector strategy that was being developed in this area;  
  the  greater  involvement  of  new  stakeholders  in  the  sector  governance  (e.g.  non-profit 
organisations, community caregivers, or private service providers) and, as a consequence, the 
greater participation in related policy processes. 
Moreover, in the context of the development of the National Health Insurance system and the related 
policy  framework,  the  DoH  experimented  with  different  innovative  models  for  the  delivery  of  health 
services (especially in remote areas), directly supported by the PrimCare programme. 
In  the  Education  Sector,  the  sector  context  that  prevailed  during  the  implementation  of  the  SBS-
supported  programme  was  characterised  by  the  difficulties  experienced  with  the  outcome-based 
education reform implemented in previous years
86 and the major institutional change that took place in 
2009
87. The SBS -supported national programme finally took the form of an innovation facility that 
allowed the experimentation of tools and systems to enhance the implementation of a variety of sector 
actions (e.g. development of  a national textbook catalogue, new approach to  multi-grade teaching or 
creation by DHET of synergies between various South African Universities in relation to teacher training 
programmes and research projects on teaching in early grades). 
                                                       
85 DWAF (2004), A history of the first decade of Water Service delivery in South Africa 1994-2004: meeting the 
millennium development challenges, p. 21. 
86 The reform was finally dropped in 2010. 
87 The Department of Education was split into two departments: Department of Basic Education, and Department of 
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In the Urban Renewal Area, while the SBS-supported programmes aim to enhance the commitment of 
the relevant Municipalities (and, more broadly, GoSA) to innovative forms of area-based governance 
and management, evidence of their contribution to the strengthening of policies and policy processes is 
mixed. Documentary evidence points to the transfer of good practices leading − especially in the case 
of eThekwini − to the adoption of similar practices within the broader work of the Municipality. However, 
these practices have yet to translate into formalised changes in policy processes. Interviews, on the 
other hand, point to the importance of: i) lessons learned through the SBS-supported URP – as well as 
other URPs – in shaping future policy for urban development; and ii) the role played by the eThekwini 
programme  in  testing  the  new  Area-Based  Management  idea,  and  thereby  contributing  to  policy 
direction through the subsequent set-up of the Neighbourhood Development Programme in 2007. 
4.5.2  Strengthening of public sector institutional and technical capacities (JC5.2) 
Most SBS-supported programmes have contributed to strengthening the institutional framework of the 
relevant sectors by: enhancing the capacities of the institutions involved (e.g. MSB support to the new 
institutional  set-up  of  the  sector,  based  on  the  policy  guidance  of  DWA  and  the  management 
responsibility of local and provincial governments); strengthening the sectoral dialogue, thanks to the 
innovative policies supported (e.g. IPA); supporting and consolidating new institutional mechanisms that 
may include demand-side pressures from non-state actors (Access to Justice, LSPSP); helping existing 
institutions to specialise in new strategic functions (e.g. IDC for risk capital management). (see also 
Indicators 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3) 
In the Private Sector Development and Employment area, the specific contributions are limited and may 
be summarised as follows: 
  SWEEEP has contributed to the creation of some spin-offs (e.g. SEDA incubation, involvement 
of non-profit organisation) and to the consolidation of several internal capacities, such as the 
donor co-ordination. 
  IDC’s support service has been consolidated through the implementation of the RCF and the 
related capacity-building components (EIB). In this framework, the IDC has acquired new skills 
and has established new functions which, in time, have led to: i) the transformation of the RCF 
unit into a much larger unit that manages a range of both off-balance sheet funds and IDC ring-
fenced  on-balance  funds;  and  ii)  the  existence  of  a  dedicated  team  that  provides  business 
support services (diagnosing business support needs, engaging and appointing consultants to 
work with clients in addressing the identified gaps, ...). 
  IPA has helped to enhance the sectoral dialogue and has contributed to feeding the cluster 
approach  in  the  sector.  The  contribution  to  the  policy  process  highlighted  above  is  itself  a 
consequence of the IPA’s capacity to promote sectoral dialogue and co-ordination. 
  ECF created a separate PMU and deployed specific TA, the contribution of which so far has 
been limited. 
In the Water Sector, the contribution of MSB I, MSB II and MSB III to the institutional strengthening and 
capacity-building was particularly high.  
  At provincial and local levels, there is considerable evidence of increased technical capacities 
in the sector. Through MSB, DWA and SALGA provided support to Water Service Authorities 
and  Water  Service  Providers  to  establish  their  water  governance  functions,  identify 
performance gaps, develop action plans with performance targets, and prepare support plans 
to achieve performance targets. 
  Before Masibambane, there were some co-ordination forums, but they were generally seen as 
top-down rather than collaborative, and the stakeholders – according to the documentation and 
the interviews – had a sense of operating in silos. The current sector co-ordination structures at 
national and provincial levels have been initiated through  MSB. As sector leader, these are 
chaired by DWA, and generally include the main actors (government and non-government) at 
the respective levels. Masibambane is  widely seen  as having  been extremely successful in 
creating a sense of sector belonging and ownership, as well as a culture of consultation, co-
ordination  and  experience-sharing  at  national  and  provincial  levels,  bringing  together  sector 
stakeholders.  
  This institutional and capacity-building contribution was stronger in MSB I, continued in MSB II, 
and  was  reduced  in  MSB  III,  due  to  changes  in  leadership  and  expertise  (MSB  III  final 
evaluation and interviews). 47 
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In the Governance Sector, the contribution to institutional strengthening and capacity-building is also 
strong. For example: 
  The Access to Justice programme has helped to create an environment in which one non-state 
partner  of  DoJCD,  the  Foundation  for  Human  Rights,  was  able  to  strengthen  technical 
capacities  in  areas  such  as  developing  effective  and  credible  grant  schemes,  assessing 
capacity needs with civil society grantees, improving monitoring and evaluation methodologies, 
and extending service delivery to poor and marginalised communities in the Justice Sector. The 
partnership model combined sector dialogue, policy innovation, policy-oriented research, and 
service  delivery  with  networking,  sensitisation  on  human  rights,  and  capacity  support  for 
grantees. This mix of functions may create demand-side pressures at the interface between 
(organised) citizenry and public authorities (at different governance levels). Such demands can 
centre on improved service delivery, accountability, or transparency. There is also evidence of 
departmental buy-in to the idea of continued government support to civil society functions as 
experimented  through  FHR  and  the  Access  to  Justice  programme,  although  the  exact 
arrangements are not yet articulated. 
  The LSPSP has contributed to the institutional structuring of the  Legislative Sector, thereby 
strengthening  technical  capacities  (e.g.  management,  planning,  standardisation,  human 
resource  functions,  systems),  as  well  as  creating  the  environment  and  providing  the 
mechanisms to stimulate sector actors at national and provincial levels to improve performance 
in key areas. With better systems in place, more training opportunities, and more opportunities 
for the various legislative bodies (including secretariats) to meet, the chances are higher that 
efforts  by  other  institutions,  such  as  the  Auditor  General  of  South  Africa,  or  the  capacity 
development efforts by the Fiscal and Financial Commission, add up to a stronger sector in 
terms of its key mandate. However, there are still strong political disincentives at work, and the 
change  process  is  not  merely  a  technocratic  one  of  capacity  strengthening.  The  LSPSP 
component  that  is  geared  to  international  co-operation  with  legislative  bodies  (including  the 
European  Parliament)  has  institutionalised  this  outreach  function  of  the  South  African 
Legislative sector. 
In the Health Sector, the contribution to institutional strengthening and capacity development is also 
strong. The Partnership for Health contributed to strengthening various aspects of sector governance. 
Capacity development, in particular, was a key feature of the programme, and there is evidence of 
notable  improvement  at  all  institutional  levels.  The  TA  recently  provided  under  the  PrimCare 
programme  has  also  reportedly  played  a  key  role  in  terms  of  reinforcing  institutional  capacities  at 
central level. 
In the Education Sector, there is no strong evidence of significant increase in capacities within the line 
ministries or at provincial/local government level in relation to the initiatives supported. The internal calls 
for proposals organised by the departments under the programme have had some positive effects on 
the institutional structure, especially in terms of reinforcing internal reporting lines, but they have had 
limited  short-term  effects  on  the  actual  capacities  of  the  national  departments’  staff  in  terms  of 
formulation, reporting and monitoring. 
Results  in  the  Urban  Renewal  Area  are  overall  limited,  with  significant  differences  across  the 
municipalities,  and  are  influenced  by  the  fact  that,  while  the  programmes  are  located  within  the 
Municipalities, they are managed separately − often through the recruitment of additional staff. That 
said, and despite the continuing challenges posed by the human resource capacity (especially in some 
Municipalities), the programmes have indeed fostered the strengthening of individual and institutional 
capacities,  although  these  remain  seated  within  the  intervention  areas.  Improvements  have  been 
recorded in terms of: i) more integrated patterns of line management delivery across line departments, 
and  scattered  evidence  of  enhanced  inter-governmental  co-ordination  processes;  and  ii)  the 
introduction of improved systems and procedures at Municipal level in the case of eThekwini. 
4.5.3  Enhanced multi-actor partnerships (JC5.3) 
In the Governance Sector, this effect of the SBS-supported programmes has been particularly high, 
especially in the Access to Justice. In the Water Sector, the involvement of the NSAs has been partly 
overlooked. In the PSD, there are some positive examples. 
In the Private Sector Development and Employment area, the specific contributions are limited: 
  SWEEEP contributed to the strengthening of a number of public-private partnerships (e.g. CAV, 
Deciduous Fruit Canning, Black Tea, National Tooling Initiatives, Business Unity South Africa). 48 
Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa 
Final report - Volume 1 - 2013 - Particip GmbH 
  IPA has promoted some significant partnerships with private enterprises, national institutions 
and NGOs (e.g. Sasol Chemcity), although involvement of the private sector, according to the 
existing assessments, is suboptimal. 
  In the IDC-RCF strategy, public-private partnerships do not seem a priority. 
  In the ECF, the promotion of multi-actor partnerships is not a priority area. 
In the Water Sector, non-state actors’ participation throughout MSB was problematic, and deteriorated 
by the end of MSB
88. The focus was on the building of a system based on the integration between DWA 
and the provincial and local administrations. The involvement of non -sate actors was not a priority, and 
– according to some informed opinions  – it probably diminished as an indirect consequence of the 
programme implementation. 
In  the  Governance  Sector,  the  implementation  of  the  SBS-supported  programmes  has  contributed 
directly and indirectly to enhanced partnerships with non-state actors:  
  The  Access  to  Justice  SBS-supported  programme  is  based  on  a  strategic  collaboration 
between DoJCD and FHR, a civil society actor that has, over the years, specialised in acting as 
a  grantor,  a  facilitator,  and  a  capacity  developer  (it  calls  on  specialised  CSOs  to  provide 
organisational  and  other  support  to  a  host  of  grassroots  and  civil  society  organisations). 
Structured mechanisms of co-ordination and consultation between DoJCD and FHR have been 
created and consolidated (quarterly meetings and reporting systems). In addition, the EUD has 
managed a complementary action to the SBS operation that supports a number of medium-
sized  and  larger  NGOs  in  related  strategic  intervention  areas.  Furthermore,  the  bilateral 
meetings between the EUD and its CSO partners created possibilities for synergies between 
the two components, although DoJCD was keen to see more transparency on the side of the 
EUD on the EUD-managed component. 
  A specific component of the LSPSP addresses public participation with the Legislative Sector. 
A report on public participation (commissioned under the Legislative sector programme) pointed 
out that, while a Public Participation Framework and a number of structures were in place to 
support public participation at national and provincial levels (and, indeed, numerous exchanges 
take place between the various legislatures and citizens), a number of shortcomings needed to 
be addressed. To that end, the Legislative sector programme had launched a process to design 
a new public participation framework, which would contribute to greater standardisation and 
lesson-learning. Civil society, along with government and other legislative bodies in the world, 
are invited to the annual International Consultative Seminar. 
The  more  structured  and  varied  forms  of  engagement  between  civil  society,  citizens  and  public 
authorities (including People’s Parliaments, but also, for example, sector dialogue, consultation, service 
delivery) are a feature of South Africa’s participatory democracy. Both Access to Justice programme 
and LSPSP have contributed to creating opportunities for such engagement, which may – if sufficiently 
strong – create political incentives or create accountability pressures on public authorities at various 
levels in the two sub-sectors. This is a positive consequence, although public authorities might perceive 
it as a problem. 
In  the  Health  Sector,  the  two  SBS-supported  programmes  have  had  a  strong  focus  on  multi-actor 
partnerships, and notable achievements have been recorded in this area. In particular, the civil society 
and the private sector were given an important role in the PHC model that was developed by DoH in 
recent years. The new framework for sector governance that has been established has also enabled 
non-state actors to play a stronger role in policy processes in a sector where, historically, relations had 
not always been easy between them and the Department. 
In the Education Sector, there is an intense sectoral dialogue taking place at national level, but the 
overall role of civil society in policy formulation and M&E processes remains limited, while accountability 
chains have remained weak, especially at community level. Despite some notable examples (e.g. the 
previously  mentioned  networks  of  Universities  to  enhance  teaching  programmes  and  curriculum 
development), there is very little evidence that the SBS-supported initiatives have contributed to any 
evolution in this area.  
In the Urban Renewal Area, there are mixed results − more pronounced in the case of eThekwini and 
extremely limited in the case of Buffalo City, with Nelson Mandela Bay somewhere in the middle. While 
                                                       
88 MSB III Final Evaluation found that “despite examples of individual CSOs doing relevant and vital work in the 
water sector, the programmatic development of CSOs in the sector has largely failed to take place over the course 
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the  involvement  of  civil  society  was  not  fostered  through  the  inclusion  of  specific  complementary 
envelopes,  the  implementation  of  the  programmes  has  tested  innovative  forms  of  area-based 
management, giving rise to the increasing involvement of  various community  and civil society role-
players in developmental local government. In the case of eThekwini, it is argued that, despite some 
limitations, general democratic engagement has been expanded in the learning areas as a result of the 
positive  effect  of  the  area-based  programme  on  opportunities  and  space  for  consultation.  More 
generally, it is argued that the programme has contributed to enhanced area-based communication 
between the Municipality and communities. 
4.5.4  Enhanced quality and quantity of goods and services provided (JC5.4) 
In  most  cases,  the  SBS-supported  programmes  have  contributed  either  directly  or  indirectly  to 
enhancing  the  quantity  of  public  goods  and  services  provided,  at  least  in  their  specific  areas  of 
implementation. Often they have contributed also to improving the quality of the delivery, when they 
have helped to provide new/innovative services (e.g. IPA, Access to Justice, PrimCare). However, there 
is little evidence that they have contributed to improving the quality of the standard services (e.g. in the 
Water Sector, there is little qualitative improvement). (see also Indicator 5.4.1)  
In the Private Sector Development and Employment area, the specific contributions are summarised as 
follows: 
  It is largely recognised that RCF has contributed to the creation and consolidation of a new 
instrument to support SMEs − namely, co-financing risky investments beyond the risk-aversion 
threshold of the existing financial system. 
  IPA, despite its experimental and demonstrative nature, has contributed to an extension of ICT 
services to the rural poor, and the creation of specialised support services for new economic 
activities. 
  ECF has not yet shown its expected potential for extended employment creation opportunities 
and support. 
  SWEEEP’s contribution has been mainly instrumental to providing complements to the policy 
and institutional process, while it is difficult to identify specific contributions in terms of actual 
service delivery. 
In the Water Sector, the final evaluation of MSB III (2012) provided an updated assessment of the 
expanded coverage, but not of the quality of the service delivery. Indeed, whilst MSB contributed a lot to 
the  quantitative  extension  of  the  coverage,  serious  questions  remain  about  the  quality  of  services 
provided. The final evaluation of MSB III notes that “a wide range of surveys, assessments, statistics 
and media reports indicate a combination of complex challenges and mismanagement in water services 
delivery”. 
In the Governance Sector: 
  DoJCD (Justice) was able to extend its service delivery reach by engaging with civil society on 
alternative service provision in areas such as conflict resolution and restorative justice (e.g. 
Community Advice Offices created, Service Level Agreements signed, cases diverted, asylum 
seekers assisted). Qualitative indicators and data are harder to come by, and the M&E systems 
in place do not yet provide adequate information. 
  LSPSP  has  improved  the  implementation  of  the  Legislative  Sector  strategy  and  the 
institutionalisation of the sector by strengthening the Legislative Sector Support unit, and by 
enhancing the opportunities for members of Parliament and of the provincial legislatures, as 
well as secretarial staff, to engage in structured ways on management and content issues. Peer 
learning, training, strengthening  information services and creating international linkages and 
collaborations were facilitated and organised. 
In the Health Sector, there have been significant and documented improvements over recent years in 
the quality of the PHC services provided and in the quantity of PHC services. 
In  the  Education  Sector,  improvements  have  been  recorded  in  certain  results  areas.  However, 
important challenges prevail in the sector, and the effects of the supported actions (many of which 
started after 2011 and focus on improving the institutional environment at central level) will take time to 
materialise. 
In  the  Urban  Renewal  Area,  despite  delays  in  the  availability  of  funds  (due  to  multiple  factors), 
improvements have been registered with regard to the quantity of services provided through the SBS-
supported  URPs  and  to  the  ways  in  which  needs  are  being  met.  All  in  all,  the  programmes  have 
contributed to: i) improved basic and development infrastructure; ii) job creation (direct employment for 
infrastructure  creation  and  skills  training  leading  to  job  creation,  including  incubators);  and  iii) 50 
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improvements  in  terms  of  social  development  by  supporting  quality  living  environments,  as  well  as 
safety and security projects. 
4.5.5  Strengthening of M&E capacities and systems (JC5.5) 
In general, in the SBS-supported programmes, there has not been a specific focus on improving GoSA 
M&E capacities and systems. M&E systems have been developed in the Government-Wide Monitoring 
and Evaluation Framework (GWMEF) and were placed under the responsibility of the DPME of the 
Presidency in 2010 which has been supported by the EU. Water and Governance sectors are probably 
an exception, as the programmes have directly contributed to strengthening and aligning the monitoring 
systems to better fit the innovative policy and implementation frameworks (in the case of MSB, the 
monitoring system – and, consequently, reporting – has been radically revised and upgraded). (see also 
Indicators 5.5.1 to 5.5.4) 
In the Private Sector Development and Employment area, the M&E mechanisms put in place have not 
specifically contributed to improving government capacities and tools. Specific attention has been given 
to ensure that the KPIs agreed upon between the parties correspond to the data collected for GoSA 
M&E (e.g. a rider approved in the ECF to strengthen alignment of the indicators). 
In the Water Sector, it is agreed among sector partners that MSB has had a strong and positive effect 
on  sector  reporting  by  establishing  clear  sector  goals  and  targets,  a  Regulatory  Performance 
Management System (RPMS), and regular reporting modalities, with inputs from sector stakeholders, 
including  municipalities.  Furthermore,  the  quality  of  reporting  from  municipalities  is  seen  as  having 
improved significantly over the years, although M&E systems still appear to be top-down. The role of 
municipalities is mainly to feed information to national level. The system and data collection is not used 
locally as a planning and learning tool, but rather seen as a requirement from the national level to check 
municipal performance. This might explain some reluctance towards reporting on poor performance. 
In the Governance Sector: 
  The stakeholders in the Access to Justice programme – DoJCD and the Foundation for Human 
Rights – have agreed upon a framework for monitoring  and  evaluation  that serves multiple 
purposes  of  multiple  partners,  and  that  is  in  line  with  the  directives  of  the  Presidency  for 
monitoring and evaluation. FHR has started strengthening monitoring and reporting so as to 
better capture  quality  aspects of service delivery, as well  as  identifying the reasons behind 
success  (or  failure),  using  new  approaches  (such  as  story  telling),  making  use  of  baseline 
surveys, and developing new systems. Included in the SBS package was the integration of a 
TA for Strategy, M&E Unit of the DoJCD. 
  The Legislative Sector has rolled out a monitoring plan on the Legislative Sector Support for the 
whole  sector.  LSPSP  monitoring  is  an  integrated  part  of  the  sector-wide  reporting,  which 
combines process and results indicators and, for the time being, is mainly about quantitative 
measures, which don’t as yet allow for assessment of sector performance in terms of its main 
mission, functions, or areas of responsibility. 
In the Health Sector, there are well-established information systems. The initiatives supported by the 
two  SBS  operations  have  both  placed  special  attention  on  data  collection,  including  via  the 
implementation of specific activities in this area. Overall, notable improvements have been recorded in 
terms of M&E capacities and systems. 
In the Education Sector, the institutional changes that occurred in 2009 (with the split of the Department 
of  Education  into  two  departments)  posed  some  challenges  in  terms  of  ensuring  consistency  and 
continuity in the database in place. Moreover, the way certain indicators are measured has evolved 
during programme implementation
89. As a result, the MTR carried out in 2012 recommended to revise 
several indicators and targets. That said,  the information systems in place are well established , and 
most initial KPIs were selected from existing lists of indicators that were r egularly monitored. Overall, 
there are several areas of improvement in the way data is collected, and especially used.  
In the case of the two  Urban Renewal  programmes, the riders have introduced key performance 
indicators (KPIs) corresponding to data that is monitored irrespective of the reporting needs linked to 
the SBS operations (FAs). That said, evidence collected points to the fact that both programmes lacked 
an efficient and effective M&E system, which has prevented : i) easy access to good quality da ta on 
programmes outcomes; and ii) the systematic gathering of experience to inform best practices and 
learning. In the case of eThekwini, the mid-term review actually points to the choice of the aid modality 
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as one of the factors that have negatively affected the set-up and running of an effective monitoring 
system. 
4.5.6  Specific SBS contributions (JC5.6) 
In  most  cases,  the  financial  contribution  of  SBS  has  been  a  determinant  in  avoiding  delays  and 
dispersion in the implementation of innovative policies, the needs and design of which had originated 
from within the GoSA departments and/or other sector institutions. The EU-SA dialogue has contributed 
to the design and monitoring of most programmes − namely, by making the commitment to embark on 
the specific support, by agreeing on the framework of the indicators and triggers, and by assessing their 
achievements. In some cases (Governance), the dialogue − enhanced by long-standing relationships 
and  high  levels  of  trust  −  has  provided  an  important  contribution  to  conceiving  and  shaping  the 
programmes.  In  other  –  and  mostly  more  recent  cases  (i.e.  third  phase  SBS  operations)  -  it  has 
interacted  with  the  inter-institutional  sectoral  dialogue  (IPA,  MSB,  Access  to  Justice,  LSPSP  or 
PrimCare),  while  in  few  cases  (IPA  and  LSPSP)  it  has  relied  on  significant  links  with  the  strategic 
partnership.  TA  and  capacity-building  provided  through  SBS  or  complementary  actions  have  been 
important in many cases, although they have favoured specific know-how exchanges and related value 
added only in some programmes (e.g. RCF, Access to Justice, PrimCare). (see also Indicators 5.6.1 
and 5.6.2) 
In  the  Private  Sector  Development  and  Employment  area,  the  SBS  has  contributed  to  the  four 
programmes (SWEEEP, RCF, IPA and ECF), mainly allowing experimentation of new approaches and 
measures (RCF and IPA) and the provision of specific complements to existing policies (SWEEEP and 
ECF).  In  all  these  cases,  the  financial  contribution  of  SBS  seems  the  most  important,  since  the 
experimental design and other policy support were conceived by the relevant departments and were 
implemented as coherent programmes due to the availability of the additional funds provided by SBS. 
The dialogue and other non-financial components have had some importance, particularly in the case of 
IPA and RCF: 
  IPA was conceived in a framework of strong sectoral dialogue promoted by DST − namely, in 
the GoSA Economic Cluster, to advocate a more intensive application of the new technologies 
in the economic policies. On the other hand, DST considers the strategic dialogue with EU a 
fundamental  window  of  opportunities  for  its  international  relations.  In  such  a framework,  its 
association with the EU, in the effort to enhance innovation in the national economic policies, 
was seen as a materialisation of the EU-SA strategic partnership − including the possibility of 
extending the Innovation for Poverty Alleviation approach to other African countries. The EU 
has  been  involved  in  the  sectoral  dialogue,  in  the  accompanying  workshops,  and  in 
dissemination activities. 
  RCF has benefited from the EU experience mainly through the participation of the European 
Investment  Bank  (EIB),  for  the  design  and  establishment  of  a  risk  capital  facility  and  the 
necessary  capacity-building  support.  EIB  specific  experience,  in  the  EU,  as  well  as  in  the 
accession and neighbouring countries, has been considered highly relevant and valuable for 
SA. Such exchange of know-how has been fundamental to launching and consolidating the 
IDC-managed programme. 
  In the other cases, the dialogue has played a role in the phases of preparation, monitoring and 
evaluation of the SBS Financing Agreements − namely, for the definition and negotiation of the 
indicators and triggers. A TA component was included only in the RCF SBS, as the programme 
relied on the EIB experience and expertise. 
In the Water Sector, the key SBS contribution has also been the availability of funds, which has allowed 
the launching and experimentation of an innovative policy approach, the results of which have brought 
about the establishment of a new sector policy framework. Indeed, the trust and dialogue developed 
over the  years through project support  have played a critical role  when  the  decision to  embark  on 
budget  support  was  taken  in  1999,  selecting  the  Water  Sector  and  the  experimentation  of  a  new 
institutional set-up as an area for a challenging new partnership between GoSA and the EU. In the 
meantime, the dialogue has played a role during the implementation, mainly as a vehicle for raising 
concerns about the lack of progress made with regard to cross-cutting issues. For instance, in April 
2009, the EUD raised concerns about the gender mainstreaming strategy not being developed, and 
about the role of civil society. The TA has not been included among the SBS inputs, although the quality 
and quantity of TA have been assessed by the EUD when considering requests for payment of the fixed 
tranches (MSB III). 52 
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In the Governance Sector, the dialogue between the EU and government partners has enabled the 
transformation  from  project  to  sector  budget  support,  and  has  been  a  key  factor  in  shaping  and 
implementing the supported innovative programmes. For example: 
  Building on the existing trust levels, the Access to Justice programme enabled DoJCD and FHR 
to  pilot  a  government-owned  engagement  policy,  with  civil  society  as  innovators,  service 
deliverers, communicators and sensitisers, and as development actors in their own right (with 
the department respecting the CSO right to take the initiative). In addition, the EU agreed with 
the department to manage part of the financial resources of the Access to Justice programme 
directly through a Call For Proposals in support of bigger NGOs, on a complementary agenda. 
This approach, supported by the SBS funds, has: enhanced mechanisms for dialogue on policy 
innovation and implementation among key sector actors; supported demand-side pressures in 
certain  policy  areas;  widened  service  delivery  through  CSO  grantees;  and  contributed  to 
innovative ways of sensitisation through public broadcasting and other avenues. Through the 
interdepartmental Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster, the scope for uptake of such 
policy innovation was broadened. 
If  the  trust  and  dialogue  between  the  partners  have  played  a  key  role  in  promoting  the 
innovative approach, the funds have allowed such a challenging experimentation to materialise, 
and have leveraged on GoSA investment. 
  In  the  LSPSP,  the  sector  approach  is  the  consequence  of  an  evolution  within  the  National 
Parliament and in its relationship with the Executive, but it has been strongly facilitated by the 
opportunity  represented  by  the  SBS,  including  the  commitment  of  the  EU  to  provide 
comprehensive support in such a sensitive area. The dialogue between the Assembly Speaker 
and the EUD has been fundamental to the shift from the previous support project to an SBS 
aimed  at  supporting  a  Sector-Wide  Approach.  As  in  the  IPA  case,  here  also  the  EU-SA 
strategic partnership has played a role as a backdrop to enhancing the sector co-operation 
reach,  as  shown  by  the  support  that  the  Sector  programme  provides  to  the  EU-SA  inter-
parliamentary relationships. 
The  SBS  funds  not  only  have  helped  to  bring  about  the  effects  of  the  dialogue  and  the 
partnership referred above, but may also have contributed to leveraging budget allocations in 
that  it  may  have  facilitated  the  negotiations  led  by  the  Assembly  Speaker  to obtain  budget 
allocations for new programmes in the sector. 
In the Health Sector, the whole SBS package has provided significant contributions. The availability of 
funds has been an important stimulus for DoH to identify and launch an innovative programme in the 
framework  of  the  PHC  strategy,  with  a  focus  on  local  service  delivery,  including  a  general  re-
engineering of the approach and a strong contribution by CSOs. Dialogue on the thematic issues, in the 
design phase, has helped to focus the EU contribution. The recent EU contribution (via a delegation 
agreement)  to  the  TA  provided  by  DFID  is  also  likely  to  play  an  instrumental  role  in  further 
strengthening the institutional environment and policy framework in the sector. The use of the TDCA 
Facility as a complement to address issues related to models and best practices − namely in the areas 
of NHI and Regulatory Medicine − has helped policy makers in their strategic decisions. 
In the Education Sector, policy dialogue was very limited and TA/CD was neither provided in the form of 
a  complementary  envelope  nor  mentioned  in  the  FA.  The  main  contributions  were  made  via  the 
provision of funds for the experimentation of new tools or systems to enhance the implementation of the 
sector strategy. 
In the Urban Renewal Area, the transfer of funds represents the most important component of the SBS 
operations, in the light of the very limited policy dialogue and what turned out to be a significant but 
insufficient provision for complementary TA. The testing of innovative forms of area-based governance 
was  part  of  a  national  programme, conceived  by  the  GoSA  and  put  in  place  through  national  (but 
decentralised) mechanisms in the form of urban renewal programmes. However, SBS – through the 
provision of funds – has contributed to the testing of such an idea, especially during the initial phases 
with the support provided to eThekwini. 
Counterfactual considerations  
Could the effects mentioned above have been obtained in the absence of the SBS, or through other 
forms of aid? In general, the answer should be “No”. In most cases, SBS guaranteed an opportunity to 
launch  innovative/new  policies  originated  from  within  the  relevant  institutions  that  could  have  been 
missed otherwise. In addition, the comparison with previous or potential projects demonstrates that the 53 
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level of ownership − and, hence, the adaptation, co-ordination and alignment − ensured by BS would 
not be attainable through alternative, more traditional instruments
90. (see also indicator 5.6.3) 
  In the RCF case, an IDC project probably could have produced comparable effects, although 
the  level  of  GoSA  ownership  through  the  SBS  is  higher  and  could  be  used  for  better 
mainstreaming and further extension of the policy and the approach, beyond the IDC itself. 
  In the IPA case, the experimentation and the important mainstreaming of its results (see above) 
could have been delayed and/or dispersed if the SBS was not available. On the other hand, a 
project would not have ensured a comparable level of ownership, with consequences in terms 
of flexible execution, rapid feedback and connection with the sectoral dialogue. 
  In the SWEEEP case, the flexible and diversified use of SBS resources also would not have 
been possible with a traditional project, as shown by the various experiences of dti. Considering 
the  multitude  of  areas  addressed,  however,  a  well-funded  facility  could  have  positively 
complemented the programme by ensuring a flexible access to high quality expertise. 
  In the Water case, the possibility of an SBS has accelerated the experimentation, according to 
various  stakeholders.  It  would  not  have  been  possible  to  address  such  complex  policy 
experimentation and institutional sensitiveness through a project, with its external set-up and 
rigidities.  The  government  ownership  has  allowed  a  more  sensitive  management,  close 
consultations  and  co-ordination,  and  an  implementation  pace  geared  to  the  actual  capacity 
development process. The most important comparative advantage of the BS modality has been 
the  rapid  feedback  and  mainstreaming  of  the  lessons  learned,  which  have  supported  the 
establishment of a new sector strategic framework. Nevertheless, a distinction should be made 
between the different phases of SBS. In the first two phases of MSB, there is evidence of trust 
being built and dialogue between partners being essential to pilot new approaches in a flexible 
way and to quickly mainstream the lessons learnt. However, in the final phase, the value added 
of SBS compared to an owned project is less evident. 
  In the Access to Justice, it was stressed how the SBS, compared to previous projects, has 
facilitated the design and the implementation of the programme. Additionally, the ownership by 
DoJCD  and  FHR  has  been  a  determinant  in  ensuring  a  close  dialogue  among  the  parties 
(quarterly meetings and – on a more continuous basis– informal contacts) and strong synergies 
in the implementation, which would have been difficult to achieve through a project, with its 
deadlines, narrow output and results horizon, and contractual constraints. 
  In the LSPSP, the comparison is relatively straightforward, since there was a project before the 
SBS. The project contributed to capacity-building, but was not considered an adequate – or a 
properly owned – tool to accompany the ambitious programme to enhance the Parliaments’ 
capacity at all levels (National, Provincial, international) and strengthen the  legislatures as a 
sector, including relations with the people. 
  In  both  Governance  SBS,  transparency  and  accountability  arrangements  have  improved 
compared to the previous project modalities (the Legislative Support Project and the EUD-FHR 
project) since the SBS modality has contributed to firmly integrating or anchoring the support in 
the management and policy systems of DoJCD and of the Legislative Sector. 
  In the Health Sector, the use of SBS gave a clear message that the EU, as a partner, endorsed 
the national PHC strategy and would ensure that its contributions would directly support GoSA 
actions  in this area  −  namely, the efforts aimed at strengthening GoSA leadership  and co-
ordination among the different sectoral partners. Moreover, SBS is perceived by stakeholders 
as enhancing the predictability of the support and ensuring greater sustainability by integrating 
this support into national efforts. 
  In the Education Sector, it is probable that a facility-type arrangement would have allowed the 
support  of  similar  types  of  innovative  initiatives  and  access  to  high-level  technical  support. 
However,  the  SBS  has  been  perceived  by  the  national  counterparts  as  having  a  clear 
                                                       
90 When comparing BS and project modalities, it should be taken into account that, in theory, one of the key 
differences  between  them  relies  on  the  different  interests  that  support  each  of  them:  in  the  case  of  BS,  the 
government institutions as such and their key partners are the owner and main supporters; in the case of a project, 
the owners and supporters are specific groups in the public administration, other non-governmental institutions 
(universities, NGOs) and donor-related institutions involved in the project conception and execution. The project 
may better respond to a need  for mobilising non-government capacities and/or creating a balance, a stimulus 
towards  the  government  mainstream.  BS  responds  to  the  need  for  strengthening  the  internal  dynamics  and 
capacities of the government and its partner institutions. 54 
Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa 
Final report - Volume 1 - 2013 - Particip GmbH 
comparative advantage because it has used national systems, has allowed greater flexibility, 
and has strengthened internal lines of communication. 
  In the case of Urban Renewal, SBS has proved to be the most appropriate aid modality in the 
case of eThekwini, a strong institution described in one of the reports as ‘one of the leading 
local authorities in the country’. This has led to enhanced ownership, to a strong partnership, 
and has promoted flexibility and stronger empowerment by transferring decision-making to the 
implementing partner. The same cannot be said for URP Eastern Cape, where the political and 
institutional  environment  has  significantly  changed  since  the  formulation  of  the  programme, 
hampering the smooth implementation not only of the SBS but of the broader URP. 
In  many  cases,  however,  there  are  also  reasons  why  a  complementary  project-based  co-operation 
could have improved the SBS performance. For instance, the low intensity of TA and capacity building 
inputs in most SBS could have been addressed through projects and/or facilities to ensure a direct 
access to international high-level expertise. For example: 
  Employment  is  a  typical  case  where  the  EU  value  added  would  probably  be  stronger  by 
facilitating access to expertise and exchange of experience between EU and SA, between SA 
and other middle income countries with big inequality problems, and between SA and other 
African countries. The present EU contribution in the sector has been shown to be effective in 
the case of the IDC/RCF and IPA, but not (or not yet) in the case of the ECF, where the specific 
EU value added is not particularly clear. 
  In most cases, including the most successful ones, the establishment of complementary actions 
(projects or facilities) to permit easy access to EU expertise and expertise from other parts of 
the world that the EU, as a global player, may mobilise, would have improved the exchange of 
experience and would have fed the dialogue between the parties (this has partly occurred in the 
case  of  Health:  international  workshops  on  National  Health  Insurance  and  Regulatory 
Medicine). 
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4.6  Step1 - Summary 
The tables below summarise the SBS contribution to the induced outputs. In particular, it highlights the 
contribution of SBS to government policies, strategies and interventions, including reference to the type 
and degree of influence.  
Table 7  Synthesis  of  Budget  Support  contribution  to  Government  of  South  Africa  policies 
(Step 1) - Private Sector/Employment sector 
Contribution of BS operations 
Changes at induced 
outputs level (incl. 
changes in GoSA policies) 
Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or internal 
or external factors 
Funds:  moderate (SWEEEP). 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: weak to moderate (financed through 
SBS). 
Counterfactual: a facility could have played a 
comparable role, if ownership strong. 
  dti capacities strengthened.  
  Strong political and social priority 
toward employment generation 
  Very complex interests at stake 
complicate political debate and policy 
decision 
Funds: strong (IPA). 
Dialogue:  moderate. 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
Counterfactual: an external project would have 
been rejected or unduly appropriated by its 
specific actors: ownership and mainstreaming 
limited. 
  Mainstreaming of innovation 
in the policy and budgeting 
process.  
Funds:  moderate (SWEEEP). 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
Counterfactual: see others 
  Strategic framework for 
women empowerment. 
Funds:  moderate (RCF & SWEEEP). 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: weak to moderate. 
Counterfactual: see others 
  New business support 
service and legal/regulatory 
reforms to improve the 
business environment. 
Funds:  moderate to strong (RCF). 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: strong (EIB). 
Counterfactual: a project could have had 
comparable effects, although the GoSA 
ownership has been stronger. 
  Development of new lending 
products & co-financing of 
risky projects (IDC). 
Funds:  moderate (ECF). 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: weak to moderate. 
Counterfactual: a project could have had 
comparable effects, although the GoSA 
ownership has been stronger. 
  Employment and industrial 
development programmes 
(public works, etc.). 56 
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Table 8  Synthesis  of  Budget  Support  contribution  to  Government  of  South  Africa  policies 
(Step 1) - Water sector 
Contribution of BS operations  
Changes at induced 
outputs level (incl. 
changes in GoSA policies) 
Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or internal 
or external factors 
Mix of Funds and Dialogue:  strong. 
TA/CD: strong (financed through SBS
91). 
  Development of a new 
sector policy framework. 
  Strong political and social priority 
  Number of initiatives and significant 
public investment. 
Funds:  strong. 
Dialogue: weak to moderate. 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
  Transfer of responsibilities to 
municipalities. 
  New funding mechanisms (e.g. MIG, 
increase in LG Equitable Share): 
strong.  
Funds: strong 
Dialogue: weak 
TA/CD: strong (financed through SBS) 
  Policies to strengthen local 
government capacities in 
place 
  Low capacities of local 
administrations 
Funds:  weak to moderate – allowed 
implementation of pilot initiatives but important 
component of supported programme 
eventually not implemented. 
Dialogue: weak to moderate. 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
  Masibambane Civil Society 
Strategic Framework 
developed but weak 
implementation  
  GoSA priority was on public 
institutions 
Funds:  strong. 
Dialogue: weak to moderate. 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
  Clear statements related to 
gender equality in sector 
policies, new gender 
mainstreaming strategy, and 
establishment of a Gender 
Unit within DWA. 
  Contributing factor: Integration of 
gender in wider legislative and policy 
framework. 
Counterfactual: In the first phases, the trust and the dialogue between partners have been essential to experiment new 
approaches in a flexible way and to quickly mainstream the lessons learned. A project would have introduced rigidities. In the 
second phase, the value added of SBS compared to an owned project is less evident. 
Table 9  Synthesis  of  Budget  Support  contribution  to  Government  of  South  Africa  policies 
(Step 1) - Governance sector 
Contribution of BS operations  
Changes at induced 
outputs level (incl. 
changes in GoSA policies) 
Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or internal 
or external factors 
Funds: strong. 
Dialogue: moderate to strong (historical 
collaboration of EU and CSO on human and 
civil rights). 
TA/CD: absent (except for one punctual input). 
  Strengthened policy
92 
implementation and testing 
of alternative service 
delivery through an 
innovative strategic 
partnership with civil society. 
  “Thick” institutional fabric in the justice 
sector with high degree of political 
commitment to making the 
Constitutional Democracy work 
(including through citizen 
participation),  
  Combined with the demand for state 
responsiveness by a vibrant and multi-
layered civil society 
                                                       
91 This means that TA is provided – at least in part – through SBS resources, but is completely managed by the 
GoSA  programme,  usising  national  expertise.  When  TA  is  provided  either  directly  or  indirectly  by  SBS  using 
international expertise for exchange of knowhow, this is specified. 
92 DoJCD Medium Term Strategic Frameworks – Programme 2 (Court services) and Strategic Plan for years 2012-
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Contribution of BS operations  
Changes at induced 
outputs level (incl. 
changes in GoSA policies) 
Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or internal 
or external factors 
Funds: strong. 
Dialogue: moderate to strong (consistent 
cooperation between EU and the five post-
Apartheid Parliaments). 
TA/CD: absent (no specific input). 
  Improved institutionalisation 
of the Legislative Sector and 
strengthened policy 
implementation
93. 
  The Legislative Sector is a key state 
pillar of South Africa’s young 
constitutional democracy with strong 
linkages with other state institutions 
such as government departments 
(National Treasury) and other statutory 
bodies (the Auditor General of South 
Africa, the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission) 
  Strong demand side pressures from 
non-state actors (including civil 
society, independent media, etc.)_ 
  Evolution of the institutional 
environment (increased relationships 
between NT and Legislative actors) 
Counterfactual: Compared to the previous project modalities in both sub-sectors, SBS has contributed to strengthening 
ownership, a programme design that is fit for purpose, trust-building policy dialogue, strengthened transparency and 
accountability arrangements in the sectors, and improved institutionalisation (in the case of the LSPSP) and stronger inter-
departmental policy processes (in the case of DoJCD and the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster). 
Table 10  Synthesis  of  Budget  Support  contribution  to  Government  of  South  Africa  policies 
(Step 1) – Non focal sectors 
Contribution of BS operations  
Changes at induced 
outputs level (incl. 
changes in GoSA policies) 
Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or internal 
or external factors 
Health 
Funds: strong. 
Dialogue: moderate. 
TA/CD: moderate (only very recent inputs). 
New original approach to service 
delivery in the primary health, 
including global reform of the 
Health Insurance and local 
networks of health agents 
(CSOs, practitioners). 
New ideas and models developed through 
various processes (e.g. interactions 
between top level management and high 
level expertise from the country or 
abroad). 
Counterfactual: SBS (compared to other types of support) has contributed to the consolidation of the sectoral approach and 
coordination. It has supported DoH to strengthen the on-going comprehensive reform process. It has been able to integrate high 
level TA as well. 
Education 
Funds: strong. 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: absent. 
Improvement of tools and 
systems within national primary 
education programmes, incl. a 
focus on strengthening the 
teaching quality and capacity of 
teachers. 
Recent policy change away from the 
ambitious Outcome Based Education (due 
to limited results).  
Strong political pressure on the sector. 
Counterfactual: a facility could have played a comparable role, if adequately owned. 
Urban renewal 
Funds:  strong. 
Dialogue: weak. 
TA/CD: weak (and only in one of the two 
programmes). 
Urban renewal programme: 
piloting an integrated inter-
governmental approach in eight 
urban nodes 
Adoption of the Municipal Systems Act & 
Municipal Finance Management Act. 
Weak local governments’ capacities. 
GoSA priority / Presidential Initiative to 
address problems in exclusion areas set 
up through apartheid spatial planning. 
Counterfactual: in the eThekwini case, SBS has facilitated stronger ownership and more partnership compared to other 
modalities. This has allowed flexibility and empowerment. In the URP Eastern Cape case, due to the big changes in the political 
and institutional framework, probably a project would have suffered less, although the results would have been negative as well. 
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4.7  EQ6 (Step 2) - Employment & Private Sector Development 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent, in the employment / private sector development sectors, 
have the development outcomes pursued through the policies and programmes supported by 
SBS  been  (or  are  being)  achieved?  And  which  have  been  the  determining  factors  of  their 
achievement? 
Box 2  Remark on the methodological approach to the identification of the determining factors 
in the Employment & Private Sector area  
EU-funded SBS operations in this sector aimed at supporting the implementation of government initiatives, policies, 
plans and strategies. While in some cases, the programmes supported by SBS had specific job creation objectives, 
their general aim was to support the employment strategies of the government, by providing policy and regulation 
improvements  (e.g.  SWEEEP),  testing  innovative  approaches  (e.g.  IPA,  RCF),  and/or  strengthening  specific 
government interventions (e.g. ECF). With few exceptions, the outcome indicators included in the SBS FAs have 
focused on job creation, skills development, financial support / funding of SMMEs nation-wide targets.
94  
This has suggested a specific methodological approach for the identification of the determining factors of such 
indicators. As the outcomes to measure the success of the supported policies are nation-wide outcomes, the best 
way to assess the causal links between such outcomes and the policies supported is to refer to the existing up-to-
date and recognized policy analyses and economic studies, which have investigated the effects of these policies at 
national  level.  This  is  the  only  possibility  to  address  in  a  credible  way  –  within  the  limited  framework  of  this 
evaluation – an impact assessment of the policies supported. 
Overall answer to the Evaluation Question 
In the period considered, employment data show a moderate growth, higher in the period 2004-07, then 
a downward trend due to the crisis (2008-09) and a slight recovery in 2010. In this period, more than 2 
million new jobs were created, with one million lost and then recovered in the last 5 years. The increase 
in employment has not been able to reduce the unemployment rates which remain very high, especially 
among the women, the youth and in the rural areas. Investments have registered a significant growth, 
with a strong contribution by the private enterprises (with the exception of the years of crisis) and by the 
public  corporations  (mainly  in  infrastructure).  Unfortunately,  the  Small,  Medium  and  Micro-sized 
Enterprises (SMMEs
95) are not among those who have profited of the growth, on the contrary they have 
been particularly affected by the crisis. This largely explains the low  effects of the growth in terms of 
employment.  
There is a consensus in the South African specialised literature about some of the main causes of the 
still relatively limited economic growth and  – above all – of its limited effects on employment. Despite 
the  positive  results  of  GoSA  programmes  like  the  EPWP  and  CWP,  aimed  at  job  creation  and  at 
promotion of economic activities in the neediest areas, the nationwide employment growth is hampered 
by key factors. Among these, the institutional framework of the labour market, the inadequate skills 
profile of the labour force and a difficult environment for SMMEs development leading to a high level of 
concentration in the national economy which does not favour labour intensive growth. Industrial and 
trade  policy  also  favours  the  protection  of  jobs  rather  than  encourage  competitiveness.  Regulatory 
costs, local services, social stability and security are other factors that contribute to explain the decline 
in country competitiveness (SA has shifted from 37
th to 50
th in the World Economic Forum Index). Wide-
reaching economic reforms, such as those set out in the NDP, are hampered by entrenched interests 
and a lack of political capital. 
The policies and programmes supported by SBS have only marginally affected such policy bottlenecks 
and  perhaps  it  could  not  have  happened  otherwise  given  the  structural  importance  and  political 
                                                       
94 e.g. key performance indicators of ECF include: i) number of work opportunities created in the framework of the 
Expanded  Public  Works  Programme  (EPWP);  ii)  Participants  in  the  Community  Works  Programme;  iii)  Skills 
development;  iv)  Support  for  IPAP  2  and  New  Growth  Path;  iv)  enhanced  Financial  Support  to  SMMEs;  vi) 
Monyetla Work Readiness programme. Job creation indicators (and targets) are also used under IPA and RCF II 
with the latter also including SMEs funding targets. (see volume 2 – EQ 6, for further details) 
95 The term SMME and SME are often used interchangeably in South Africa. A  small business is defined by the 
National Small Business Act of 1996 amended by the National Small Business  Amendment Acts of 2003 and 2004 
(NSB Act) as “ a separate and distinct business entity, including cooperative enterprises and nongovernmental 
organisations,  managed  by  one  owner  or  more  which,  including  its  branches  or  subsidiaries,  if  any,  is 
predominantly carried on in any sector or sub sector of the economy mentioned in Column I of the schedule.” The 
Act then further provides a categorisation of SMEs based on the industry using number of employees, annual 
turnover and gross assets excluding fixed property. In broad terms, an SME is entity that employs less than 200 
staff with a turnover less than R50million per annum and gross assets less than R18million. 59 
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relevance of such policy bottlenecks. Probably more could have been done in terms of exchange of 
experiences and know-how on the specific matters building on: i) experience gained by EU Member 
States through the implementation of national reforms (e.g. labour market reforms in Germany in the 
first half of the 2000s; SMEs support strategies adopted by many EU countries); ii) lessons learned from 
the widespread programmes implemented by the EU in central and eastern Europe; and iii) EU and SA 
experience with third countries, including the informal sector and other matters (Brazil, Peru, etc.). A 
better knowledge of - and a joint reflection on such experiences - might have strengthened the national 
debate and as a consequence the shape of new policies. 
Evaluation  Question  6.a:  To  what  extent  the  main  development  outcomes  identified  as  SBS 
targets have been achieved? 
4.7.1  Employment and employability (JC6.1) 
Between 2001 and 2012 the South African economy added more than 2 million new jobs, all of which 
were added in the period up till the global financial crisis which reached South Africa in 2008. With the 
onset of the crisis 1 million jobs were shed between 2008 and 2009 but by 2012 employment levels had 
almost returned to pre-crisis levels. As a result: i) the official unemployment rate fell from 26% in 2001 
to 21% in 2007 and went on to peak at 25.3% in September 2010;
96 and ii) both the labour absorption 
rate and the labour force participation rate have declined marginally during the 2001 to 2012 period. 
The fall in the labour absorption rate indicates that despite more people becoming employed during this 
period, growth in the working aged population has meant that proportionally fewer people were working 
in 2012 than in 2001.  
Figure 7  Employment (‘000s, left hand axis), official unemployment rate, labour absorption and 
labour force participation (%, right hand axis)  
 
Source: Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey (pre-2008) and Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (2008 and later). September figures. 
Female employment has exhibited a similar trend to employment in general – a steady upward trend 
until 2008, a decline as the global financial crisis reached South Africa and a return to 2008 levels 
towards the end of the period. However, during the period the proportion of females in total employment 
has exhibited a downward trend (from 46 - 47% of total employment in the early 2000s to 43 - 44% as 
of 2010) indicating that the slowdown in South African economic growth as a result of the financial crisis 
had a much larger effect on female and other marginalised groups employment.  
Over the 2001 to 2012 period, most of the jobs which were added to the economy were classified as 
being in the formal sector. The relative growth in jobs in the formal sector compared to the informal 
sector reinforces the small role which the South African informal sector plays in job creation if compared 
to other African countries. Almost all of the net job creation which has happened in the non-agricultural 
formal  sector  since  2006  has  been  in  the  community  and  personal  services  sector.  This  division 
                                                       
96 The impact of the financial crisis on unemployment in South Africa is actually larger than the narrow definition of 
official unemployment suggests. Verick (2012) has shown that during this period many individuals actually gave up 
searching for jobs and thus were not categorized as unemployed under the official definition. 60 
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includes government, education, health  and recreational, cultural and sporting activities. During this 
period manufacturing shed 185,000 jobs and construction lost 23,000 jobs. Job losses in these sectors 
are particularly disturbing since it is these sectors which are most likely to be labour intensive and have 
the ability to employ low-skilled workers. (see Indicator 6.1.1).  
Employment  of  individuals  with  university  degrees  increased  dramatically  immediately  after  the 
democratic  transition  in  1994  with  average  annual  growth  of  more  than  11%.  These  growth  rates 
declined substantially during the period 2000-2011 and during this period employment grew slower for 
those with degrees than those with only matric. (see Indicator 6.1.5) 
In its drive to raise employment levels, GoSA has put in place a number of policies (e.g. New Growth 
Path - NGP, Industrial Policy Action Plan - IPAP) and programmes such as the Expanded Public Works 
GoSA programme (EPWP) and the Community Works Programme. In all cases, information gathered 
points to the achievement of important results:  
  The Expanded Public Works GoSA programme (EPWP) aims to create job opportunities for the 
poor and unemployed in South Africa through the delivery of public and community services. In 
place since 2004/05, it has provided almost 3.8 million job opportunities in total, 2 million of 
which on infrastructure projects with over 800,000 in environmental and cultural projects
97. The 
programme has been particularly successful in reaching its targets for both women and youth 
but has not met its targets for the disabled. EPWP job opportunities
98 can either be long- or 
short-term, and a different measure of its success is therefore gained by looking at the number of 
person years of work, including years of training, it has created. Des pite the success of both 
phases  (551,000  person  years  of  work  in  Phase  1  and  600,000  in  phase  2  as  of  2012) 
substantially more jobs will need to be created in order to reach the target of 2 million full -time 
equivalent jobs. (see Indicator 6.1.2)  
  The Community Works Programme (CWP) is another initiative supported through SBS which 
aims to create an employment social net for unemployed people in the most marginalised areas 
through providing participants with a minimum number of days of regular work. This programme 
was begun in 2007 but scaled up in 2009. The CWP has come close to meeting its targets in 
both 2009/10 and 2010/11 and created almost 24,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs in 2010/11 
at  a  cost  of  R19,000  per  FTE.  The  CWP  specifically  targets  the  most  marginalised  and  in 
2009/10 71% of participants were female and half young people. (see Indicator 6.1.2) 
  Finally, within the overall policy framework put in place by the government, SBS  operations 
have supported – in addition to the above mentioned EPWP and CPW supported through the 
ECF – other specific job creation initiatives. Documentary evidence points to, among others: i) 
the  creation  of  45,900  jobs  against  a  target  of  41,229  through  funding  proposal  in  the 
framework of the IPAP 2 and NGP supported by the ECF;; ii) the creation of 33,000 jobs in 
2007/8  against  a  target  of  24,000  through  programmes  put  in  place  by  the  Industrial 
Development  Corporation  (IDC)  supported  by  the  SWEEP;  iii)  the  creation  of  6,655  jobs 
between 2007 and 2012 through programmes put in place by the IDC supported by the Risk 
Capital  Facility  SBS  operation;  iv)  the  addition  of  over  700  jobs  in  2011/12  as  a  result  of 
demonstration  projects  put  in  place  by  the  Department  of  Science  and  Technology  and 
supported through the Innovation for Poverty Alleviation SBS operation. (see Indicator 6.1.3) 
4.7.2  Public & private sector investment (JC6.2) 
A pressing concern for the new government in 1994 was reversing the increasing fiscal deficit which 
peaked at 7.3% in 1993 and curtailing government spending. This objective formed the core of the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, introduced in 1996. GEAR was remarkably 
successful in cutting the government deficit – by 2000 the deficit was down to 2.1% of GDP. This fiscal 
prudence  continued  throughout  the  2000s  resulting  in  surpluses  in  2007  and  2008.  One  of  the 
outcomes  of  this  fiscal  prudence  was  low  rates  of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  (GFCF)  by  both 
government and public corporations during the late 1990s. For both these groups GFCF was relatively 
erratic over this period and in 2001 GFCF levels were very similar to those in 1996 when GEAR was 
                                                       
97 Source: EPWP reports. Over 1.7 million work opportunities were created the Phase 1 of the EPWP (2004/5 to 
2008/9), largely exceeding the goal of 1 million, and – to date - 2.1 million job opportunities have been provided 
during Phase 2 (2009 and 2014), once again largely exceeding expectations. 
98 A job opportunity in the EPWP is defined as: “Paid work created for an individual on an EPWP project for any 
period of time. In the case of social sector projects, learnerships will also constitute job opportunities. The same 
individual  can  be  employed  on  different  projects  and  each  period  of  employment  will  be  counted  as  a  job 
opportunity.” 61 
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introduced. As Fedderke, et al. (2006) show this resulted in a decline in the infrastructural fixed capital 
stock, continuing a trend from the mid-1980s. 
The  government  acknowledged  that  investment  was  below  optimal  levels  and  began  to  ramp  up 
spending both directly and through public corporations. The ‘Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative - 
South Africa’ (ASGISA) specifically targeted infrastructure investment and planned to raise public sector 
investment from 4 to 8% of GDP.  
In real terms, increases in GFCF in both the public and private sector were substantial over the 2000s. 
Between 2000 and 2012 GFCF directly by government and by the private sector doubled. The real 
increase in GFCF by public corporations was even more substantial – in 2012 real GFCF was more 
than four times that of 2000. Much of this investment was on public infrastructure, including power 
generation, power distribution, rail transport, harbours and other physical infrastructure including an oil 
pipeline.  
Figure 8  Gross Fixed Capital Formation by category, 2005 prices percentage change year-on-
year 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, series KBP6009Y, KBP6100Y, KBP6106Y, 
KBP6109Y. 
This recent surge in investment by public corporations began in 2006 and lasted until 2009. During this 
period yearly growth in GFCF exceeded 20% in real terms and peaked at almost 40% between 2007 
and  2008. During the period of 2006-2009  National  Treasury budgeted R 58  billion to be spent on 
roads, R 58 billion on electricity, R 32 billion on housing, R 22 billion on education, R 19 billion on water, 
R 18 billion on rail and R 15 billion on ports, for capital and infrastructure investment. (see Indicators 
6.2.1 & 6.2.2) 
Large banks contribute 95% of all lending to SMEs in South Africa (World Bank, 2011). During the 
period 2008 to 2012 overall bank credit exposure to SMEs through both retail and corporate lending 
remained relatively constant. However, the proportional exposure of banks to SMEs has fallen over this 
period from approximately 15.2% to 13.9%. (see Indicator 6.2.3) 62 
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Figure 9  Bank  credit  exposure  to  SMEs,  levels  (LHS)  R’000s,  proportion  of  total  exposure 
(RHS) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. 
Access to finance is a larger obstacle for smaller firms than large ones, and particularly for those firms 
with less than 20 employees this does not seemed to have changed between 2003 and 2007. In both 
years approximately 40% of firms in this size category reported that access to finance was some type of 
obstacle. This is in contrast to firms with more than 100 employees, where the proportion reporting that 
access to finance was an obstacle fell from 34% in 2003 to 21% in 2007. 
In light of this, during the period 2007-12, RCF II supported the IDC which financed investments for 
R400 million in favour of 73 SMMEs. These SMMEs had 3,198 HDI shareholders of which almost half 
were female (source dti / IDC). 
4.7.3  Evolution in structure of SMMEs (JC6.3) 
Figure 10  Corporate income tax payers by firm size category - all enterprises 
 
Source: South African Revenue Services’ Tax Statistics 2011. 
Very little is known about the number of SMMEs in South Africa because data is not collected on these 
in a systematic manner. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) provides some information on 
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registered taxpayers for company tax.
99 Between the period 2007 and 2010 the number of corporate 
income tax payers fell substantially (from 176,175 in 2007 to 150,568 in 2010) driven by a fall in the 
number of micro firms (from 122,950 to 96,960). A change in tax thresholds is unlikely to have resulted 
in this. In the small and medium categories, where the reported number of firms is likely to be more 
accurate, numbers are roughly similar although numbers were slightly higher in the 2008/09 period. 
Figures show that there is no upward trend in the number of enterprises paying corporate income tax in 
South Africa over this period, i.e. South Africa is not creating large numbers of micro, small and medium 
firms. For manufacturing the picture is similar  – across all size categories there were fewer firms in 
2010 than in 2007. (see Indicator 6.3.1) 
The  seemingly  declining  contribution  of  SMMEs  in  the  South  African  economy  is  also  reflected  in 
employment numbers. Figures from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey (QLFS) indicate that the share of employment in firms with less than 10 people 
has shown a broadly declining trend over the past decade. The share of employment in the 10-49 size 
category was increasing until 2008 but declined since then and the share of employment in firms with 
more than 50 workers seems to have increased. One study
100, using data which Statistics South Africa 
collects directly from companies, shows that between 2005 and 2011, there was net job destruction in 
all size categories of firms with less than 500 employees.  
Other surveys which focus on small and medium business also show declining employment among 
these sized firms. SBP’s SME Growth Index (2012) showed that between 2011 and 2012 aggregate 
employment  in  firms  with  10-49  employees  decreased  by  6%.  This  decline  in  employment  was 
unevenly distributed across sectors. Manufacturing and business service firms reduced contracted by 7 
and 8% respectively, whilst aggregate employment in the tourism sector fell by only 1%. (see Ind. 6.3.2) 
On the other hand, Employment Equity reports submitted by business show a steady upward trend in 
the share of management who are female or black. The share of top management who are black almost 
doubled  between  2000  and  2011.  The  share  of  senior  management  who  are  black  also  increased 
substantially, by 86%, over the same period. Although the share of female management has increased, 
it has done so at a slower rate.  
Entrepreneurship  also  seems  to  be  growing  in  South  Africa.  The  Global  Entrepreneurship  Monitor 
(GEM) data suggests that the proportion of owner-managers in the South African population increased 
by  about  three  times  between  2001  and  2012.  However,  in  comparison  to  other  countries  these 
proportions remain very low – in 2012 the proportion of owner-managers in Brazil was 15% whereas in 
South  Africa  it  was  only  2.3%.  The  involvement  of  HDIs  in  entrepreneurship  also  seems  to  be 
increasing. Between 2008 and 2012 Statistics South Africa’s QLFS indicates that the number of Black 
individuals who were self-employed and employing other people increased by 6% and although the 
number of females fell by 9%. This increase has been more widespread than just entrepreneurs in 
micro firm: Black individuals who were self-employed with firms with more than 10 employees increased 
by 35%, and females increased by 13%, over this period. (see Indicator 6.3.3) 
4.7.4  Competitiveness of the South African economy and trade outlook (JC6.4) 
Since 2005 South Africa’s ranking in global competitiveness has shown a steady downward trend. In 
2005/6  it  ranked  45
th  by  the World  Economic  Forum  (WEF) measure  and  37
th  by  the  International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) measure. By 2011/12 it had fallen to 50
th (WEF) and 52
nd 
(IMD). The Economic Freedom of the World indicator presents a longer term view and shows that this 
measure (which does not specifically measure competitiveness but is highly correlated with economic 
growth) is now higher than during apartheid and the mid-1990s but has been declining since 2000. 
Worryingly,  in  terms  of  competitiveness,  South  Africa  performs  particularly  badly  on  education  and 
labour market aspects which have a direct influence on the poor and most marginalised. The two broad 
aspects  which  the WEF  ranks  South  Africa  lowest  on  is  primary  education  and  health,  and  labour 
market efficiency (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2011). Specifically South Africa ranks in the bottom 10% 
of all countries surveyed (142 countries in 2011) in the following areas: business costs of crime and 
violence; tuberculosis; HIV; life expectancy; quality of primary education, of the education system and of 
mathematics  and  science  education;  co-operation  in  labour-employer  relations;  flexibility  of  wage 
determination; hiring and firing practices; pay and productivity. (see Indicator 6.4.1) 
                                                       
99 These numbers are likely to undercount smaller firms (particularly micro firms and to some extent small firms) 
who may fall under the tax threshold and there is also likely to be ‘bracket creep’ as firms enter higher tax brackets 
as their nominal incomes increase but not their real incomes. All else equal this should lead to more firms in the 
higher size categories over time. 
100 Kerr, et al., 2013 64 
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Trade  outlook.  South  Africa  has  generally  become more  open  since  democracy  in  1994.  However, 
much of this has been driven  by the increasing share of imports which  exceeded exports in 2005. 
Worryingly, although exports exhibited a slight upward trend in terms of their share to GDP until 2007, 
they are below the share of GDP which they were in 1994. In addition to this, South Africa has, despite 
its  historic  reliance  on  primary  products,  failed  to  capitalise  on  the  rise  in  commodity  prices  which 
happened during this period. The increase in real exports experienced over the period has been, since 
the early 2000s, been driven mostly by an increase in the value of exports rather than an increase in 
volume. Overall, the South African economy has become less export intensive and these exports are 
now higher value per unit indicating that actually the volume of exports, relative to GDP, is now lower 
than previously. (see Indicator 6.4.2) 
Figure 11  Exports and imports as a share of GDP  Figure 12  Exports since 1980 
   
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
4.7.5  Identification of the determinant factors 
Evaluation Question 6.b: Which have been the main factors responsible for such achievements? 
Identification of the determinant factors related to employment and employability 
South African employment levels have increased over the past 10 years (and for even longer than this), 
adding more than  2 million jobs  – an  increase  of approximately  20%.  Much  of this increase  is the 
consequence  of  South  Africa’s  relatively  high  economic  growth  during  the  period  as  the  result  of 
sensible macro-economic policies, investment and trade reforms in the 1990s, rather than any specific 
policy to increase employment. Despite the increase in employment, this has not been large enough to 
substantially reduce the official unemployment rate. This lack of progress in reducing unemployment 
has been the result of a number of factors, including structural constraints, adverse recent economic 
conditions,  policy  ineffectiveness  and  the  unintended  consequences  of  some  policies  which  have 
actually discouraged employment growth. 
From  a  long-term  point  of  view,  the  South  African  economy,  and  with  it  labour  demand,  has  been 
changing.  Since,  and  even  prior  to,  1994,  the  historical  drivers  of  the  South  African  economy  – 
agriculture and mining – have experienced declines in absolute employment numbers. This decline in 
the primary sector has not been compensated by an increase in manufacturing jobs (165,000 jobs lost 
between 1994 and 2004, and an additional 185,000 jobs shed between 2006 and 2012). Many of the 
jobs that have been created post-1994 have been in the service sector, including financial services and 
government. Labour demand has thus been moving away from labour-intensive sectors which require 
lower  levels  of  skills  to  sectors  where  skills  requirement  have  been  higher.  Even  within  sectors, 
production is becoming less labour-intensive and more skills and capital-intensive (in 2010, 20% fewer 
workers were required to produce the same amount of real output as in 1995). This has meant that 
South  African  economic  growth  is  relatively  low  in  terms  of  labour  absorption.  Zhan  (2011),  who 
compares the performance of South Africa in terms of job creation against a group of peers over the 
period 2000-2009, finds that the poor performance of South Africa is both a relatively lower output 
growth and a lower labour intensity of growth. 
Part  of  these  changes  are  explained  by  broader  global  trends  –  output  per  unit  labour  has  been 
increasing  in  most  developing  and  developed  countries,  but  there  are  a  number  of  South  African 
specific factors which compound these, the two most important being the institutional and regulatory 
structure of the South African labour market, and the skills profile of labour market participants. 
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In fact, although the passing by South African government of employment and labour market legislation 
in  the  mid  to  late  1990s  was  intended  to  address  some  of  the  glaring  regulatory  failures  which 
characterized the apartheid period, its application turned the South African labour market in one of the 
least competitive in the world. South Africa performs particularly badly in areas such as cooperation 
between employers and employees (138 out of 142), flexibility of wage determination (138 out of 142), 
hiring and firing practices (139 out of 142) and the link between pay and productivity (138 out of 142), 
especially when compared to other countries such as Malaysia or even Brazil.
101 These are all areas 
where outcomes are heavily influenced by the institutions in the labour market, such as bargaining 
councils,  and  where  rapid  job  creators  perform much  better  (Zhan,  2011).  The  continued  close 
relationship between the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the ANC has meant 
that there has been no reform of labour market regulations to make the labour market more flexible.  In 
fact recent amendments to South Africa’s labour regulations have made the labour market less flexible 
and will further hamper employment growth. Specifically, one of the key institutional factors which has 
limited the creation of jobs and labour intensive firms is the sectoral nature of the wage bargaining 
system whereby agreements on wages and working conditions reached by a group of employers and 
employees  in  Bargaining  Councils  are  extended  to  all  firms  in  the  sector.  Academic  research 
(Magruder, 2012) shows the impact of these Bargaining Councils on employment, entrepreneurship and 
small firms and recent events in the clothing and textile industry are a stark illustration of the negative 
consequences of these structures.
102 
The  education and skills of the labour force has not changed sufficiently   to adequately meet this 
demand. A shortage of skills was listed as one of the top three constraints to business in both of the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments in 2004 and 2008. Kraak (2008) argues that by the mid-
2000s the South African economy of education reached ‘expansion saturation’ after a period of massive 
growth and expansion. Contributors to this saturation included a declining share of education spending 
in the national budget, low financial allocations to adult basic education and training and early childhood 
development,  a  slowdown  of  learner  enrolment  in  public  schools,  poor  efficiency,  and  a  decline  in 
further education and training enrolments. He suggests that “South Africa does not face a numerically 
severe ‘skills crisis’ as yet, but rather, a set of systematic malfunctions which need urgent attention.” 
ASGISA specifically acknowledged the need for education and skills training and proposed a number of 
measures to address the issues mentioned by Kraak. One of these was the Joint Initiative for Priority 
Skills Acquisition (JIPSA). 
The creation of jobs in South Africa stalled temporarily with the global financial crisis and the resulting 
slower rates of South African economic growth from 2008. Between 2007 and 2012 the unemployment 
rate increased by 4 percentage points driven by the loss of almost one million jobs between 2008 and 
2009.  The  financial  crisis  has  particularly  affected  the  most  marginalized  in  the  labour  market. 
Particularly  for  the  youth,  the  sharp  rises  in  unemployment  rates  are  driven  not  by  large-scale 
retrenchment but rather by fewer people being able to actually enter employment (Rankin, et al., 2012).  
It is against this background and trends that the success of the various GoSA’s initiatives (be they specific 
programmes or broader strategies / plans) supported by SBS needs to be measured. 
Despite the large number of ‘job opportunities’ which the EPWP has created (actual job creation has 
exceeded targets), many commentators have been critical of the ability of the EPWP to improve the 
longer term employability  of participants (see  Centre for Development and  Enterprise,  2012) for an 
overview of some of the evidence). The largely short-term nature of many  EPWP job opportunities 
means that many participants do not gain useful skills and - as a result - there is little impact on post-
EPWP  employability  (Nzimakwe,  2008).  Furthermore,  it  does  not  seem  that  EPWP  expenditures 
resulted in the creation of many micro, small or medium enterprises  (McCord & Meth, 2009). As a 
result, the impact of the EPWP on employment creation at a national level has been marginal. 
The CWP, being relatively new, has not undergone any quantitative evaluation of its impact. However, a 
set of studies provides some qualitative evidence of the impact of the programme. (Vawda, et al., 2013) 
find  that  the  CWP  has  increased  the  capability  set  of  participants.  Participants  interviewed  report 
“improvements in nutritional intake; that they continue to look for formal employment opportunities; they 
accumulate capital and assets; invest in savings products; engage in micro-enterprises; contribute to 
                                                       
101 World Economic Forum, 2012. See also volume 2 for comparative figures.  
102 For further details see volume 2 section 6.6 ‘Analysis of determining factors - JC6.1 Improved employability and 
employment  especially  among  HDPs’  and  box  ‘The  deleterious  effect  of  South  African  collective  bargaining 
institutions  on  smaller  firms:  the  case  of  the  Newcastle  clothing  firms’  in  volume  2,  section  6.7  ‘Analysis  of 
determining factors - JC6.3 Increased and diversified economic activity focusing in particular on SMMEs and BEE 
entrepreneurs’. 66 
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improvement of community assets and social services; improve their educational qualifications; and 
reduce in alcohol consumption”. They also report that “the work opportunities given by the CWP have 
shifted the perspectives of the participants, making them feel part of their community”. Vawda, et al. 
(2013) argue that the low entry requirements and universal access makes the programme efficient in 
dealing with the needs of the most marginalised in the most marginalised communities. However, there 
are a number of perceived challenges facing the CWP including: late payments; insufficient and poor 
quality  occupational  and  health  gear;  unfair  recruitment  practices;  and  limited  management  and 
leadership skills amongst managers. A second paper in this series - Stanwix & Van Der Westhuizen 
(2013) - argues that an increase in the reach of the CWP can impact on large numbers of people, 
although the impact on national poverty levels is fairly small.  
Industrial policy, and its use to specifically create jobs, is controversial. A key aim of the Industrial Policy 
Action Plan (IPAP) is to promote a labour absorbing industrialisation path where the state plays an 
active leadership role. A concern often raised by the critics of industrial policy is that it creates rents 
which can be captured by specific interest groups and can end up benefiting a small, usually already 
well-off, group at the expense of the large group of consumers. Examples of this are:  
  the South Africa’s Motor Industry Development Plan (MIDP) which favoured the adjustment of 
African motor industry but has not created new jobs
103; and  
  the restriction of imports of Chinese clothing in 2007 and 2008 which was designed to protect 
local  jobs,  but  resulted  in  large  costs  borne  by  consumers  (during  the  period  2007-8  it 
increased  consumer  prices  of  these  restricted  products  by  6-11%)  and  to  the  continued 
shedding of jobs in the sector throughout this period (see also Volume II, section 6.6 Analysis of 
determining factors - JC6.1). 
Identification of the determinant factors related to public & private sector investment 
Government’s performance in funding investment since the mid-2000s has been impressive. This has 
been possible for a number of reasons: i) GEAR’s fiscal prudence significantly reduced the budget 
deficit and created fiscal  space in the  2000s;  ii)  government investment, or at least the  budget for 
investment, happens by fiat (there is little need to coax private sector actors or other constituencies); 
and iii) infrastructure and social investment is politically uncontentious, supported by business, labour 
and government. This investment does not, or is not perceived to, challenge entrenched interests. 
This increase in infrastructure bodes well for future economic growth given the relationship identified 
between  infrastructure  and  growth  by  (Fedderke,  et  al.,  2006)
104. However, there are at least two 
concerns surrounding this investment. The first is the ability of  the  government, particularly at the 
municipal level, and public corporations to spend these amounts efficiently. The second, as  (Frankel, et 
al., 2006) indicate, is that South African growth is likely to be investment intensive and thus increases in 
economic growth are likely to require very large amounts of investment . (Frankel, et al., 2006) argue 
that “given the employment/productivity performance of the South African economy even such a large 
investment program will barely deliver the desired growth rates while imposing an impossible burden on 
public  investment.”  Public  investment  by  itself  is  thus  not  sufficient  for  growth  but  requires  other 
complementary economic policies which change the structure of the economy. 
The fiscal space created in the 2000s meant that, at least in terms of the budget deficit, South Africa 
was well placed to weather the global financial crisis. Despite lower tax revenues as South African 
economic  growth  slowed  from  2008,  government  spending  was  largely  unaffected  leading  to  an 
increase in the budget deficit.  
Although private GFCF has risen steadily since 2001, higher levels of investment by both domestic and 
foreign firms are essential for future economic growth. Government spending on infrastructure has the 
potential  to  ‘crowd-in’  private  investment  but  there  are  a  number  of  factors  which  can  limit  this 
investment. Uncertainty about policy and the future performance of the South African economy is likely 
to temper investment levels. Although government strategies, such as the National Development Plan, 
are relatively clear on the direction of economic policies, it is less clear whether these will actually be 
implemented. Other factors, such as crime, also limit investment. The  (World Bank, 2009) provides 
                                                       
103 The MIDP created incentives for foreign-owned companies not to leave the country; while it can therefore be 
argued  that  it  prevented  the loss  of  employment,  its  broader  consequences  are  controversial.  See  F.  Flatters 
(http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/flatters/main/midp.html) where it is argued that the ‘saving of jobs’ came at a 
very heavy cost to the consumer.  
104 See also Volume II - Box 12 “The role of infrastructure investment in South African economic growth” in § 6.6 
“Analysis  of  determining  factors  -  JC6.2  Increased  public  &  private  sector  investment,  overall  and  in  priority 
sectors”. 67 
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evidence that crime against business reduces the gross profitability ratio of fixed assets, and raises risk 
and uncertainty, which in turn will lead to lower investment. 
For  smaller  firms,  access  to  finance,  and  financial  products,  to  help  pay  for  investment  can  be  a 
constraint and does not seem to have changed significantly over the period. It also seems like the gap 
in access between smaller and larger firms is bigger than for other similar countries. The World Bank 
(2009) shows that in South Africa only 59% of SMEs have any credit products compared to 82% of 
large firms, a gap of 23 percentage points. For countries like Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand, 
this gap is in the range of 10 to 14 percentage points. The RCF has focused on such key bottlenecks by 
supporting the IDC to test and develop new lending products, but its systemic effects have been limited. 
Ultimately, it is firms which drive private investment. Teal (1999) finds that uncertainty is important in 
constraining  investment  but  argues  that  “the  reduction  of  risk  and  the  creation  of  a  more  stable 
macroeconomic  environment  would  undoubtedly  be  of  enormous  benefit  but it  may  well  not  be 
sufficient to see a rise in investment.” He also argues that for the other African countries considered 
there is little evidence that firms fail to invest because of a lack of sufficient funds and that a reason for 
lack of investment in South Africa could be linked to the fact that firms are relatively inefficient. This 
suggests  that  in  the  South  African  context  policies  to  promote  firm-level  efficiency,  such  as  trade 
liberalisation, product market competition and a reduced regulatory burden, are likely to lead to higher 
investment levels. 
South  Africa’s  limited  domestic  market  and  a  regional  market  which  is  small  and  fragmented,  also 
hampers private investment. Relatively high labour costs and an inflexible labour market, together with 
high transport and port costs within the country, and large distances to major trading partners also 
means that South Africa is an unattractive destination for companies wanting a low cost location as a 
base for exporting and limits integration into global value chains. The limited domestic and regional 
markets, as well as the barriers to exporting, means that South African firms struggle to attain scale 
economies which allow them to be competitive globally. 
Identification of the determinant factors related to evolution in structure of SMMEs 
In addition to the broad movement away from the non-mineral tradable sector which is argued (Rodrik, 
2006) to have led to lower growth and employment opportunities, particularly at the lower end of the 
skills distribution, South African industries are relatively concentrated with high mark-ups (Fedderke, et 
al., 2007). This makes it difficult for smaller firms to compete. Given the strong relationship between 
competition  and  productivity  growth  identified  by  empirical  studies  (Aghion,  et  al.,  2005),  this  high 
concentration is a further factor limiting export-led growth. Economic sanctions and a closed economy 
during apartheid contributed to this. A more diversified economy, in terms of both SMMEs and more 
representation of HDIs through BBBEE, is thus essential for future economic growth and job creation. 
Main limiting factors. The relatively fewer number of smaller firms in South Africa compared to a country 
like Brazil are the result of a number of factors. Costs of red-tape, regulations which raise labour costs, 
high concentration rates and the fact that smaller firms are more sensitive to economic fluctuations 
have all contributed to what seems like a declining role for smaller firms in the economy. Since 2006 net 
job creation has been concentrated in firms which employ more than 500 people (Kerr, et al., 2013). 
SARS returns suggest that there are fewer smaller firms, and the labour force statistics indicate that, at 
least since 2007, there is a lower proportion of people working in firms with less than 50 employees. A 
key factor  which results in fewer smaller firms and lower levels of small firm employment  is South 
Africa’s  institutional  bargaining  structure.  Magruder  (2012)  shows  that  Bargaining  Councils,  which 
favour  large  firms,  result  in  7%-16  %  fewer  employees  in  small  firms  (those  with  less  than  10 
employees) and 7%-15% fewer entrepreneurs. Labour market institutions such as the CCMA also can 
absorb large amounts of management’s time for smaller firms, making them less likely to survive and 
grow. Regulations, which all have a fixed-cost component, also disadvantage smaller firms relative to 
larger firms. These include regulations such as those associated with BBBEE but also aspects related 
to tax compliance. 
There are also other service delivery issues which may disadvantage smaller firms relatively to larger 
firms. Small firms mention that municipal services are one of their most pressing concerns (SBP, 2012). 
An  erratic  electricity  supply  will  disadvantage  those  firms  who  do  not  have  a  generator.  Delays  in 
company tax assessments or refunds will also disadvantage smaller firms without the cash-flow or cash 
reserves to carry them through these periods. 
South  Africa  has  a  number  of  policies  designed  to  promote  SMMEs  and  entrepreneurship.  These 
include  the  government  funded  agencies  Small  Enterprise  Development  Agency  (SEDA),  Small 
Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA) and the small business activities of IDC, and the National Youth 
Development Agency. One measure against which SEDA evaluates its performance, is the proportion 68 
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of its clients whose turnover and employment have grown. Between 2011 and 2012 the set targets were 
exceeded for both measures. 56% of their clients experienced turnover growth and 25% experienced 
employment growth.  
Other  measures  to  encourage  SMMEs  include  various  tax  incentives  such  as  a  progressive  tax 
structure and accelerated depreciation, and initiatives undertaken by SARS to lessen the administrative 
burden  associated  with  tax.  (Friedland,  2010)  suggests  that  one  impact  of  these  incentives  was  to 
increase capital intensity among small firms. 
Overall though it seems that South Africa’s small business policies can be improved. (Timms, 2011) 
argues that “South Africa’s small business policies have done little to create effective support agencies 
to help support business owners to start up and grow their business. Added to this awareness of many 
of  the  government’s  support  schemes  also  remains  very  low.  Much  of  this  is  as  a  result  of  the 
government’s  lack  of  co-ordinated  strategies  aimed  at  small  business  and  a  government  support 
architecture…  which  is  both  clumsy  and  confusing  –  both  to  business  owners  and  to  government 
officials themselves. The government simply has too many agencies trying to assist business owners, 
which are in turn spread across two different departments – in turn confusing government officials.” 
Identification of the determinant factors related to competitiveness of the SA economy and trade 
outlook 
The competitiveness of the South African economy, as measured by various international rankings of 
competitiveness, has not improved over the period under review. The share of exports in South African 
GDP, another indication of South Africa’s external competitiveness was lower in 2010 than in any year 
since  1994.  Two  key  aspects  which  lead  to  South  Africa’s  low  ranking  in  the  competitiveness 
comparisons are its education system and labour markets which have a direct impact on the ability of 
South African firms to compete in the international market through exports. 
Despite large increases in the value of exports, the ratio of exports to GDP has remained relatively 
constant during the period. Over the period South Africa has not managed to become a more export-
intensive economy. In addition to this, South African export growth has been mediocre relative to other 
middle-income  economies  (Alves  and  Edwards,  2006;  Hausmann  2008).  During  the  period  imports 
have also grown more rapidly than exports leading to a current account deficit which, as has happened 
in the past, is likely to be a constraint to future growth. Recent economic development plans have 
acknowledged this, most recently the NDP which emphasises the potential contribution of exports to 
growth and jobs. 
South African exports are limited by a number of factors:  
  the current global economy (low growth rates in South Africa’s traditional export markets of 
Europe and North America means that demand for South African goods and services is likely to 
be constrained in the future);  
  an international trade environment which has become more competitive due to increases in 
exports from low-wage countries such as China. South African firms have not been able to 
switch to non-traditional markets to compensate for this since in many cases these markets are 
different. Markets such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the rest 
of Africa, which many South African firms participate in, often require lower-value products and 
due to lower income levels are limited (Rankin & Schöer, 2013). South African firms are thus 
likely to send only a small proportion of their output into the region. These regional markets also 
do not serve as a stepping stone to international markets since the types of products which are 
exported to them are different to those required for exporting outside of Africa; 
  limited availability of skills and wages in South Africa as firms which export outside of Africa pay 
higher  wages,  use  more  skilled  labour  and  more  productive  than  within  Africa  exporters 
(Edwards,  et  al.,  2008).  Without  changes  in  their  production  technology  these  firms  are 
constrained by the availability of the types of people which they employ; 
  trade  liberalisation,  which  in  the  view  of  (Edwards  &  Lawrence,  2006)  was  an  important 
contributor to the improved export performance on the 1990s, has stalled recently. There is 
evidence  that  this  trade  liberalisation  was  related  to  improvements  in  productivity  growth 
(Jonsson & Subramanian, 2001) (Harding & Rattso, 2005) and reduced mark-ups (Edwards & 
van de Winkel, 2005) (Fedderke, et al., 2007). Dawdling on further trade reform thus helps to 
maintain the levels of high concentration and limit productivity improvements in South Africa.  
  costs exporters incur due to transport are high. South African port charges are considerably 
higher than the international norm (Botes, 2006) Firms also choose road over rail due to an 
unreliable rail network despite the additional costs linked to road transport (South African road 69 
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costs are also high by international standards). These high transport costs also act to limit 
imports. This has a dual impact – uncompetitive local producers are not forced to become more 
productive  and  the  cost  of  importing  intermediate  inputs  increases.  This  means  that  South 
African  production  costs  increase  which  makes  South  African  firms  less  competitive  on  the 
international market. These high transport costs are the result of the inefficiencies of public 
companies. Neither Portnet (which runs the ports) nor Transnet (which runs the railways) seem 
able to deliver efficient and cost-effective services. In addition to high costs within the country, 
South Africa is generally far from its main trading markets which further adds to the costs of 
trade and limits export participation. 
4.7.6  Step 2 - Summary table - Employment & Private sector 
The table below synthesises the factors determining changes observed at outcome and impact level. In 
particular, the table highlights the determining factors of economic and social growth, and the causal 
links between outputs of the Government strategy on the one hand, and outcomes and impacts of the 
Government strategy on the other hand. Inclusion of internal and external factors allows to better qualify 
the role of the induced outputs. 
Table 11  Synthesis of factors determining changes observed at the outcome and impact levels 
(Step 2) - Private Sector/Employment sector 
GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development Results  Influence  Other historical and/or 
policy interacting factors, 
and/or internal or external 
factors  
  Employment and 
industrial development 
programmes
105. 
  Legal and regulatory 
reforms to improve the 
business environment. 
  dti capacities 
strengthened.  
  Strategic framework for 
women empowerment. 
 
  moderate. 
 
  weak.  
 
  weak.  
 
  weak. 
  Significant but 
insufficient job creation 
(growth in working aged 
population leading to 
persistently high 
unemployment rates, 
esp. among women and 
poor). 
Contributing 
factors:  
  weak to 
moderate. 
Limiting 
factors:  
  strong. 
  strong. 
  strong. 
Contributing factors:  
  High political priority attached 
to private sector and 
employment strategies. 
Limiting factors:  
  Changes in the historical 
drivers of the South African 
economy (decline of primary 
sector, less labour-intensive 
production in the service 
sector). 
  Skills profile of labour market 
participants. 
  Institutional and regulatory 
structure of the South African 
labour market. 
  Global financial crisis. 
  Employment and 
industrial development 
programmes. 
  dti capacities 
strengthened. 
  weak to 
moderate. 
 
  weak. 
  Overall substantial 
increase in public & 
private sector 
investment but only 
limited increase for 
SMMEs. 
  moderate to 
strong. 
  moderate to 
strong. 
Limiting factors:  
  Regulatory burden. 
  Global financial crisis. 
  Employment and 
industrial development 
programmes. 
  Legal and regulatory 
reforms to improve the 
business environment. 
  dti capacities 
strengthened. 
  Development of new 
lending products & co-
financing of risky 
projects (IDC). 
  weak. 
 
  weak.  
 
  weak. 
 
  weak. 
  Declining contribution of 
SMMEs to the economy 
  moderate to 
strong. 
  moderate to 
strong. 
Limiting factors:  
  Service delivery issues (e.g. 
municipal services or failures 
in power supply system). 
  Other competitiveness 
policies. 
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GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development Results  Influence  Other historical and/or 
policy interacting factors, 
and/or internal or external 
factors  
  Employment and 
industrial development 
programmes. 
  Legal and regulatory 
reforms to improve the 
business environment. 
  dti capacities 
strengthened. 
  weak. 
 
  weak. 
 
  weak. 
  Decreased 
competitiveness.    strong. 
Limiting factors:  
  Institutional and regulatory 
structure of the South African 
labour market. 
  Skills profile of labour market 
participants. 
  Insecurity and social 
instability. 
Source: Particip GmbH analysis. 
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4.8  EQ7 (Step 2) - Water 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent, in the water sector, have the development outcomes 
pursued through the policies and programmes supported by SBS been (or are being) achieved? 
And which have been the determining factors of their achievement? 
Brief overview of the context 
South Africa is a water scarce country with a water availability of 928 m
3/year per capita; only 30 countries have 
less water per inhabitant. Agricultural irrigation alone stands for 60% of the total water use in South Africa. Urban 
requirements constitute 25% of total water use, with the remaining 15% shared by rural requirements, mining and 
bulk industrial requirements, power generation and forestation.
106  
Key policy reform process began immediately after the first free elections in 1994 with the Water Supply and 
Sanitation  Policy  White  Paper,  which  established  the  responsibility  of  GoSA  (DWA)  for  Water  Supply  and 
Sanitation (WSS) in rural areas (former homelands). The 1997 Water Services Act provides for the rights of access 
to basic water supply and basic sanitation by setting national standards and norms, and gives together with the 
1996 Constitution DWA the responsibility to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to assume their 
role and functions. In 2000, the Free Basic Services Policy includes access rights to basic water and sanitation and 
refers to a clearly defined level of service such as 6,000 litres/month pr. household. The key document guiding 
sector reform is the 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS), prepared with extensive stakeholder 
consultation, which establishes DWA as sector leader responsible for regulation, support and policy, while service 
provision is transferred to local government. The 2004 National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) provides the 
framework for water resource management (WRM) and a shift towards decentralised integrated WRM (IWRM) with 
the planned establishment of Catchment Management Agencies. 
The policy reform process was accompanied by a number of programmes and mechanisms to address the major 
needs in the sector. In 1998/99, the Equitable Share funding was introduced to provide unconditional subsidies to 
local governments for recurrent expenditure (e.g., operations and maintenance). The Equitable Share allocation is 
also important to finance Free Basic Water (FBW), especially in local and district municipalities with large rural 
populations. In 1997, the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) was launched, the significance 
of which was that it provided funding for what was then DPLG to provide municipal infrastructure development 
support in urban and peri-urban areas, whereas DWAF would continue with its capital programme in the rural 
areas. Between 1997 and 2004 CMIP invested R4.9 billion in urban and peri-urban water and sanitation service 
infrastructure.
107 The conditional Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) focusing on capital expenditure was  then 
introduced to further ensure adequacy of funds and speedy roll out of investments.  
The EU has been involved in the sector since 1994, in particular providing significant support to Limpopo Province 
and Eastern Cape. In 1994, GoSA embarked on a Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme based on 
the experience from participatory WSS projects piloted and implemented in the early 1990s by NGOs. The GoSA 
programme ‘Masibambane’ (MSB) - supported by EU SBS – was launched in 2001. MSB I (2001-4) expanded 
WSS service provision in three provinces and contributed to design and adoption of the new Strategic Framework 
for Water Services (2003). Moreover, MSB promoted sector collaboration and an integrated approach to sector 
planning  and  established  collaborative  structures,  first  to  promote  WSS  services,  and  later  to  promote  water 
resource management. During MSB II (2004-7), the sector wide approach was up-scaled to covering the entire 
country, the focus shifted away from infrastructure construction to capacity building and DWA was established as 
the sector leader. Water for Growth and Development (WfG&D) was the overarching theme of MSB III (2007-10) 
which saw the scope broadened to promote integrated water resource management (IWRM). Service provision is 
now transferred to local government, and DWA focuses on sector policy, support for local governments, monitoring 
the performance of new water supply institutions, and the regulation of the sector. 
Overall answer to the Evaluation Question 
Significant achievements have been attained in the period 2000-2011 in terms of increased access to 
water and sanitation facilities and, to a lesser extent, in terms of the quality of the drinking water. There 
is evidence that Masibambane - the GoSA programme supported by SBS - has contributed to these 
improvements.  The  strategies  and  policies  developed  by  the  programme,  the  sector  leadership 
promoted  by  the  programme,  and  the  wide  range  of  innovative  pilot  projects  also  funded  by  the 
programme  played  a  key  role  in  this  development.  That  said,  broader  GoSA  efforts  and  funding 
mechanisms put in place such as the Equitable Share and MIG were also key to profoundly influence 
the reduction of the infrastructure backlog. So  did the overall strategic  direction provided  by  GoSA 
influence the policies developed by MSB (such as the political imperative of the Free Basic Water Policy 
and the need to transform Irrigation Boards into more equitable WUAs).  
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However,  important  geographical  disparities  prevail  and  some  provinces  still  present  significant 
backlogs in terms of access to basic water supply and sanitation services. The GoSA programme has 
had less effect on significantly improving living conditions. The focus on backlog reduction as opposed 
to operations and maintenance has meant that the recent gains are being undermined as the quality of 
the service provision deteriorates. 
Moreover,  whilst  the  Masibambane  has  also  helped  increase  the  number  of  WUAs  and  thus  help 
strengthen  initiatives  to  protect  South  Africa’s  fragile  water  resources,  the  programme  was  less 
successful in increasing the participation of CSOs in the management of these resources.  
Finally,  the  programme  has  been  successful  in  promoting  the  participation  of  women  in  the 
management of the sector, especially at the top/senior level. But it has not made much progress in 
increasing the wider participation of women in the sector and, despite clear improvements in terms of 
access to pipe water, the burden for women in accessing water still represents a challenge in the most 
vulnerable provinces. 
Evaluation  Question  7a:  To  what  extent  the  main  development  outcomes  identified  as  SBS 
targets have been achieved? 
4.8.1  Equitable  access  to  basic  water  supply  and  sanitation  services  (JC7.1)  &  Access  to 
clean water and efficient use of water resources (JC7.2) 
In 1994, it was estimated that only 59% of the population had access to a basic water supply, by the 
end of MSB this figure had increased to 97%. In 1994, only 49% of people had access to sanitation 
facilities, by the end of MSB this had increased to 79%. Significant achievements have been attained in 
the period 2000-2011 in terms of ensuring that all South Africans have access to water and sanitation 
services. This was done in parallel to an important reform process in the sector that, in particular, saw 
the transfer of water services schemes initially operated by the national department (DWAF) to water 
services institutions (local governments or water boards). 
Data from the General Household Survey (GHS) shows improvements in a number of indicators (e.g. 
access to pipe waters, distance from nearest water sources, type of sanitation facilities used in the 
households, etc.) in all provinces over the period 2000-2011. Positive progress has also been recorded 
in terms of the proportion of schools with access to water. (see Indicators 7.1.1 to 7.1.4 in Volume II) 
The figure below depicts the evolution in terms of percentage of households with access to piped water 
over the period 2002-2011. 
Figure 13  Percentage of households with access to piped water (provincial and national level) 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the GHS survey (2002-2011) 
Some positive development in terms of access to clean water have also been observed, as illustrated 
by the percentage of households with water from the main source not safe to drink which decreased by 
more than 30% in several provinces between 2002 and 2007 (see details related to Indicator 7.2.2 in 
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Volume II).  There  are  also  improvements  in  related  health  outcomes,  as  illustrated  by  the  overall 
decrease in diarrhoea incidence under 5 in recent years. (see Indicator 7.2.1 in Volume II) 
Despite the substantial achievements in the water and sanitation sector described above, important 
geographical disparities prevail and some provinces still present significant backlogs in terms of access 
to basic water supply and sanitation services.  
In 2011, as illustrated in Figure 14 below, only slightly more than half of the residents in Northern Cape 
(59.3%),  Free  State  (59.3%)  and  KwaZulu-Natal  (61.2%)  rated  water  services  as  good.  In  other 
provinces such as Limpopo, North West, Mpumalanga or Eastern Cape, less than half of the residents 
perceive the water quality as good.  
Figure 14  Percentage of households that rated the water quality provided by the municipality as 
good, 2011 
 
Source: GHS survey 2011. 
Moreover, further improvements in the sector are hampered by  serious problems faced in terms of 
operations  and  maintenance  of  the  infrastructure  developed  in  the  last  decades.  The  2011 
‘Infrastructure Report Card’ prepared by the South African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE)
108 
notes a deterioration in the state of water services infrastructure outside of the major urban areas: “The 
quality and reliability of basic infrastructure serving the majority of our citizens is poor and, in many 
places, getting worse. Urgent attention is required to stabilize and improve these.” It rated the state of 
water infrastructure in the major urban centres as ‘C plus’ and wastewater infrastructure as ‘C minus’ 
(‘satisfactory for now’); but it gave all other areas a ‘D minus’ (‘at risk’) for water infrastructure, and an ‘E 
minus’ (‘unfit for purpose’) for their sanitation infrastructure.
109 
In 2012, DPME conducted a study on the “quality of sanitation in South Africa”. The study underlines 
that “approximately 11% of households (Formal - no services and Informal – no services) still have to 
be  provided  with  sanitation  services  (these  households  have  never  had  a  government  supported 
sanitation  intervention).  Additionally  at  least  26%  (rounded)  of  households  within  formal  areas 
disturbingly  have  sanitation  services  which  do  not  meet  the  standards  due  to  the  deterioration  of 
infrastructure”. The deterioration is mainly explained by a lack of technical capacity to ensure effective 
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operation, timely maintenance, refurbishment and/or upgrading, pit emptying services and/or insufficient 
water resources. The study further notes: “The startling finding  is that while access to sanitation is 
increasing (albeit at less than an optimal pace) from a functionality and adequacy point of view, as 
many as 26% (or about 3.2 million households) are at risk of service failure and/or are experiencing 
service delivery breakdowns. Add to this the 9% (or 1.4 million households) in formal settlements that 
have no services and (…) 64% of households in informal settlements making use of interim services 
and we get a picture of service delivery failure on a massive scale.” 
4.8.2  CSOs and community representatives participation in water sector policy development 
and implementation (JC7.3) 
During  the  evaluation  period,  there  was  a  strong  national  commitment  for  CSOs  and  community 
representatives’ participation in the water sector. Legislation pertinent to the water sector provided a 
clear framework for ensuring that civil society is engaged in both the management of water services and 
water resources. Moreover, the key role that CSOs could play in the sector was recognised in several 
sector policy and strategy documents. 
The MSB I final evaluation
110 observed considerable involvement of CSOs at local community level.  
GoSA programmes also succeeded in supporting and promoting pilot projects targeted at CSOs. Whilst 
never  rolled  out  completely  across  the  country  (due  to  resource  constraints) ,  these  projects 
demonstrated the value of involving CSOs in  water resource management related issues as illustrated 
by the case described in the box below.
 111 
Box 3  Case study on Citizens’ Voice (Water sector) 
The "Raising Citizens' Voice in the Regulation of Water Services" was first initiated by the National Regulator within 
DWA and conducted in four Cape Town township areas as a pilot project. The basic concept was to empower 
citizens through a phased training process so that target communities could engage knowledgeably with water 
issues and hold local government to account. Following the capacity-building period, "user-platforms" (monthly 
meetings between the municipality and the community) were to be set up to institutionalise on-going engagement 
between communities and government around water issues.  
Based on the success of the Cape Town pilot projects, the City of Cape Town took on "Citizens' Voice" as a fully-
fledged Municipal Programme and began rolling it out to other areas. Additionally, DWA decided to fund further 
pilot projects in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng) and Msunduzi Local Municipality (KwaZulu Natal). 
At the same time, eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality was inspired to implement and self-fund its own version of 
Citizen's Voice.  
The Citizen's Voice initiatives are in their essence intended to be public accountability mechanisms working for the 
public. The benefits, however, work both ways. In the areas where it has been successfully implemented, Citizen's 
Voice projects have resulted in reduced water losses, increased payment levels, and more active citizens within 
target communities. A key challenge in most areas has been taking the time to engage properly with local 
government - because without their buy-in, the platforms are unable to work as intended’.  
(source: MSB III Final Evaluation report - section 6, p.270) 
However, evidence shows that, overall, CSOs have not played the key role they were expected to play 
in water resource management during the evaluation period. As the MSB programme progressed the 
participation of CSOs decreased, particularly at both regional and local level. CSOs no longer attend 
water sector meetings nor do local authorities engage CSOs in any meaningful way to resolve water 
and sanitation issues. 
Whilst the first two phases of MSB did not emphasise water resource management, the evidence from 
MSB  II  supports  the  fact  that  only  few,  if  any,  CSOs  were  playing  a  key  role  in  water  resource 
management. Specific mention was made in the final evaluation report of MSB II that CSOs were not 
being used in monitoring service provision, nor was there much evidence that of community/local labour 
being used on projects. Moreover, the evaluation found “Inconsistent participation of CSOs in provincial 
forums (with little sector funding provided to facilitate access to these meetings)”. In conclusion, the 
MSB II final evaluation reported that “skills development/capacity building initiatives did not increase the 
number of CSOs actively engaged at local level to assist in delivery of services” and that there had 
been “too much focus on developing capacity and insufficient attention paid to what CSOs could do with 
their  new  found  capacity  (e.g.  no  resources  for  M&E,  delivery,  advocacy,  promoting  capacity 
participation)”.
112 
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Regarding  the  number  of  Water  User  Associations  (WUAs)  in  catchments,  a  large  increase  in  the 
number of WUAs can be observed during the evaluation period, particularly during the latter half of the 
evaluation period. Literature supports the view that, in general, WUAs are currently operating in many 
regions and are effective in identifying local water resource issues.  
But there is also evidence that many do not have the means to intervene to protect water resources if 
capital investments are required
113. The future sustainability of the changes is threatened by the lack of 
funding for these newly established WUAs . Moreover, the integration of WUAs  and wider participation 
remain  a challenge.  So far,  efforts  at the level of social transformation  have not been sufficient  to 
ensure the inclusiveness of, and participation by, new entrants into the process.  
4.8.3  Gender equality in the water and sanitation sector (JC7.4) 
There is evidence of increased gender integration at institutional level and, in particular, there has been 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  women  in  sector  management  positions.  At  the  project  level,  one  of 
DWA’s most visible achievements in gender mainstreaming efforts was the ability to ensure a  50% 
quota for participation by women in Village Water Committees according to interviews conducted in the 
Limpopo Province (with CSOs, WUAs and DWA provincial officials). Those interviewed reported that 
during MSB women attending meetings regularly, were participating actively, were playing a leadership 
role, and that a subtle shift in behaviour could be seen when men trusted the decisions being taken by 
women
114. Employment data reported in the Consolidated Water Sector Reports (and the MSB Annual 
reports) regularly presented sex disaggregated data. The data demonstrates that the GoSA programme 
reportedly created jobs on a range of projects (such as Working for Water and Working on Fir e) to 
actively promote employment opportunities for women and thus facilitating the participation of women in 
the sector.  
However, the overall participation of women in the sector has remained limited. Interviews conducted in 
the Limpopo province found that, whilst newly formed WUAs and other relevant community structures 
still embrace efforts to promote gender equality, the same could not be said for local government . This 
view is supported by findings in MSB II Final evaluation, which noted, after visiti ng municipalities, that 
“Gender as a cross-cutting issue very low on the agenda at local level”.  
Finally, data  on time spent fetching  water  every  week collected  via the General Household  Survey 
indicate a persisting burden for women, esp. in poor provinces. However, literature in this area argues 
that measurements of the time taken to collect water can be seen to be unreliable or the interpretation 
of this data can be misleading. Common reasons why the perceptions may not change/or even got 
worse  (even  if  things  have  actually  improved)  include:  if  piped  services  are  unreliable,  people 
overemphasise the challenges when the water is not available; the piped water pressure level (i.e. the 
pressure may fluctuate which gives the impression things have got worse, when in fact previously there 
was no water at all).
115  
4.8.4  Identification of the determinant factors 
Evaluation Question 7b: Which have been the main factors responsible for such achievements? 
Identification  of  determinant  factors  related  to  access  to  basic  water  supply  and  sanitation 
services 
An attempt was made in this evaluation to identify potential statistical relationships between the SBS 
supported  GoSA  programme  (Masibambane)  and  the  outcomes  in  terms  of  access  to  water  and 
sanitation services. Two quantitative approaches have been used:  
  In the first, we examine whether overall water-related expenditure at local government level and 
Masibambane expenditure are associated with changes in the outcome variables;  
                                                       
113  Surplus  People  Project  (2008)  Water  user  Associations  in  the  Olifants-Doorn  Water  Management  Area, 
compiled by Gwendolyn Wellmann; J.S. Kemerink, L.E. Méndez, R. Ahlers, P. Wester, P. van der Zaag (2013). The 
question of inclusion and representation in rural South Africa: challenging the concept of Water User Associations 
as a vehicle for transformation. Water Policy 15, p. 243–257. 
114  The  MSB  I  Final  evaluation  noted  that  “there  are  reported  research  findings  indicating  improved  relations 
between men and women as a result of serving on project steering committees. This includes decrease in cultural 
stereotypes around gender”. 
115  See  Estimation  of  Water  Demand  in  Developing  Countries:  An  Overview.  Céline  Nauges  Dale Whittington 
(2009),  World  Bank  Res  Obs  (2010)  25  (2):  263-294.  First  published  online:  November  11,  2009. 
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  In the second, we employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis to examine whether there 
are any significant differences in the outcome variables between the provinces where the GoSA 
programmes were most intensively implemented (namely: Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and 
Limpopo provinces) and other provinces during the period of implementation. 
The first approach shows that Masibambane expenditure is negatively correlated to access to water 
and sanitation, and this is not significant  when Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces  (the two 
better-off provinces) are excluded. One explanation for the negative relationship is that Masibambane 
expenditures are likely to be ‘endogenous’ (the programme has been implemented where the conditions 
were the worst).  
The  second  approach  extends  the  analysis  to  further  investigate  whether  the  provinces  where  the 
programme was most intensively implemented performed any differently to those where the programme 
was implemented less intensively. It shows that Masibambane is actually significantly correlated to the 
positive evolution in the outcome variable.
116 (see Indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2) 
Although  this  analysis  suggests  that  the  programmes  were  associated  with  better  outcomes,  the 
estimates do not necessarily indicate a causal impact of the programmes on these outcomes. Some 
qualitative considerations can be developed to highlight such a causal link:  
  Since the end of apartheid, with water becoming a strong political and financial priority, the 
sector has undergone major reforms, both in terms of the provision of water and sanitation 
services,  but  also  in  the  management  of  water  resources.  All  of  which  has  substantially 
transformed the sector over the last two decades.  
  During the period 2000-2011, Masibambane has focused on soft issues which have contributed 
to strengthen the on-going reform process (see also EQ5). Masibambane was mainly about 
strategic  programmes  complementing  infrastructure  development,  in  the  hope  of  building  a 
foundation for sustainability. In particular, the programme focussed on educating entirely new 
rural administrations about what water services entail and how to go about it. Hence, its focus 
on building capacities at local government level and promoting sector collaboration.  
  Masibambane also funded much of the strategic planning of the sector (such as the Strategic 
Framework  for  Water  Services  and  the  National  Water  Resource  Strategy),  much  of  the 
research and development (as distributed by the Water Information Network of South Africa), 
and a number of innovative pilot programmes (such as the electronic Water Quality System) 
that DWA did in the regions and within the WSAs. 
While broader GoSA efforts and funding mechanisms put in place (such as the Equitable Share and 
MIG)  were  key  to  profoundly  influence  the  reduction  of  the  infrastructure  backlog,  Masibambane 
contributed to accelerate the ongoing reform process. The MSB III Final Evaluation
117 describes well 
this contribution: “Masibambane has provided a programme of sustained support and institution building 
which, since 2003, has brought together the 21 District WSAs to share their experiences and learn from 
each other. Together those DMs serve a third of the population - the poorest third - the third prioritized 
in current government policy. Support provided through Masibambane has been very important to these 
WSAs.  This  is  where  the  value  of  the  Masibambane  approach  has  been  so  profound:  in  bringing 
together municipal roleplayers in workshops and regional forums to share information, municipalities 
learn about their roles and service options… Masibambane support has greatly assisted in accelerating 
the  pace  of  infrastructure  development  to  eradicate  backlogs,  with  extensive  support  from  DWA, 
DPLG/CoGTA/DCoG,  DBSA  and  others  helping  municipalities  to  plan  their  capital  development 
programmes and ‘unlock’ access to MIG, RBIG and ACIP funding and project manage implementation”. 
In  terms  of  improved  water  quality,  during  MSB  III  (2007-2010),  it  is  noteworthy  that  DWA  shifted 
decisively away from providing direct support to municipalities in this area, in favour of an emphasis on 
‘its own water services regulatory mandate’; the Blue Drop programme has been a major success of 
this initiative. The initiative not only moved the discussion away from simply monitoring the quality of 
drinking water but to actually ensuring systems and procedures were in place to effectively respond to 
the monitoring information. Thus, MSB has been actively involved in providing a more holistic approach 
to water quality, albeit one that is being undermined by poor maintenance or delayed maintenance, and 
plants operating at above their build capacities. 
                                                       
116 The coefficient estimates for the DiD term are positive and significant (DiD=0.06 with a p-value<0.01). 
117 MSB III Final Evaluation (2012) - p.157-159. 77 
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However,  important  challenges  still  prevail  in  the  sector.  As  highlighted  above,  important  service 
delivery backlogs in terms of both water supply and sanitation can still be observed in several provinces 
and quality of water does remain a major concern.  
In general, whilst access to water infrastructure has improved, the quality and quantity of the services 
have deteriorated; primarily operation and maintenance has failed to keep up with the installation of 
services. This is particularly visible in provinces such as Limpopo which was visited by the evaluation 
team in early 2013. As one interviewee noted “municipalities were incentivised politically and by capital 
grants to focus on expanding coverage, and radically under-estimating what it takes to keep services 
working”.  The  lack  of  capacities  of  certain  key  local  stakeholders  to  assume  new  roles  and 
responsibilities in service delivery has thus remained a major obstacle. In particular, in several areas, 
the system has expanded so rapidly that this could not been matched by a comparable expansion of 
capacities to sustain these developments. The 2012 DPME study on the “quality of sanitation in South 
Africa” also notes: “The speed with which the bucket eradication programme was implemented did not 
allow municipalities sufficient time for proper feasibility assessments and project life cycle planning.” 
The Masibambane programme has contributed to address these issues over the period (see also EQ5). 
But, these challenges (not the least the strengthening of capacities at local level, an issue which can be 
observed  in  other  sectors  as  well)  are  considerable  and  many  were  outside  the  ambit  of  the 
programme. Moreover, with the increase in the independence of municipalities, as a result of the rapid 
increases in the Equitable Share and MIG funding, the authority DWA had over local government has 
declined and thus reduced its ability to resolve these challenges.  
Identification  of  determinant  factors  related  to  CSOs  and  community  representatives 
participation in water sector 
Regarding CSO participation in the water sector, Masibambane did contribute to some success stories 
in this area. Yet, as highlighted above, participation has overall remained limited. There are three main 
reasons why there has been little observed change, namely: 
  Confusion over the role of CSOs in the GoSA programme (MSB): From the outset (as noted in 
the final evaluation of MSB I) there has been confusion over the role of CSOs. The challenges 
that emerged in the implementation of the programme revolve largely around the nature and 
extent  of  civil  society  participation:  “The  terms  ‘meaningful  involvement’  and  ‘meaningful 
participation’  are  used  interchangeably”
118.  Subsequent  evaluations  of  MSB II  and  MSB  III 
noted  that  this  confusion  remained.  Coordination  of  CSOs  within  MSB  was  also  poor. 
Evaluation  reports,  interviews  and  DWA’s  own  documents  suggest  that  CSOs  were  not 
effectively coordinated by MSB, nor were CSOs effective in organizing themselves. 
  ‘Training for the sake of training’: DWA and other state agencies did not manage to provide 
clear guidance on what role CSOs should play. Interviews with CSOs in Limpopo found that 
CSOs had repeatedly been offered capacity building training, but much of this training  was 
seen to be “generic, and of little practical use….and it certainly did not provide us with the 
means to effectively work in the sector”. 
  Financial  resource  not  mobilised:  the  virtual  collapse  of  the  component  of  the  programme 
focusing on CSO during the recent years, and the fact that the proposed funding for CSOs, as 
envisaged in the FAs for the three different phases of MSB, was never realized.  
Regarding the increase in Water User Association (WUA) in catchments, there are two determinants of 
the observed changes, the first being the legislative imperative being enforced by DWA (namely the 
requirement to transform all Irrigation Boards into WUAs) and the second being the acceleration of the 
transformation process by DWA during MSB III. 
The MSB III Final evaluation illustrates how the transformation process has been accelerated by this 
programme
119. For instance, reference is made to the rapid progress that the Eastern Cape DWA team 
has made in transforming a number of irrigation schemes during MSB III. MSB funds were used directly 
to support the Eastern Cape programme, in particular via  the provision of consultants to facilitate the 
social consultation (i.e. bringing local groups together to work out a comm on vision for their area) and 
via the provision of means to host meetings, facilitate disputes, etc.  
                                                       
118 MSB I final evaluation (2004) - p.72. 
119  P.201  notes  that  in  the  2010/2011  financial  year,  DWA  has  intensified  its  work  on  water  management 
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However, meaningful participation has remained problematic. This is often explained by the fact that 
new  members  of  WUAs  often  have  had  limited  exposure  to  water  resource  issues  and  lack  the 
technical competencies.
120 
There are also concerns in terms of  the financial viability of many WUAs.  Whereas DWA has been 
effective in getting WUAs to emerge and has provided considerable capacity building support to WUA s, 
DWA has had no means to provide ‘seed money’ to WUAs. Many WUAs cannot become formal entities 
(i.e. they have no ‘seed money’ with which to open a bank account, rent an office etc.), leading to a 
vicious  cycle  –  the WUA  cannot  raise  its  own  money  by  billing  users  as  the WUA  is  not  formally 
constituted, but they cannot get constituted properly without some start-up funds. Moreover, National 
Treasury’s strict application of the PFMA to WUAs (i.e. they are  subject to the requirements of the 
PFMA) have created difficulties for many WUAs. 
Overall,  the  sector  does  not  have  funding  to  sustain  the  small  WUAs  made  up  of  ‘resource  poor 
farmers’ all over the country. Interviews with DWA officials show that, now that MSB has ended, DWA 
has very limited means to help support and further strengthen existing WUAs and almost no means to 
build capacity/shape the setting up of new WUAs. 
Identification of determinant factors related to Gender equality in the water and sanitation sector 
The gains made in terms of women participation in the water sector cannot be seen without taking the 
wider developments in the national legislative and policy framework and the broad efforts made by 
DWA  into  account.  That  said,  Masibambane  has  actively  supported  and  directly  contributed  to  the 
evolution taking place in this area. The programme was important with respect to contributing to the 
increase documented here for a number of reasons, including: 
  Supporting  and  facilitating  the  formulation  of  gender  equality  policies  that  promoted  the 
importance of women in leadership positions; 
  Supporting (through resources) the establishment of the Gender Unit within DWA; 
  Championing  gender  equality  efforts  through  the  Water  Services  Sector  Leadership  Group 
(WSSLG); 
  Recruiting women into key leadership positions in the programme, so that by the time of MSB 
III nearly all of the senior decision making positions were occupied by women; 
  Supported (through resources) efforts to ensure every provincial DWA office had a gender co-
ordinator; 
  “By Masibambane recognising the importance of mainstreaming gender in the water sector, the 
programme has elevated the significance of gender in the sector, especially with regards water 
services provision” (MSB III Final Evaluation). 
  At the project level, one of DWA’s most visible achievements in gender mainstreaming efforts 
was the ability to ensure a 50% quota for participation by women in Village Water Committees 
according  to  interviews  conducted  in  the  Limpopo  Province  (with  CSOs,  WUAs  and  DWA 
provincial officials). Those interviewed reported that during MSB there was some evidence that 
women attending meetings regularly, were participating actively, were playing a leadership role, 
and that a subtle shift in behaviour could be seen when men trusted the decisions being taken 
by women
121. 
However, as highlighted above, efforts in terms of increasing participation of women in the sector have 
been hampered by the state of local government in South Africa, which is seen as largely dysfunctional. 
Moreover,  although data used to measure burden on women should be considered with care ,  the 
burden on women seems to have increased together with the deterioration of the quality and quantity of 
the services in the most vulnerable provinces (see above section related to JC7.2). In Limpopo, known 
as  one  of  South  Africa’s  poorest  provinces  with  the  highest  proportion  of  rural  dwellers,  local 
stakeholders  interviewed  mentioned  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  province  has  a  specific  historical 
legacy, namely it is made of three ex-homeland administrations and always lacked certain key technical 
competences of some of the other provinces making the area more prone to failure in the water system. 
Moreover, due to poor water resources in much of the province, there is a widespread reliance on 
boreholes  and  groundwater,  which  generally  means  lots  of  discrete  installations  requiring  regular 
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servicing (delivery of diesel, parts and so on) and vulnerable to breakdown (cable theft / copper theft, 
vandalism,  mechanical  failure  and  a  dearth  of  electricians  in  rural  areas).  Thus,  as  services  have 
deteriorated, this has increased the burden on women in certain areas.
122 
4.8.5  Step 2 - Summary table - Water 
The table below synthesises the factors determining changes observed at outcome and impact level. In 
particular, the table highlights the determining factors of economic and social growth, and the causal 
links between outputs of the Government strategy on the one hand, and outcomes and impacts of the 
Government strategy on the other hand. Inclusion of internal and external factors allows to better qualify 
the role of the induced outputs. 
Table 12  Synthesis of factors determining changes observed at the outcome and impact levels 
(Step 2) - Water sector 
GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development Results  Influence  Other historical and/or 
policy interacting factors, 
and/or internal or external 
factors  
  Introduction of new 
sector strategies. 
  Transfer of water & 
sanitation schemes to 
local government. 
  New approach to sector 
collaboration. 
  strong 
 
  strong 
 
  strong 
 
Increased access to water 
and sanitation although 
maintenance and operations 
has remained weak. 
  strong 
 
  strong 
 
  strong 
  Contributing factor: Water has 
been a strong political and 
financial priority. 
  Contributing factor: funding 
mechanisms for local service 
delivery introduced over the 
past decades. 
  Limiting factor: Persistent 
weaknesses in capacities at 
municipal level. 
  Masibambane Civil 
Society Strategic 
Framework. 
  Pilot initiatives to 
involve CSOs. 
 
  absent to 
weak 
 
  weak 
Decreased participation of 
communities and CSOs  
  strong 
 
  weak 
  Limiting factor: Persistent 
weaknesses in capacities at 
municipal level. 
  Contributing factor: clear 
national legislative and policy 
framework to CSOs 
engagements in the sector. 
  Gender mainstreaming 
strategy and clear 
statements related to 
gender equality in 
sector policies. 
  Establishment of a 
Gender Unit within 
DWA. 
 
  moderate 
 
  moderate 
Mixed results in terms of 
women participation in the 
sector 
  moderate 
  Contributing factor: 
Integration of gender in wider 
legislative and policy 
framework. 
 
 
   
                                                       
122 Although outside the scope of this indicator, poor service delivery has not only increased the burden on women, 
but it has sparked an ever growing number of public protests. Not only the ongoing ‘bucket – toilet saga’ in the 
Western  Cape  (http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/nine-held-for-airport-faeces-dumping-1.1537654#.Uc0wiuv 
HQSQ), but across the country. See also Tapela, Barbara (2012) ‘Social water scarcity and water use’, Report to 
the Water Research Commission, WRC Report No. 1940/1/11 who argues that “Inequitable access to water has 
since  2004  become  juxtaposed  with  an  exponential  increase  in  social  protests”.  Also,  Alexander,  P.  2010. 
Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis. Review of African Political 
Economy 37(123):25–40; Habib, A. 2010. The state of the nation and its public service in contemporary South 
Africa: A critical reflection.  Adminitratio Publica 18(3):2–24. 80 
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4.9  EQ8 (Step 2) - Governance (Access to justice & Legislative) 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent, in the sub-sectors of access to justice and legislative, 
have the development outcomes targeted by the policies and programmes supported by SBS 
been  or  are  being  achieved?  And  which  have  been  the  determining  factors  of  their 
achievement? 
Overall answer to the Evaluation Question 
Overall,  in  the  two  subsectors  (Justice  and  Legislative),  the  outcomes  as  defined  and  targeted  by 
DoJCD and SALS (and established in the SBS FA) have been achieved. 
In the Justice Sector targets have  even  been surpassed before the  agreed  deadline. A  network of 
paralegal and other services at community level has been made accessible for marginalised groups 
through  an  innovative  support  mechanism  involving  the  Foundation  for  Human  Rights.  There  is 
evidence that people use and appreciate such alternative services delivered by civil society in areas 
such  as  trauma  counselling,  alternative  dispute  resolution,  community  conflicts,  discrimination  in 
marginalised  communities,  cases  treated  of  undocumented  migrants  and  asylum  seekers,  etc. 
Sensitisation  and  awareness  of  a  large  number  of  citizens  on  constitutional  rights  have  improved, 
although it remains difficult to assess the depth of such achievements. Finally, there are signs of a 
better democratic participation within some of the communities in which FHR has provided assistance.  
The ‘institutionalisation’ of the Legislative Sector has been strengthened during the implementation of 
the LSPSP. There are cycles of joint strategy development and operational planning among national 
and  provincial  legislative  stakeholders  in  key  sector  areas  such  as  oversight,  HR  and  legislative 
functions. Harmonisation and joint stock-taking has taken place in promoting participative democracy, 
with  evidence  of  an  increased  capacity  by  Parliament  and  provincial  legislatures  to  reach  out  to 
marginalised groups and communities. And though it is early days to make affirmative statements about 
the improvements in capabilities of members of Parliament and the provincial legislatures, data show 
that some 400 members of SALS have obtained certification from different South African universities, 
human  resource  systems  are  being  strengthened,  and  collaborative  mechanisms  between  various 
components of the Legislative Sector have been enhanced, which also contributed to a more effective 
engagement with other institutions such as the Auditor General’s office and the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission. South Africa’s legislative sector has further institutionalised and diversified its international 
outreach  and  cooperation  with  legislative  bodies  in  the  Southern  African  region,  in  Africa  and 
throughout the world, thereby enhancing the potential for South-South cooperation. Still, these changes 
don’t allow for further conclusions about the deeper outcomes in terms of SALS capacity of rigorous 
oversight over the Executive or its legislative functions. 
The identification of the determining factors for the observed changes in the two sub-sectors can be 
supported by considerations on the political, institutional and socio-economic environment that create 
political incentives for key actors.  
First, the factors that determine the achievements in the justice sector (improved access to justice for 
marginalised groups, enhanced rights awareness, and strengthened citizen and civil society capacities, 
including  for  grant  management)  were  made  possible  through  the  innovative  cooperation  between 
DoJCD and specialised non-state actors, such as the Foundation for Human Rights and others. This 
approach  also  strengthened  the  sector  policy  to  improve  regular  state-civil  society  relations  in  the 
justice sector and the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster. This in turn contributed to better 
informed policy processes, which is an essential contributing factor of participatory democracy. 
Secondly, LSPSP has contributed to the already on-going efforts by key Legislative Sector stakeholders 
to  institutionalise  the  sector.    Formal  ‘rules  of  the  game’  have  been  adapted  to  emerging  needs, 
systems have been harmonised, financial, managerial and HR functions have been strengthened, and 
LSPSP  has  contributed  to  stronger  connectivity  between  Parliament  and  the  nine  Provincial 
Legislatures, and between the South African Parliament and international or external legislative bodies. 
It is, however, still too early to confidently state whether these achievements have already contributed 
to  envisaged  sector  outcomes  such  as  improved  oversight,  law-making,  representation  and 
strengthened democratic guidance.  
To more fully appreciate the impact of both governance programmes, it is appropriate to contextualise 
them  in  the  political-institutional  environment.  This  environment  was  characterised  by  institutional 
strengthening in certain sectors (including justice and the legislative sectors), but also by the challenges 
of a young constitutional democracy with rising expectations and “state-citizen relations that have to 81 
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improve to avoid instability”
123. Both programmes have considerably contributed to enhance incentives 
and citizen demands on DoJCD, the Legislative Sector and other departments for improved service 
delivery (justice), participation (justice and LS) and gradual uptake of policy innovation (justice and LS).   
 
Evaluation  Question  8a:  To  what  extent  the  main  development  outcomes  identified  as  SBS 
targets have been achieved? 
4.9.1  Access to Justice and Constitutional Rights: improved access through new structures 
and tools (JC8.1) 
In the key performance areas that are targeted by DoJCD, all targets have been met or surpassed well 
before  the  finalisation  of  the  SBS.  This  includes  the  number  of  new  Community  Advice  Offices 
established, the number of new Equality Courts or the number of new cases diverted to Alternative 
Disputes Resolution Mechanisms ADRM). 
Interestingly, case management by all courts dropped in the year 2010/11. Yet, this was compensated 
by  the  considerable  increase  of  justice  served  by  means  of  ADRM.  Such  mechanisms  include 
diversions after enrolment, matters diverted in terms of the ‘Child Justice Act’, and informal mediations. 
(see also indicator 8.1.1) 
When  looking  at  beneficiaries’  perception  related  to  the  above  achievements,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish  between  two  categories  of  beneficiaries.  The  first  group  are  the  direct  (or  intermediary) 
beneficiaries, i.e. the CSOs (including Community Based Organisations) that receive grants through 
FHR for delivering services in one or more of the three key performance areas of the Access to Justice 
programme:  improved  access  to  justice,  greater  awareness  of  constitutional  rights  and  enhanced 
participatory democracy. The second group are the  ultimate beneficiaries, citizens (or communities) 
who benefit from these intermediary actors (the CSOs or the grantees) or from the policy innovations 
that are being introduced and implemented by the departments with whom FHR cooperates in certain 
key performance areas.  
All indicators monitored by the DoJCD in the programme are either process oriented or are quantitative 
outcome indicators. Examples of achievements measured by these indicators include establishment of 
Equality courts to total of 382 in 2012 (up from 220 in 2007), Community Advice Offices (46 in 2012, 
increase  from  18  in  2011),  and  increasing  numbers  of  cases  diverted  through  alternative  dispute 
resolution (10,600 cases in 2011/2012 against a target of 7,600).  
FHR  has  produced  additional  diagnostics  and  sampled  experiences  from  its  work  with  poor  and 
underserviced  communities.  Studies,  stories  and  evaluations  of  particular  areas  of  its  work  provide 
useful additional information on both process and the various types of outcomes and responses from 
different  stakeholders,  including  the  target  audience,  i.e.  the  weak  and  the  vulnerable  or  the 
underserviced  communities.  The  examples  collected  by  FHR  include  stories  of  grantees  and 
beneficiaries of counselling, such as Nonhlanhla Mfuzi, who had been seriously injured and managed to 
obtain  a  disability  grant,  or  the  experience  of  an  unnamed  woman,  whose  husband  was  shot  and 
trauma counselling facilitated her emotional healing. FHR also presents the accounts of counsellors and 
trainers  working  within  these  programmes,  such  as  the  Khulumani  Support  Group,  which  seeks  to 
educate and support widows, and is often faced with deep-rooted cultural and societal attitudes, which 
limit their achievements.  
Overall, one can conclude that access to justice for marginalised groups has improved, and there are 
clear indications of enhanced potential for policy innovation at the sub-sector level. 
4.9.2  Access to Justice and Constitutional Rights: improved awareness (JC8.2) 
In this key result area of the DoJCD, one can distinguish two types of initiatives undertaken within the 
programme to improve the awareness on constitutional rights. There are those initiatives ‘broadcasted’ 
to broader categories of viewers and listeners, largely through the public broadcaster. Secondly, there 
are smaller scale projects initiated and implemented by a host of smaller CSOs and usually targeted to 
communities. 
A  partnership  between  the  department  and  the  public  broadcaster  resulted  in  an  educational  radio 
programme (Justice on the Airwaves), which reached a wide audience. The target for this KPI has been 
largely  met.  FHR  undertook  an  audit  on  the  existing  initiatives  and  sensitisation  material  on 
constitutional rights awareness. It also produced a baseline survey on attitudes vis-à-vis and knowledge 
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about core constitutional principles and provisions
124. Over time, such baseline study may help assess 
changes  in  attitude  or  awareness  about  constitution al  rights.  No  follow -up  surveys  have  been 
undertaken so far for this purpose. It is possible to state that the intermediate outcome of establishing 
local broadcasting and public discussion capacities on constitutional rights has been achieved, but the 
results of the surveys will tell whether the actual awareness has significantly improved and the related 
behaviours have been affected. 
Under the second small-grants component 169 CSOs had received grants for all sorts of outreach or 
sensitisation activities on constitutional rights, as well as the new ‘Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act’. Other initiatives included public policy dialogues on various human rights 
issues,  a  research  programme  on  refugee  women  and  unaccompanied  minors,  dialogues  on 
immigration rights with CSOs, and a workshop of donors and CSOs to discuss coordination on refugee 
issues
125. The Orange Farm Human Rights Advice Centre illustrates well the range of initiatives that are 
developed by such community -based organisations. The advice centre combines sensitisation on 
constitutional rights with a social action portfolio stretching from environment, informal economy, so cial 
and cultural resilience, service delivery, child care, and advocacy through networking and civic activism. 
Through its work with specialised NGOs and academia and its work on  ‘people’s stories’ FHR tried and 
tries  to  gain  better  insight  into  the  nature  of  change  processes  through  (organised)  citizens’ 
engagement  with  public  authorities,  and  the  role  that  knowledge  about  rights  plays.  (see 
Indicators 8.2.1 & 8.2.2) 
As in the case of broadcasting, while it is hard and too early (as the surveys planned have not yet 
produced enough information) to assess changes in perceptions, awareness levels and attitudes with 
the  ultimate  beneficiaries,  and  contribute  possible  detected  changes  to  particular  actions  (such  as 
specific  media  campaigns)  or  contextual  variables,  first  findings  of  the  FHR  diagnostics  indicate 
improved levels of awareness among certain target groups. 
4.9.3  Access to Justice and Constitutional Rights: capacities of key stakeholders have been 
further developed, and participatory democracy has enhanced (JC8.3) 
FHR has undertaken two diagnostics: one that helped clarify the perceived needs in the CSO sector
126, 
and one post-training survey
127 that provided relevant findings of FHR’s capacity training roll-out with 
sixteen project partners with whom FHR had service agreements for capacity strengthening of smaller 
CSOs.  The  difference  in  capacities  between  the  various  categories  of  CSOs  also  becomes  clear 
throughout the vetting process of project proposals and CSOs that introduce them (Discussion Group, 
FHR 25 January 2013). A strong, recurrent characteristic with all the surveyed CSOs
128 was that despite 
numerous practical problems and a range of critical comments as to the pertinence of some of the 
capacity services provided, “almost all participating organisations and individuals warmly embraced and 
greatly  appreciated  the  opportunity  to  be  part  of  these  capacity  building  projects”  (McKinley,  Post 
Training Survey: 6).  
Multiple  initiatives  within  the  GoSA  programme  Access  to  Justice  illustrate  the  areas  in  which 
participatory democracy has ‘come alive’ through a host of civil society actors, ranging from the very 
sophisticated (operating usually at multiple government levels) to the more localised community based 
organisations. One can appreciate the difficulties in monitoring and measuring outcomes in the area of 
‘participatory democracy’ when one takes into consideration the highly diversified nature of civil society 
and the multitude of forms that such ‘participation’ can take (ranging from well-structured state-society 
exchanges  in  well-orchestrated  forums  to  the  other  extreme  of  the  ‘hustle  and  bustle’  of  often 
unpredictable social activism in cities, townships and even rural areas, often around charged notions of 
injustice, inequality, and citizen discontent about the lack of responsiveness of public authorities, and 
the unequal or insufficient provision of public goods.  
There  is  evidence  of  sophisticated  CSOs,  social  movements,  community-based  organisations,  and 
lobby groups that have combined different stratagems and action models, and have engaged at multiple 
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125 See the footnote above on the intermediate outcomes and the nature of the grantees CSOs 
126 McKinley, D.T. (2012) Analysis and Research Support in Phase 2 of Implementation (2011-2012) – Capacity 
Building of CSOs.  
127 McKinley, D.T. (2012) Post-Training Survey: Capacity Building for CSOs 
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levels with state and other non-state actors, including media. Depending on the leadership, network and 
organisational capacity, such organisations may mobilise citizens as voters or consumers
129 thereby 
creating political incentives at different policy and political levels. FHR provided a range of support 
services: funding to grantees, capacity development, networking facilities, and the conduit for policy 
feedback loops to key departments on pol icy implementation challenges and experiences. Despite the 
tensions that such CSOs may have on the body politic, DoJCD has not been alienated in the process of 
engagement with FHR.  
In other words, there is evidence that capacities of a number of civil soc iety stakeholders has improved 
in various areas relating to community mobilisation and awareness raising (including practical issues of 
obtaining  and  managing  grants  and  benefits) ,  and  that  DoJCD  has  succeeded  in  enhancing 
‘participatory democracy’ in the area of improving access to justice. In the process, this has resulted in 
more informed policy processes. 
4.9.4  Legislative Sector: Public participation and representation (JC8.4) 
Through a range of public participation initiatives the Legislative Sector has engaged with marginalised 
and  vulnerable  citizens,  incl.  women’s  and  youth  parliaments  and  ‘Taking  Parliament  to  the 
People/People’s Assembly’ events.  Moreover, citizens have access to all sittings of the House as well 
as standing and portfolio committee meetings. Petitions are also a recognised means for the public to 
register dissatisfaction with the implementation of legislation through legislatures. The application has 
been  regulated  through  legislation  or  internal  processes  in  all  legislatures  through  a  Petitions 
Framework. Legislatures conducted more public hearings, organised public education initiatives, made 
numerous laws and held open committee meetings at national and provincial levels. These initiatives 
are well documented (see Indicators 8.4.1 and 8.4.2), but it proved harder to assess how the public 
appreciated these efforts and what the effects were in terms of the intended outcomes. 
Some concerns have been raised within and outside SALS that the impact on the quality of participation 
and representation may be less than optimal as these efforts may become ritualistic or event-oriented 
(I-841), and that others may not automatically deepen public participation. The Speakers’ Forum has 
taken  a  central  role  in  promoting  a  more  strategic  and  coherent  Public  Participation  Framework  in 
response  to  such  concerns,  but  also  triggered  by  a  few  Constitutional  Court  rulings  that  declared 
legislation invalid because Parliament failed to take “reasonable” steps to enable public involvement. 
This judicial sanction has helped clarify the constitutional  obligation to provide for specific forms of 
participation  with  respect  to  law-making  processes.  Furthermore,  this  legal  imperative  has  given  a 
strong  impetus  for  the  Speakers’  Forum  to  take  public  participation  in  law-making  processes  more 
serious
130.  
The  Speakers’  Forum  contracted  two  studies,  one  of  which  surveyed  perceptions  of  Members  and 
Officials  of  Parliament  and  Provincial  Legislatures,  and  one  sampled  public  perceptions  or  public 
participation at provincial level. The reports were so varied that it was not possible to obtain unfiltered 
citizens views on public participation in the provinces, but they confirm the concerns about the lack of 
preparation,  management  of  information,  transparency,  and  managerial  discipline  in  ensuring  that 
public  participation  becomes  more  than  a  “mere  exercise  in  consultation  and  information  sharing” 
(Public Participation Report: 33). The survey among members and officials confirms this reductionist 
interpretation of public participation as “consultation” rather than one of “deliberation and power sharing” 
(Public Participation Report: 28). The Legislative Sector was still discussing the findings of the studies 
and the implications of a future Public Participation Framework, but a Discussion Group between the 
evaluation team and members of SALS (see Indicator 8.4.1) demonstrated interest in more effective 
public participation.  
On the basis of the available information it seems clear that effective public participation is a strong 
priority for the sector and that the LSPSP provides a key contribution to strengthen and monitor it, 
although it remains difficult to provide unambiguous evidence on whether the functions of participation 
and representation have actually improved.   
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4.9.5  Legislative  Sector:  Oversight  skills  and  roles  of  National  and  Provincial  parliaments 
(JC8.5) 
Measures have been taken to improve oversight skills of Parliament and provincial legislatures, and to 
ameliorate  law-making  roles.  Yet,  insufficient  data  or  evidence  could  be  collected  to  make  reliable 
statements about actual improved outcomes on these highly politically sensitive functions of oversight 
over  the  Executive  by  the  legislatures  and  deliberative  and  of  participatory  processes  required  for 
effective law-making. 
Elements that help appreciate oversight skills and law-making roles include:  
  In 2010 the Legislative Sector finalised an ‘Oversight Model for the Legislative Sector’, which 
provides guidelines for legislature oversight. Information workshops were conducted with the 
Members of Parliament and of the Provincial Legislatures on the oversight model. A total of 335 
members attended the course on Democratic Governance and Legislative Processes (2010/11) 
and the chairpersons of the various Standing Committees completed an induction programme, 
which included oversight training. 
  The  Money  Bills  Amendment  Procedure  and  Related  Matters  Act  (2009)  is  an  important 
oversight tool that was introduced to enable Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures to hold 
the Executive effectively accountable on budget planning and execution. As of 26 February 
2013,  a  dedicated  support  office  has  been  officially  created  within  the  LS,  the  Parliament 
Budget Review Office, and Members of the legislatures have been trained in the assessment of 
procedures  to  amend  Money  Bills  and  the  compilation  of  quarterly  reviews  and 
recommendations. It is anticipated that such roles, new (research) functions of the Parliament 
Budget Review Office, strengthened capacities and the promotion by the National Treasury and 
the South African Local Government Association of the Municipal Accounts Committees may 
energize the oversight functions of the Legislatures at different levels of governance. Moreover, 
performance targets are now to be monitored on a quarterly basis (with departments being 
required to fill in quarterly targets and having to report against them). 
  The  introduction  and  shift  since  the  2011  Medium  Term  Expenditure  Framework  towards 
including a functional classification of the budget with the rest of the budget documentation “is 
believed to have led to increased budget credibility, improved transparency and accountability 
as well as a stronger political oversight and efficiencies in allocations” (SBS Tranche Payment 
Request 2012, p. 19). Government and departments are now expected to submit information 
with  regards  to  donor  funding  (both  financial  and  in-kind)  as  part  of  their  annual  reports, 
creating thus new incentives and possibilities for improved oversight by the legislatures. 
In  the  context  of  this  evaluation,  views  were  solicited  from  a  number  of  civil  society  actors,  which 
echoed some of the key findings from the Independent  Panel Assessment of Parliament (see  also 
Indicator  8.4.2).  CSO  interviewees  confirmed  that  parliament  had  taken  measures  to  enable 
engagement with the public, but they also pointed to two types of persistent flaws: 
  One  relates  to  organisational  matters  such  as  transparency  and  problems  of  reliability  and 
predictability in the agenda setting (for example last minute changes).  
  A second type of hurdles is more systemic in that it relates to the institutional incentives that 
militate against an assertive oversight role by legislatures. Indeed, its members rely heavily on 
the endorsement of political parties in the context of an electoral system with closed lists and 
proportional representation. This places “tremendous power with the leadership of all parties”
131 
and reduces incentives for accountability towards citizens. 
Evidence of improved oversight and law-making roles of the legislatures is illustrated and documented 
through a few concrete cases. Some of these cases involve outside pressures and demands from civil 
society and citizens, rather than autonomous or sector generated improvements. Other cases – such as 
the strengthened roles for oversight over the Executive  in  budget matters  – indicate the  incentives 
created through a stronger institutionalisation of the legislative sector. This improved institutionalisation 
involves  or  includes,  inter  alia,  an  improved  regulatory  and  legal  framework  and  arrangements  for 
oversight and strengthened relations with the Auditor General of South Africa. 
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4.9.6  Legislative Sector: Improved human and financial resource management (JC8.6) 
The  Legislative  Sector  has  been  financially  and  managerially  strengthened  through  some  of  the 
realisations dealt with in JC 8.5 (see previous sub-section). and other achievements that include the 
development  of  a  generic  Legislative  Sector  Performance  Appraisal  Framework  during  2010  (see 
Indicator 8.6.1), the implementation of a three pronged Capacity Building Plan for its members (with 
almost 400 members of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures receiving their tertiary certificates in May 
2013), and a training schedule for staff members (based on an interim staff capacity building plan for 
the LS). A Sector Human Resources Management Strategic Framework was envisaged to be finalised 
during 2013. This will address the competency framework for job categories in in the sector as well as 
the orientation framework for Members of Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures. 
Public finance management in the dynamic LS has improved in the previous years and reforms are still 
ongoing.  The  2010/11  audits  present  a  “significantly  improved”  financial  management  environment. 
There is a closer working relationship between LS and the Auditor General since the start of the 4
th 
Parliament,  resulting  in  assistance  to  the  Speakers’  Forum  to  exercise  close  oversight  over  the 
administration of the legislatures. (see also Indicator 8.6.1). 
The Financial  Management of  Parliament Act  was enacted  in April 2009,  and aims to regulate the 
financial management of Parliament in a way that is consistent with the terms of the Constitution. The 
Provincial Legislatures proceeded to develop their own legislation in line with the norms, standards and 
regulations of the FMPA. But after the Constitutional Court challenged one of the Provincial Legislature 
Bills,  the  LS  is  now  developing  a  draft  amendment  to  the  FMPA  to  incorporate  all  Provincial 
Legislatures  into  the  national  legislation  before  the  deadline  of  9  September  2013.  In  the  interim, 
Provincial Legislatures operate under the current legislation relevant to them.  
4.9.7  Legislative Sector: Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures have strengthened their 
role for democratic guidance (JC8.7) 
On the basis of the outputs monitored by the Legislative Sector or the parliamentary records (annual 
reports, etc.) it is hard to make an informed judgement on whether parliament has strengthened its 
‘democratic mandate’ or to provide evidence of the degree in which it has improved on democratic 
guidance. In the context of this evaluation, evidence or examples of improved sector performance that 
hold the promise of strengthening the legislatures’ role for democratic guidance includes:  
  Public participation: more systems have been put in place to facilitate such participation, and a 
number of manifestations of more strategic engagement with civil society actors.  There is a 
positive appreciation of this potential by CSOs. New Public Participation Framework and model 
may further contribute to harmonisation of approaches and peer learning. The EUD’s Variable 
2
nd  Tranche  Payment  Request  judges  that  the  “strengthening  of  relations  between  the 
Legislative Sector and civil society” is “another positive development”. 
  Law-making: there is a stronger drive for Parliament to ensure that the minimum requirements 
to implement the constitutional principle for public participation in law-making is guaranteed, as 
the Constitutional Court has already ruled against legislation that failed to provide evidence of 
“reasonable” steps enabling public participation. 
  Oversight  function:  as  Commissioner  for  the  Legislative  Sector  (Financial  and  Fiscal 
Commission) indicated, the potential of Parliament to provide more effective check and balance 
function in the budget oversight (with a ‘credible threat’) has been strengthened by a) the legal 
framework of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (2009), b) the 
newly created research capacity of the Parliament Budget Review Office (February 2013), and 
c)  the  targeted  capacity  development  programmes  of  Members  of  Parliament  as  the 
“terminology and concepts around fiscal policy and public finance management underpinning 
the budget is often very technical and can be quite intimidating”. 
132 
  International  outreach  and  cooperation:  the  international  mandate  of  Parliament  has  been 
better  implemented  and  new  indicators  and  targets  have  been  integrated  in  the  LSPSP. 
Between EU and South Africa this has resulted in high profiled visit of a delegation of South 
Africa’s Parliament to the European Parliament and vice-versa. 
The legislatures have been enabled to strengthen their information, consultation and analytical base, for 
example in the strategically important area of oversight over budget processes. It is much harder to 
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make affirmative statements about improvements in strategic discussions on human rights and what 
has contributed to such improvements. The case of the constitutional right of citizens to information 
clearly demonstrates that the improvements to the Protection of State Information Bill as introduced in 
the  new  version  were  introduced  after  and  because  of  pressures  of  the  media,  citizens,  and  the 
groundswell that was mobilised by specialised civil society organisations such as the Right2Know. (see 
also I-852)   
4.9.8  Identification of the determinant factors 
Evaluation Question 8b: Which have been the main factors responsible for such achievements? 
Politico-institutional context for the Access to Justice programme and LSPSP 
When identifying determining factors for the achievements dealt with under EQ8a, it helps to reflect on 
the  politico-institutional  environment  in  which  the  policy  support  programmes  were  implemented. 
Although  the  entry  points  for  the  two  programmes  are  very  different,  both  touch  on  the  core 
constitutionally  enshrined  principles  of  citizen  participation  and  participatory  democracy.  Both 
programmes also support policy innovation and piloting in a middle-income country that is a vibrant 
democracy with major economic, socio-political and institutional challenges.  
The  broader  political  and  institutional  environment  in  which  these  programmes  were  designed  and 
implemented are well articulated in the National Development Plan 2030
133 and its supporting diagnostic 
studies.  After  broad  and  in-depth  consultations  by  the  National  Planning  Commission,
134  the  GoSA 
accepted  the  NDP  2030.  The  diagnostic  studies  clearly  acknowledge  government failures:  in  many 
areas “service delivery has fallen dramatically short of expectations (…) because people live in areas 
where the state fails to meet its constitutional obligation” (NPC, Institution and governance diagnostics, 
p.3)  and  the  NPC  goes  further  and  warns  for  the  dangers  of  unaccountable  and  unresponsive 
government:  “In  recent  years,  citizens  have  resorted  to  protest  action,  sometimes  violent,  to  draw 
attention to their demands. Many communities are frustrated and feel their voice is not being heard 
through formal channels. There is an urgent need to create more constructive forms of engagement” 
(idem, p.16).  
Despite  positive  achievements  linked  to  government  realisations  since  1994  in  terms  of  extending 
public  service  delivery  in  areas  ranging  from  housing,  water,  health,  education,  to  social  protection 
schemes,  etc.
135,  inequality  (as  measured  by  the  GINI  coef ficient)  has  gone  up  since  1994, 
unemployment rates remain high  and major challenges persist in certain social sectors . There is a 
sense that in government’s responses to historic wrongs far too often “equity trumped performance”, 
referring to the political appeal of policies and practices that signal visible and often symbolic changes 
instead of those promising deep, institutional transformation with enhanced quality of service delivery 
and public service performance.  
These combined dynamics have resulted in a “growing number of protests across the country” that 
increasingly turn violent (NPC, idem, p.16). To curb the danger of instability in state-citizen relations 
mere  symbolic  measures  won’t  suffice  and  purposeful  engagement  between  state  and  citizens  to 
strengthen  accountability  systems  is  needed  rather  than  what  are  perceived  by  the  public  as  
“meaningless exercises in participation through ward committees, public meetings and the like”
136.  
Identification of the determining factors - Justice and Constitutional Rights 
Some of the outcomes achieved in the areas under consideration (in particular, see above findings 
related to JC8.1 to JC8.3) can be considered a relatively direct consequence of GoSA policies and 
measures under the Access to Justice programme. The programme managed to reach targets in all key 
results areas (see Indicators 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.2.2 and 8.3.1). Qualitative assessments carried out indicate 
that  such  results  are  closely  related  to  government’s  strong  policy  ownership  in  combination  with 
effective partnership arrangements with FHR, which acted as a conduit for engaging a wide diversity of 
civil  society  organisations  and  provided  grants.  These  grants  contributed  to  enabling  these 
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organisations to provide services, to undertake sensitisation activities, or to engage public authorities, 
engagements and initiatives that would otherwise not have taken place in the same quantity or may not 
have taken place at all. 
The  DoJCD  ensured  its  strategic  and  policy  guidance  and  monitoring,  and  provided  the  financial 
resources. FHR added value by developing credible and effective ways of identifying and financing civil 
society service providers in underserviced areas and communities, including CSOs that can strengthen 
capacities of grassroots or community based organisations. This helped widen the range of CSOs and 
the access to services in the key performance areas as targeted and financed by government. 
But FHR, in collaboration with DoJCD, also acted as an enabler, incubator and facilitator for policy 
innovation and piloting. It did so in direct and indirect ways. FHR directly engaged with the department 
in  regular  and  purposeful  ways  on  policy  implementation  challenges  and  provided  feedback  to  the 
realisation of the programme. It also contributed in indirect ways, in that it supported third party actors – 
other  civil  society  organisations  –  that  often  combine  service  delivery  and  policy  dialogue  with  a 
challenge function of public authorities at different levels. This way they may create political incentives 
for  policy  changes,  improvements  or  implementation  of  policies  that  are  already  in  place  but  not 
implemented yet.  
The political and institutional context in which the Access to Justice programme came about and was 
implemented was conducive for the types of outcomes of this programme and its policies. There were, 
for  example,  the  efforts  by  the  President’s  Office  to  encourage  greater  coordination  of  government 
departments in support of 12 strategic priorities or outcomes. Two directly relate to DoJCD’s areas of 
responsibility: outcome 3 (“all people in South Africa are and feel safe”), and part of outcome 12 (“an 
empowered,  fair  and  inclusive  citizenship”).  A  Department  for  Performance  and  Monitoring  and 
Evaluation  was  created  in  the  Presidency  with  the  purpose  of  strengthening  transparency  and 
accessibility  of  information  on  objectives  and  implementation  of  developmental  policies.  Such 
transparency “can help both political leaders and citizens identify where government is falling short of 
their expectations.” (NPC, Institution and governance diagnostics: 14). These high level efforts have 
created institutional incentives that are likely to have strengthened departments such as DoJCD, which 
was entrusted with coordination and monitoring functions in departmental clusters and created further 
political legitimacy to engage purposefully and in structured ways with civil society. 
‘Participatory democracy’ called for in the Constitution of South Africa, section 70(b) implies relations 
between state and society that are sufficiently institutionalised, which is not  yet the case in such a 
young  middle-income  democracy  with  an  extreme  degree  of  inequality,  and  a  combination  of  fairly 
developed modern institutions with persistent informal and traditional or neo-patrimonial ‘rules of the 
game’.  In  this  respect,  the  National  Planning  Commission  points  to  the  need  to  combine  formal 
institutions  (laws,  written  rules  and  regulations  and  the  modern  rule  based  state  apparatus)  with 
participatory  approaches  to  accountability  (idem:  20).  This  reflects  high  level  endorsement  and 
encouragement for citizen participation combined with state activism in order to remove hurdles on the 
way  to  a  “capable  and  developmental  state”,  creating  probably  the  type  of  incentives  that  help 
strengthen the partnership relations and linkages between department and FHR/CSOs, and may have 
further  stimulated  the  uptake  of  FHR  inputs  in  departmental  and  ‘Justice,  Crime  Prevention  and 
Security’ cluster policy processes.  
Identification of the determining factors - Legislative Sector 
President  Mandela  congratulated  the  First  Parliament  at  its  last  session  (26  March  1999).  Yet 
Mandela’s closing remarks before Parliament also contained a warning and extended an invitation to 
“re-examine  our  electoral  system,  so  as  to  improve  the  nature  of  our  relationship,  as  public 
representatives, with the voters
137”. The politics of consensus-seeking, deliberations and negotiations 
and  the  cross-party  work  that  marked  the  First  Legislature  have  gradually  given  more  way  to  the 
dynamics of dominant party politics. South Africa’s party-list electoral system encourages Members of 
Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures to be accountable to their party rather than the electorate
138. 
Furthermore, political parties have unconditional power to remove their members from Parliament. The 
Independent Panel has analysed the problems with accountability, with the links between public  and 
Parliament,  or  with  the  broader  participatory  democracy  agenda.  It  openly  identified  the  political 
incentives inherent to South Africa’s electoral system as an important explanatory factor for the lack of 
accountability and responsiveness to citizens (Independent Panel: 36). 
                                                       
137 President Nelson Mandela, at the closure of the First Parliament, 26 March 1999 (quoted in: Independent Panel: 
35) 
138 Calland (1999), “The First Five Years”   88 
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On the other hand, LSPSP has operated in this context and has been the condition for the legislatures 
to evolve over time and strengthen their capacities to respond to their constitutional role.  Rules and 
regulations  have  been  adapted,  systems  have  improved  and  harmonised,  key  functions  (including 
financial, managerial and HR functions) have been ameliorated, and capacities for public outreach and 
international  cooperation  have  extended.  These  realisations,  as  supported  or  facilitated  by  a  well 
embedded  Legislative  Sector  Support
139,  enabled  connectivity  between  Parliament  and  the  nine 
Provincial Legislatures. There was a tendency for the different legislatures to emphasise their mandate 
as  ‘independent  institutions’  with  the  risk  of  fragmentation.  This  risk  was  reduced  by  initiatives  to 
connect  the  legislatures,  improve  collaboration  between  and  governance  of  the  various  SALS 
structures, and to streamline and harmonise processes underpinning sector development. This way, the 
potential was created for peer pressures and collaborative sector arrangements, a potential that could 
be tapped by other state checks and balance institutions such as the Auditor General and the Financial 
and Fiscal Commission, as well as a potential for more effective human resource development (see JC 
8.6 and JC 8.7).  
This institutionalisation process in the Legislative Sector has created or strengthened opportunities and 
incentives to improve outcomes in the key performance areas of oversight, law-making, participatory 
democracy and regional and international outreach.  Other factors related to the political context, as 
mentioned above, may have worked in different directions. 
So,  while  it  is  safe  to  assert  that  LSPSP  has  supported  the  on-going  process  of  gradual 
institutionalisation  of  the  Legislative  Sector,  it  is  too  difficult  to  make  statements  with  sufficient 
confidence about the direction this sector development process takes in terms of improved oversight 
and law-making functions. Clearly, one also has to look beyond the technical and managerial aspects of 
sector improvements, and inculcate political systemic dimensions (such as electoral system design) and 
the day-to-day political dynamics
140. 
4.9.9  Step 2 - Summary table - Governance  
The table below synthesises the factors determining changes observed at outcome and impact level. In 
particular, the table highlights the determining factors in both governance sectors, and the causal links 
between  outputs  of  the  Government  strategy  on  the  one  hand,  and  outcomes  and  impacts  of  the 
Government strategy on the other hand. Inclusion of internal and external factors allows to better qualify 
the role of the induced outputs. 
Table 13  Synthesis of factors determining changes observed at the outcome and impact levels 
(Step 2) - Governance sector 
GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development 
Results 
Influence  Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or 
internal or external factors  
  Strengthened 
policy
141 
implementation for 
access to Justice and 
Constitutional Rights 
in the poorest areas, 
esp. via co-operation 
with CSO and testing 
of alternative service 
delivery provision. 
  strong 
  Improved access to 
justice through 
newly established 
structures and 
tools, including 
diversion through 
alternative dispute 
resolution.  
  Improved access 
for marginalised 
groups. 
 
  Strong 
 
 
  strong 
 
  moderate 
 
 
 
 
 
  strong 
Contributing factors: 
  Long and strong tradition of Civil 
Society in human and 
constitutional rights 
  High level political steer  
Limiting factors: 
  Under-resourced department in 
a context of extreme inequality, 
intense modernisation/ 
globalisation and a strong 
persistence of traditional 
institutions 
  Increased expectations and use 
                                                       
139  “The  establishment  of  the  LSS  within  Parliament  is  a  unique  phenomenon  in  which  Parliament  provides 
administrative  support  that  services  the  entire  Legislative  Sector”.  (Parliament  of  the  RSA  (2012)  The  Annual 
Report 2011/12 
140 Or as the National Planning Commission’s diagnostic on institutions and governance states: “Improvements in 
parliamentary  oversight  are  unlikely  to  be  achieved  through  changes  to  formal  structures.  As  Butler  argues, 
“ultimately any executive is held to account not by careful institutional design but by the efforts of a country’s 
citizens using the full range of its political institutions and associations.” (Butler 2009).” (Institutions and governance 
diagnostic: 15). Butler A. (2009), Contemporary South Africa. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan   
141 DoJCD Medium Term Strategic Frameworks – Programmes 2 (Court services) and 3 (State legal service) and 
Strategic Plan for years 2012-2017. 89 
Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa 
Final report - Volume 1 - 2013 - Particip GmbH 
GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development 
Results 
Influence  Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or 
internal or external factors  
 
 
 
  moderate 
 
by citizens of courts and 
improved access to justice 
sector institutions 
  A civil society sector under 
duress (increasing demands and 
reduced external funding) 
  moderate 
  Improved 
awareness and 
knowledge of 
constitutional rights. 
 
  moderate 
  strong 
 
 
 
  strong 
 
 
 
 
  moderate 
Contributing factors: 
  a strong and free press 
  a vibrant and layered human 
rights civil society and research 
community. 
Limiting factors: 
  Lack of access to 
communication and information 
technology, illiteracy, city/rural 
areas divide, the multitude of 
languages, high levels of 
poverty 
  Insufficient institutionalisation of  
relations between state and 
society 
  moderate 
  Capacities of key 
stakeholders were 
strengthened 
(especially CSOs) 
in promoting 
participatory 
democracy. 
 
  strong 
 
  moderate 
 
 
 
  moderate 
Contributing factors: 
  Strong and diversified playing 
field of civil society actors 
  Fairly open access to state 
actors in a young constitutional 
democracy  
Limiting factors: 
  Continued reduction in donor 
support for key civil society actors  
 
  Institutionalisation of 
the sector and 
Strengthened policy 
implementation 
(Legislative Sector 
Policy and Strategic 
Framework). 
  strong 
  Increased public 
participation in the 
Legislative Sector. 
 
  moderate 
 
  strong 
 
 
 
  moderate/str
ong  
 
 
 
 
  moderate 
 
 
  strong 
 
 
  strong 
 
 
Contributing factors: 
  Diversified and vibrant civil 
society  
  Sector ownership and 
commitment to capacity and HR 
development and improved 
sector management  
  Other state institutions (Auditor 
General of South Africa, FFC, 
National Planning Commission, 
etc.) create incentives or 
demands for improved 
performance and accountability  
  Non-state actors demand side 
pressures 
Limiting factors 
  Dynamics of dominant party 
politics and party-list electoral 
system reduces accountability 
pressures towards 
citizens/constituencies 
  High degree of socio-economic 
tensions within a context of high 
inequality and growing 
expectations  90 
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GoSA Policies 
(induced output level 
in the IL) having 
contributed to 
Influence  Development 
Results 
Influence  Other historical and/or policy 
interacting factors, and/or 
internal or external factors  
  Stronger 
international links 
with African, EU 
and other 
Parliaments 
  moderate / 
strong 
 
  Improved oversight 
skills of National 
and Provincial 
parliaments
142. 
  moderate 
  Improved oversight 
skills and roles of 
Parliament and 
Provincial 
Legislatures. 
  Improved human 
and financial 
resource 
management in the 
Legislative sector. 
  No evidence yet on 
improved outcomes 
of the Legislative 
Sector’s functions 
in terms of 
democratic 
guidance, 
representation, 
oversight and law-
making. 
 
   
                                                       
142 This and the following are considered as development outcomes, although at an intermediate level, as the 
Parliament is not a key actor of the society. Having a Parliament resourced and capable, with stronger links with 
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4.10 EQ9 (Step 2) - Other sectors 
Evaluation  Question  9:  What  hypotheses  can  be  made  on  the  extent  to  which,  in  the  other 
supported sectors, the development outcomes pursued through the policies and programmes 
supported by SBS have been (or are being) achieved, and on the related determining factors? 
This EQ aims at completing the Step 2 assessment with an overview of the development outcomes 
achieved in the non-focal sectors and a hypothesis on their determinant. As the evaluation does not 
foresee any specific in-depth study for these sectors, the answer to the EQ is based on the information 
coming from Step 1 and other easily accessible literature. It just provides a table summarising key 
information for each of the non-focal sectors (see Table 14 below), which includes
143:  
  a summary of the outcomes achieved over the evaluation period; and 
  the  policies  put  in  place  by  the  government,  including  those  supported  by  SBS,  which 
supposedly  have  determined  the  outcomes  in  synergy  with  the  other  environmental  factors 
mentioned in the last column. 
Table 14  Summary table of Step 2 for the non-focal sectors 
Sector  Outcomes  Policy Factors  Other factors 
Health 
Although, the relevant period of 
implementation remains too short 
to observe outcomes related to 
supported policies, the following 
can be observed:  
  Very good outcomes in terms 
of access (coverage of 
attendance, vaccinations). 
  Since 2005, decrease in 
children mortality under 5 but 
neonatal mortality static. 
  Contrasted picture in terms of 
maternal health. 
  The ‘tide has turned’ against 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
  Heavy burden of non-
communicable diseases. 
  Development of an integrated 
district health system in co-
operation with non-profit 
providers. 
  Recent re-engineering of PHC 
through ward-based PHC 
outreach teams, district-based 
clinical specialist team, new 
school health services.  
  More recently, involvement of 
general practitioners in DHS. 
  Wide programmes on prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission 
and, in recent years, vast 
campaign against HIV/AIDS. 
  HIV/AIDS expansion 
and effects have been 
overlooked during the 
first post-apartheid 
decade. 
  Improvement in social 
determinants of health 
(housing, access to 
water and sanitation, 
etc.). 
  Persistent 
socioeconomic 
inequities. 
Education 
Although, the relevant period of 
implementation remains too short 
to observe outcomes related to 
supported policies, the following 
can be observed:  
  High levels of enrolment rates 
and, overall, slight 
improvements in access. 
  Improved access of women to 
tertiary education. 
  High level of teachers’ 
absenteeism. 
  Low or no improvements in 
transition to secondary. 
  Low level of literacy and 
numeracy and low 
improvements in learning 
achievements. 
  Outcome Based Education 
started in 1997 but dropped in 
2010. 
  New policy framework at work, 
with a focus on improving 
teaching quality, incl. ECD and 
primary schooling. 
  Complex, multi-
linguistic educational 
environment. 
  Persistent 
socioeconomic 
inequities, incl. high 
level of violence in 
schools (esp. in poor 
areas). 
                                                       
143 This table is slightly different from the Step 2 tables elaborated for the focal sectors. Indeed, the outcomes 
(second column) and policy factors (third column) relate to the sectors as such and not only the outcomes targeted 
by SBS and the policies which are expected as induced outputs of SBS. The reason is that the content of the table 
does  not  ‘summarise  an  evaluation  exercise’,  but  provides  broad  additional  information  to  enhance  the 
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Urban 
Renewal 
  Outcomes of the sectoral 
policies, in terms of social and 
economic development are 
uneven. 
  Improvements in living 
environments, basic and 
development infrastructure and 
job creation – fostered through 
the initiatives supported by 
SBS – have highlighted 
possible replicable lessons. 
  URP: piloting an integrated inter-
governmental approach in eight 
urban nodes (2001). 
  Neighbourhood Development 
Partnership Grant (2007). 
  Breaking New Ground, 
Department of Housing (2004). 
  On-going work to develop a 
National integrated urban 
development framework. 
  Continuing strong 
urbanisation trend. 
  Increasingly critical 
sustainability 
pressures on the 
natural resource base 
and ecosystems 
supporting urban 
areas and high density 
rural settlements. 
 
The summary table above intends to complement the picture of the evaluation by providing some hints 
about the results achieved in the non-focal sectors. It may help for the completion of Step 3 and to 
strengthen the conclusions and recommendations. 
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4.11 EQ10 (Step 2) - Impact 
Evaluation Question 10: To what extent have the outcomes achieved so far in the focal sectors 
been  sustainable  and  represent  a  potential  towards  consolidated  inclusive  growth,  poverty 
eradication and inequality reduction? 
The development results achieved in the focal sectors (employment, water and sanitation, access to 
justice and legislative) are very important, although they are characterised by a lot of lights and shades. 
The  analysis  has  mainly  regarded  the  outcome  level,  i.e.  the  short-medium  term  changes  in  the 
response of the targeted social and economic actors. To look at the impact level, i.e. the longer term 
changes and their consolidation into new living and behavioural standards, specific analyses should be 
done, which have not been foreseen in this evaluation. Here, some impact indicators, when available, 
have been taken into account (e.g. the effects of access to clean water and sanitation on diarrhoea 
incidence, or the child mortality in the EQ9 tables), but the analyses carried out even in the focal sectors 
have not allowed to focus on them. 
Under this EQ, there is an attempt to highlight the sustainability of the outcomes and the solidity of the 
factors  that  have  determined  them.  This  should  help  better  understand  the  potential  impact  of  the 
policies carried out. Table 15 summarises the analyses carried out under the EQs 6, 7 and 8, of which 
EQ10 is a complement, and highlights the factors that may contribute to both the sustainability and the 
unsustainability  of  the  positive  outcomes  achieved  so  far.  The  limits  (or  the  failures)  of  such 
achievements  are  highlighted  under  the  heading  ‘weaknesses’.  The  table  does  not  contain  further 
analyses compared to those developed under the EQs 6, 7 and 8, but just synthesises their implications 
in terms of sustainability. This may be used to strengthen the Step 3 synthesis and the evaluation’s 
conclusions and recommendations. 
Table 15  Overview of key sustainability aspects in the Step 2 focal sectors 
Positive outcome  Weaknesses  Sustainability factors  Unsustainability 
factors 
Employment has grown 
significantly and public and 
community work 
programmes have achieved 
good results. 
Insufficient growth to 
absorb labour force. 
Employment is a strong 
strategic priority and there 
are consolidated 
programmes to create 
employment (EPWP, CWP). 
A positive economic 
environment persists. 
Political uncertainty on 
labour market and 
competitiveness. 
The access to clean water 
and sanitation has 
dramatically improved in the 
poorer districts. 
Failure of maintenance, 
weak participation and 
serious risks of 
deterioration of the 
achievements. 
There is a strong and 
consolidated strategic and 
institutional framework. 
Limited capacity of LG 
and involvement of 
CSOs. 
Improved access to Justice 
and Constitutional Rights in 
the poorer areas: effective 
networks of intermediation 
among citizens and between 
citizens and government. 
Not a specific weakness 
but need to further 
strengthen the 
institutionalisation of the 
partnership 
arrangements with civil 
society (for example 
through budgetary 
processes)   
Policy strongly owned by 
current government and 
strong key civil society 
actors. 
Risk of breaking the 
continuity of political 
and financial support. 
Opportunities and systems 
to improve outcomes in 
legislative oversight, law-
making, participatory 
democracy and international 
cooperation have been 
created: stronger public 
participation and improved 
capacity of the assemblies. 
This has not 
demonstrably resulted in 
improved sector 
outcomes in these 
performance areas. 
Sector strategy consolidated 
and owned by the Legislative 
Sector with certain pressures 
for sector consolidation 
through various state 
institutions and demand side 
pressures from non-state 
actors  
A broader political 
institutional environment 
generating disincentives 
for improved 
responsiveness to 
citizens and sector 
outcomes  
The considerations about the outcomes’ sustainability should not look at  a hypothetical absence or 
reduction  of  the  many  weaknesses  identified  so  far  and  summarised  in  the  table,  in  favour  of  the 
strengths (“positive outcomes”), but rather at the dynamic process that has characterised the period 
from the post-apartheid to the present situation. As summarised in the table, most of the sustainability 
and unsustainability factors are not linked to external factors or conjunctures, but are connected with 
deep policy processes entrenched in the post-apartheid history. 94 
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4.12 Step 3 - Summary 
The  comparison  of  the  tables  of  Step 1  and  Step 2  allows  identifying  the  transitive  relationships  between  SBS  and  the  development  results  through  the 
assessment of the significance of each of the chain of influence (SBS → Government policies & interventions; and Government policies & interventions → 
Outcomes & Impacts). This is done using the format presented in Table 16 below. 
Table 16  Synthesis of BS contributions to government policies (Step 1) and their contribution to development results (Step 2) 
Intensity and type of 
budget support’s 
contribution to 
GoSA policies (induced 
outputs in the IL) having 
contributed to 
 
Development Results 
  Other policy or environmental 
factors 
Employment &  private 
sector 
 
 
 
   
SWEEEP 
 Funds: Moderate  
 Dialogue: Weak 
 TA/CD: Weak to Moderate 
(financed through SBS) 
IPA  
 Funds: Strong  
 Dialogue: Moderate 
 TA/CD: Absent 
RCF 
 Funds: Moderate to Strong 
 Dialogue: Weak 
 TA/CD: Moderate to 
Strong 
ECF 
 Funds: Moderate  
 Dialogue: Weak 
 TA/CD: Weak to Moderate 
  dti capacities strengthened. 
  Employment and industrial 
development programmes 
(public works, etc.). 
  Mainstreaming of innovation in 
the policy and budgeting 
process.  
  Strategic framework for women 
empowerment. 
  New business support service 
and legal/regulatory reforms to 
improve the business 
environment. 
  Development of new lending 
products & co-financing of risky 
projects (IDC). 
 
 
 
 
  Moderate 
 
 
 
 
 
  Weak to moderate 
 
 
 
  Weak 
 
 
  Weak 
 
 
 
  Significant but insufficient job 
creation (growth in working 
aged population leading to 
persistently high unemployment 
rates, esp. among women and 
poor). 
 
  Overall substantial increase in 
public & private sector 
investment but only limited 
increase for SMMEs. 
 
  Declining contribution of 
SMMEs to the economy. 
 
  Decreased competitiveness. 
 
 
 
  CF: weak to 
moderate 
LF: strong 
 
 
  CF: moderate to 
strong 
LF: moderate to 
strong 
 
  CF: moderate to 
strong 
LF: moderate to 
strong 
 
  LF: moderate to 
strong 
Contributing factors:  
  High political priority attached to 
private sector and employment 
strategies. 
Limiting factors:  
  Apartheid legacy; 
  Changes in the historical drivers 
of the SA economy (decline of 
primary sector, less labour-
intensive production in the 
service sector);  
  Skills profile of labour market 
participants; 
  Institutional and regulatory 
structure of the South African 
labour market; 
  Insecurity and violence. 
  Global financial crisis. 
  Service delivery issues (e.g. 
municipal services or failures in 
power supply system). 
  Other competitiveness policies 95 
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Intensity and type of 
budget support’s 
contribution to 
GoSA policies (induced 
outputs in the IL) having 
contributed to 
 
Development Results 
  Other policy or environmental 
factors 
Water sector           
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Moderate to 
Strong (not on CSOs) 
 TA/CD: Strong (financed 
through SBS) 
  Development of a new sector 
policy framework. 
  Transfer of responsibilities to 
municipalities. 
  Local government capacity 
strengthened though significant 
weaknesses have remained. 
  Masibambane Civil Society 
Strategic Framework developed 
but mixed results in terms of 
involvement of CSOs and 
private sector in policy 
processes. 
  Clear statements related to 
gender equality in sector 
policies, new gender 
mainstreaming strategy, and 
establishment of a Gender Unit 
within DWA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Moderate to strong 
 
  Weak 
 
  Moderate 
  Increased access to water and 
sanitation although 
maintenance and operations 
have remained weak. 
  Decreased participation of 
communities and CSOs  
  Mixed results in terms of 
women participation in the 
sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CF: strong 
LF: strong 
 
  LF: strong 
 
  CF: moderate 
LF: moderate 
 
Contributing factor:  
  Water has been a strong 
political and financial priority. 
  Funding mechanisms for local 
service delivery introduced over 
the past decades.  
  Integration of gender in wider 
legislative and policy 
framework. 
Limiting factor: 
  Persistent weaknesses in 
capacities at municipal level. 
  Priority given to the public 
institutions and poor use of 
CSOs 
Governance sector           
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Moderate to 
Strong 
 TA/CD: Weak 
  Strengthened policy 
implementation and testing of 
alternative service delivery 
provision through an innovative 
strategic partnership with civil 
society. 
 
 
 
 
  Moderate to strong 
 
  Moderate  
 
  Moderate to strong 
 
  Improved access to justice and 
constitutional rights especially 
for marginalised groups.  
  Improved awareness and 
knowledge of constitutional 
rights. 
  Capacities of key stakeholders 
were strengthened (especially 
CSOs) in promoting 
participatory democracy. 
 
 
  CF: Moderate 
LF: Strong 
 
  CF: Moderate to 
strong 
LF: Moderate 
 
  CF: Strong 
LF: Moderate 
 
Contributing factors:  
  Strong experience of CS in 
human and constitutional 
rights with a diversified playing 
field of CSOs and free press. 
Limiting factors: 
  Under-resourced department 
and backlogs in courts. 
  High levels of poverty and 
inequality.  
  Lack of access to information 
technology, illiteracy, large 
number of official and unofficial 
languages. 96 
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Intensity and type of 
budget support’s 
contribution to 
GoSA policies (induced 
outputs in the IL) having 
contributed to 
 
Development Results 
  Other policy or environmental 
factors 
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Moderate to 
Strong 
 TA/CD: Absent 
  Improved institutionalisation of 
the Legislative sector and 
strengthened policy 
implementation (Legislative 
Sector Policy and Strategic 
Framework). 
 
 
  Moderate to strong 
 
  Strong 
 
  Moderate 
 
  Moderate to strong 
 
  Moderate 
 
  Increased public participation in 
the Legislative sector. 
  Stronger regional and 
international links  
  Improved oversight skills and 
roles of Parliament and 
Provincial legislatures. 
  Improved human and financial 
resource management in the 
Legislative sector. 
  No strong evidence yet on 
improved outcomes of the 
Legislative Sector’s functions in 
terms of democratic guidance, 
representation, oversight and 
law-making. 
 
  CF: moderate 
LF: moderate 
 
  CF: weak  
LF: weak 
 
  CF: moderate 
LF: moderate 
 
  CF: weak to 
moderate 
LF: weak to 
moderate 
 
  CF: moderate  
LF: weak 
Contributing factors: 
  Sector ownership and 
commitment to capacity and 
human rights development and 
improved sector development. 
  Incentives and demands for 
improved performance and 
accountability from other state 
institutions. 
  Demand-side pressures from 
non-state actors within a young 
but vibrant constitutional 
democracy. 
Limiting factors: 
  Low dynamics in the political 
context. 
  The electoral system reduces 
the link with voters. 
Health           
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Moderate 
 TA/CD: Moderate to strong 
(only very recent TA inputs 
and TDCA contribution on 
strategic models). 
  New original approach to service 
delivery in the primary health, 
including global reform of the 
Health Insurance and local 
networks of health agents 
(CSOs, practitioners). 
 
 
 
 
  n/a  
  The relevant period of 
implementation remains too 
short to observe potential 
results of supported policies. 
That said, the following can be 
observed: the ‘tide has turned’ 
against the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
and there are increased access 
outcomes (coverage of 
attendance, vaccinations), 
although the data on child and 
maternal mortality are not 
improving fast. 
 
 
 
 
  n/a 
Contributing factors: 
  Strong leadership change in the 
DoH and change of government 
strategies. 
  New ideas and models 
developed through various 
processes (e.g. interactions 
between top level management 
and high level international 
expertise). 
Limiting factors: 
  Persistent socioeconomic 
inequities 
Education           
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Weak 
 TA/CD: Absent 
  Improved policies in the primary 
education system, with a focus 
on strengthening the teaching 
quality and capacity of teachers. 
 
 
  n/a    The evaluation observation 
period is too short. 
 
 
  n/a 
Limiting factors: 
  Complex, multi-linguistic 
educational environment. 
  Persistent socioeconomic 
inequities, incl. high level of 
violence in schools (esp. in poor 
areas). 97 
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Intensity and type of 
budget support’s 
contribution to 
GoSA policies (induced 
outputs in the IL) having 
contributed to 
 
Development Results 
  Other policy or environmental 
factors 
Urban renewal           
 Funds: Strong 
 Dialogue: Weak 
 TA/CD: weak (and only in 
one of the two 
programmes) 
  Urban renewal programme: 
piloting an integrated inter-
governmental approach in eight 
urban nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
  Weak to moderate 
  Uneven outcomes in terms of 
social and economic 
development. Improvements in 
living environments, basic and 
development infrastructure and 
job creation – fostered through 
these initiatives – have 
highlighted possible replicable 
lessons. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Moderate to strong 
Contributing factors: 
  GoSA priority / Presidential 
Initiative to address problems in 
exclusion areas set up through 
apartheid spatial planning.  
  Adoption of the Municipal 
Systems Act & Municipal 
Finance Management Act. 
Limiting factors: 
  Continuing strong urbanisation 
trend. 
  Increasingly critical 
sustainability pressures on the 
natural resource base and 
ecosystems supporting urban 
areas and high density rural 
settlements. 98 
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The relationships illustrated in Table 16 may be briefly explained as follows: 
1. Employment and private sector development: 
  The availability of SBS funds has allowed GoSA to integrate its strategic framework (through 
SWEEEP), launch a new promising programme focusing on innovation for poverty reduction 
(IPA),  test  new  financial  products  for  co-financing  risky  projects  (RCF)  and  strengthen  its 
employment  creation  programmes  (ECF).  Beyond  the  funds,  other  SBS  inputs  have  been 
deployed, namely:  
  dialogue  in  the  case  of  IPA,  with  a  number  of  implications  –  partly  still  to  be 
developed –  in  terms  of  strategic  exchange  on  Science  &  Technology,  and 
systematisation and extension of lessons learned;  
  TA and capacity development inputs, based on exchange of know-how between SA 
and EU have been used in the RCF, through the EIB involvement. 
  Such  policies  and  programmes  have  produced  results  in  terms  of  increased  employment, 
mainly through enhancing public interventions, and have tested some successful approaches 
that might be appropriated by a dynamic private sector (namely SMMEs and rural enterprises). 
Unfortunately, the employment has not grown at the necessary rates, especially because of the 
persistence of some structural bottlenecks, such as: inadequate skills profiles, institutional and 
regulatory burden of the labour market, and difficult environment for SMMEs, especially at local 
level, etc. 
  SBS has not affected such policy domains, despite the fact that potential areas of collaboration 
and exchanges of experience between EU and SA exist. EU recent history has addressed and 
still addresses similar kind of problems and a diversified set of solutions has been tested by EU 
member states. 
2. Water: 
  SBS funds and dialogue – based on previous experience of collaboration – have concurred at 
the right time to help the government design and implement a new institutional approach in the 
sector,  with  a  focus  on  the  poorer  provinces.  This  has  contributed  to  test  a  new  sectoral 
strategic framework based on the transfer of responsibilities to the local governments and a 
new leading role of DWA. A lot of TA/CD activities have been financed as well through SBS. 
Over time, SBS has supported various phases of the programme, with a view to extend and 
consolidate its results. The level of dialogue in the further phases has fallen, while the funds 
have remained significant. 
  The  implementation  of  the  programme,  combined  with  significant  public  investment  in 
infrastructure,  has  permitted  to  meet  important  results  in  terms  of  access  to  water  and 
sanitation in the poorer provinces. Other objectives of the programme, such as the involvement 
of the CSOs, have been overlooked. With time, new problems have arisen, in particular the 
complexity  of  maintaining  the  infrastructure  developed  and  ensuring  efficient  management. 
Such problems present the risk of offsetting the development results achieved. 
  The impoverishment of the dialogue has hampered to address such bottlenecks between SA 
and EU and identify new shared solutions to be potentially supported. 
3. Access to Justice: 
  SBS  funds  and  an  effective  dialogue  built  on  solid  past  cooperation  between  EU,  key  civil 
society  actors  (including  the  Foundation  for  Human  Rights)  and  DoJCD  contributed  to  the 
design  of  an  innovative  approach  that  targeted  extending  service  delivery  to  marginalised 
groups/citizens and improving human rights knowledge through a strategic partnership with the 
Foundation for Human Rights. 
  The policy implementation and innovation has already produced significant results in terms of 
improved access to justice and enhanced awareness of constitutional rights for marginalised 
groups,  as  well  as  emerging  arrangements  for  policy  innovation  through  feed-back  and 
anchorage  or  institutionalisation  of  civil  society  partnerships  through  the  Justice,  Crime 
Prevention, and Security Cluster.  
  Even though this innovative approach of strategic partnership with civil society has not yet been 
fully institutionalised, these results and partnership trust are promising in that they may create 
further political buy-in for improving access to justice and constitutional rights, and reinforce 
institutional capacities for such state-non-state partnerships. , and organisational capacities and 
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4. Legislative Sector: 
  Since the first democratic elections, the EU has become the most consistent and important 
supporter of the five  South African Parliaments. Given the strong sector ownership, SBS  – 
through the LSPSP – has contributed to the efforts of key stakeholders of the South African 
Legislative  Sector  to  institutionalise  their  sector.  The  efforts  at  harmonising  systems  and 
procedures,  strengthening  key  functions  (financial,  managerial,  human  resources,  etc.), 
strengthening capacities such as research, public outreach and international cooperation have 
been stepped up during the LSPSP. These efforts coincided with - and reinforced - other state 
institutions’  efforts  (including  AGSA,  FFC,  etc.)  that  strengthened  accountability  and 
performance pressures (including peer pressures) or collaborative arrangements between the 
autonomous Parliament and the nine Provincial Legislatures.  
  This  positive  SBS  contribution  to  the  gradual  institutionalisation  process  of  the  Legislative 
Sector has created or strengthened opportunities and incentives for improved sector outcomes 
in oversight and law-making functions, public participation and representation, or for ‘deepening 
democracy’ in a highly politically sensitive area. Yet, other institutional and political dynamics 
are also strongly at play, which make pronouncements on envisaged sector outcomes in terms 
of improved oversight, representation and law-making functions unreliable.  
  Finally, to fully appreciate the importance of efforts by SALS and the contributions of LSPSP to 
the  envisaged  sector  outcomes  and  impact,  the  changes  in  the  Legislative  Sector  and  the 
induced  and  other  outcomes  need  to  be  assessed  against  the  unique  socio-economic  and 
institutional-political  transformations  and  challenges  of  the  post-apartheid  constitutional 
democracy that South Africa has become. 
5. Health: 
  A strong sectoral leadership in the DoH and the determination of the EU Delegation to embark 
through  SBS  in  a  complex  sector  have  promoted  a  significant  combination  of  intervention 
modalities  to  support  the  sectoral  reform:  SBS  has  provided  the  resource  base,  the  TDCA 
Facility has supported high level exchanges of experience on the Health strategy matters, a 
specialised TA – financed through SBS – has provided specific international knowhow for the 
implementation of reform modules. 
  Some preliminary outcomes of the sectoral reform are already encouraging. 
  This experience seems to have experimented a successful mix of contents, where funds for 
innovation  have  been  made  available  to  a  strong  and  reform-minded  sectoral  leadership, 
combined with strategic dialogue on alternative models and options and exchange of knowhow 
on implementation modules. 
6. Education: 
  The SBS is supporting a number of important actions of the DBE & the DHET to improve the 
system in primary education. The support has enabled the DBE & the DHET to focus some key 
outcomes related to improving the teaching quality. 
  It’s too early to identify any development outcome of such an action. 
  The SBS facilitates the ownership of the DBE & the DHET, although a facility-type modality 
could  obtain  comparable  results.  The  programme  does  not  include  any  strategic  dialogue, 
although the DBE is in a process of deep strategic review. 
7. Urban Renewal: 
  The SBS has helped launch important programmes aimed at enhancing local development in 
the exclusion areas set up through the apartheid spatial planning. 
  In one of the two supported programmes (eThekwini), the outcomes were positive, while in the 
other (URP Eastern Cape) have been disappointing. The stability and capability of the public 
institutions involved have made the difference. 
  The  SBS  did  not  include  specific  components  to  exchange  experiences  on  territorial 
management and regional cohesion, areas where the EU could present significant knowhow 
and good practices. 
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5  Overall assessment 
Summary assessment 
In the period 2000-2011, EU BS in SA represents a positive experience that should be continued and 
better  integrated  into  the  SA-EU  Strategic  Partnership.  BS  has  been  adapted  to  the  context,  by 
ensuring both GoSA ownership and strategic relevance of the EU support. 
It has supported policy innovation, through enhancing specific innovative GoSA programmes often with 
the participation of CSOs, within wider priority sectors, with a focus on fighting poverty and inequality 
and supporting democracy. 
The supported programmes have produced visible development results in water, justice, legislative, 
some segments of employment and rural poverty, and other areas, although their success has been 
limited when addressing some key structural bottlnecks that characterise the SA context and affect the 
policy making processes. 
BS through its various financial and non-financial inputs has provided significant contributions in terms 
of enabling successful policy innovations, but has been only partially able – especially in the first period 
– to profit of the opportunities of the comprehensive EU-SA partnership, to expand policy dialogue and 
knowledge sharing between the partners on the relevant matters. This could have helped GoSA and EU 
to better support wider and more informed policy thinking in the areas addressed. 
Adaptation to the context 
The context during the evaluation period (2000-2011) is characterised by the following main features: 
1.  a post-revolutionary political environment in South Africa, including: 
  the consolidation of the post-apartheid state and related ownership; and 
  the materialisation of complex political and policy challenges to address the structural 
bottlenecks of the SA society, namely the deep inequality in access to resources, public 
services and constitutional rights. 
2.  the establishment of a comprehensive partnership between SA and EU, based on an ambitious 
shared  platform  of  values  and  strategic  objectives,  including  a  range  of  instruments  and 
modalities still to be tested and developed and a specific mandate in the area of development 
cooperation, namely to respond to the key development challenges with a focus on partnership 
and knowledge sharing
144. 
The EU-SA cooperation has  evolved from the experiences of the nineties , where the priority was to 
support the post-apartheid efforts in key areas and help obtain tangible results. The request of GoSA to 
strengthen  South  Africa’s  ownership  and  to  increase  alignment  in  policy  support  has  brought  most 
donors to review the intensity and modalities of their interventions, taking into account SA’s upper-MIC 
features. Some donors have emphasised the work with CSOs, others the regional dimension
145. The EU 
has decided to shift to budget support without neglecting other modalities as needed , in the early 
2000s. By the mid-2000s, it has also developed an ambitious framework for strategic dialogue including 
on development cooperation under the TDCA and the SP. 
Shifting to BS has been a  coherent decision, probably the only option compatible with keeping ODA 
focused on the key strategic challenges addressed by the GoSA while responding to its requ est for 
stronger ownership and alignment. This choice has been criticised by various sides, using the argument 
of the low ‘quantitative relevance’ of budget support in a MIC. Indeed, this evaluation and others show 
that the BS modality may be very relevant in a MIC context
146, when its policy relevance is high; this 
despite its low quantitative weight. In  SA, the policy relevance of the programmes supported through 
this modality has been generally high : in most cases it has allowed an accelerated and exhausti ve 
experimentation of important policies and approaches that otherwise would have suffered delays, 
fragmentation and even resistances. 
                                                       
144 See references in the Regulation of 2000, CSP of 2003 and JAP of 2007. 
145 “Working with an emerging economy requires more intensive, quality interaction with key interlocutors to build 
and maintain presence, trust and a platform for policy dialogue that can replace more traditional project investment 
approaches. This … could be further supported with flexible financial resources to gain more traction with partners”. 
This  is  one  of  the  “lessons  learned”  mentioned  in  DFID EV711,  Evaluation  Report on  DFID’s  Southern  Africa 
Country Programme (2004-2009) – page IX. 
146 See the Evaluation of Budget Support operations in Tunisia, AidCo-European Commission, 2009. 101 
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Introducing the strategic dialogue framework on development cooperation under the TDCA (drafted in 
1999 and entered into force in 2004) and the SP with its related JAP (adopted in 2007) was also a 
coherent decision vis-à-vis the established partnership. 
Supporting policy innovation and policy partnership (Step 1) 
EU  SBS  operations  have  supported  policy  experimentation  and  innovation  through  different 
contributions: 
  In  most  cases,  they  have  created  a  financial  opportunity  for  the  key  policy  actors  (GoSA 
departments, decentralised and/or specialised public institutions) to develop their own policy 
processes,  through  risk  taking  initiatives  and  innovation,  including  –  in  several  cases  –  the 
significant involvement of CSOs in the delivery of key services. 
  In  various  cases  (e.g.  Justice,  Legislative,  Water,  Health,  S&T),  the  dialogue,  building  on 
previous joint experiences and exchanges  of know-how, has helped shape and/or integrate 
innovative aspects within policy design and approaches. 
  Only in conjunction with more recent SBS operations (PrimCare / Health and, partly, IPA in S&T 
and LSPSPS in the Legislative sector, but not ECF in the Employment sector or PrimEd in the 
Education  sector),  the  dialogue  has  gone  beyond  the  single  policies  and  programmes 
supported and has paved the way to a wider exchange of policy experience profiting from - and 
feeding into - the existing partnership framework (TDCA and SP). 
The SBS contribution to the policy processes may be summarised as follows: 
  The creation of opportunities to enhance a South African owned process of policy innovation in 
the targeted sectors is the most original and successful contribution of SBS. 
  The occasional and/or limited links established between such policy experimentation and the 
wider SA-EU strategic partnership framework, in view of building joint learning processes to 
feed the development action of both partners at different levels (in SA and EU, at regional level 
and worldwide), is still a weak point of the SBS implementation, although improvements are 
visible in the recent years. 
The supported policies have produced development results (Step 2) 
In  most  instances,  the  policies  supported  through  SBS  have  determined  -  directly  and  indirectly  - 
significant development outcomes: 
  The approach launched and tested through MSB in the water sector has been a determining 
factor of the success in increasing access to clean water and sanitation facilities in the poorest 
areas between 2000 and 2007. 
  The GoSA programme Access to Justice and  Constitutional Rights has produced important 
results  through  mobilising  local  networks  of  intermediation  in  the  most  marginalised  areas, 
which have started responding to the democratic needs of the poor. 
  Strengthened  Legislative  Assemblies  relying  on  stronger  people  participation,  access  of  the 
poor to advanced technologies, improved access to primary health facilities are all consolidated 
outcomes of the policies and programmes supported through SBS. 
In other cases, results have been more limited. This is primarily due to key bottlenecks of the post-
apartheid transition which the supported policies and programmes have only been marginally able to 
address. Among these the failure in infrastructure operation and maintenance and CSOs mobilisation in 
the water sector; the insufficient employment growth and strengthening of the SMMEs participation to 
economic activity; the inadequate skills development resulting in low level of employability of the labour 
force; etc. 
Apart from the structural difficulty of the SA transition, much of the disappointing results highlighted can 
be linked to the complex political context and to the opposite social and economic interests at stake, 
which influence and hamper the policy-making process. 
SBS has contributed to such results in different ways and at different levels (Step 3) 
SBS operations have contributed to some of the policies that have produced significant development 
results. In such a way they have contributed to the attainment of the targeted development results. The 
way in which their contribution has materialised differs from one programme to the next. 
In the Water sector, SBS financial support has created a key opportunity to launch MSB in early 2000, 
integrated with an original mix of dialogue and exchange of experience during the design and the first 
implementation phases.  102 
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SBS funds, dialogue and capacity development have played a key role for the success of both the new 
Access to Justice and Constitutional Rights policy and the Health strategy to strengthen Primary Health 
Care. 
In the S&T and Legislative sectors, the combination of funds with a wider partnership dimension with 
the EU has strengthened the successful supported programmes. 
With respect to the policies that have led to the mentioned weak results, probably BS could not do 
much, considering the origin of their weaknesses, deeply entrenched in the key bottlenecks of the post-
apartheid transition. This is, for instance, the case of: the inadequate skills profile and institutional set 
up of the labour market; the low capacity of the local governments; the difficulties to tackle the strong 
regional imbalances; the low competitiveness of the economy and a non-conducive environment for 
SMMEs; etc. EU cooperation cannot enter in such constraints, unless specific requests are formulated 
by the SA partners. The SBS operations which address such policy areas, however, could have helped 
promote  an  expansion  of  the  relevant  knowledge  base  through  a  stronger  integration  with  the  SP 
framework. This would have contributed to better informed policy thinking and debate and increased 
awareness of the policy alternatives at stake, benefitting both partners. As shown in the Health sector or 
in the Legislative one, some tools are already available in the framework of the SP, as for instance: 
  exchanges  of  experience  on  EU  and  other  countries  worldwide  policy  models  successfully 
experimented in the Health sector; 
  other inter-institutional exchanges experimented in the inter-Parliamentary dialogue.  
A wider use of such links and tools, however, would have implied a stronger integration between SBS 
programmes and the Strategic Partnership which provides the framework and the mandate to enhance 
the knowledge sharing processes between the partners. Such integration is still under way. Both the NT 
and the EUD are aware of the need for this stronger integration, although a common view on how to 
address it in operational terms is not yet established. 
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6  Conclusions 
For analytical clarity, we have grouped the conclusions into four clusters: 
  Cluster 1 - Development co-operation: priorities and modalities; 
  Cluster 2 - Value added of the EU-SA development co-operation; 
  Cluster 3 - Outcomes and impacts at sector level; 
  Cluster 4 - Other key issues regarding the implementation of the SBS modality in South Africa. 
The  table  below  presents  the  main  links  between  findings,  conclusions  and  recommendations  by 
highlighting  for  each  conclusion:  i)  the  EQ(s)  on  which  it  is  based;  and  ii)  the  related 
recommendation(s). 
Table 17  Major links between EQs, conclusions and recommendations 
Conclusion  Based on 
EQs 
Leads to 
Recom. 
Cluster 1 - Development cooperation: priorities and modalities     
C1: EU-SA development co-operation has deep historical roots and reflects the 
government priorities and the key objectives of the EU-SA partnership 
EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ5 
R1, R8 
C2: Budget Support has become the key modality of this co-operation and has 
significantly evolved over time 
EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ3, EQ4, 
EQ5 
R2 
C3: Budget Support has been designed and implemented with significant flexibility  EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ5 
R2 
C4: Budget Support in South Africa has developed as a specific typology  EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ3, EQ4, 
EQ5 
R2, R3, 
R4 
C5: SBS has shown strong comparative advantages vis-à-vis other modalities and 
significant capacities of complementarity 
EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ3, EQ4, 
EQ5 
R2, R3 
Cluster 2 - Value added of the EU-SA development co-operation     
C6: SBS funds have created strong opportunities to test policy and institutional 
processes through innovative and risk-taking initiatives 
EQ3, EQ4, 
EQ5 
R3, R7, 
R8, R12 
C7: In the absence of a mutually agreed definition of policy dialogue, the dialogue has 
mostly focused on programme management issues and has only more recently 
expanded at the broader level of the Strategic Partnership to generate exchange of 
experiences and know-how 
EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ5 
R5, R7, 
R8, R12 
C8: CB/CD inputs strongly relied on existing national capacities and mainly focused on 
managerial and technical issues. They were rarely used for exchange of experience and 
know-how between the parties, according to the TDCA/SP framework, although the few 
cases where this happened showed a considerable value added 
EQ1, EQ2, 
EQ5 
R5, R6, 
R7, R12 
C9: The strategic dialogue and the knowledge sharing processes combined with SBS are 
limited by the absence of specific tools and procedures 
EQ2, EQ5  R5, R6, 
R7 
Cluster 3 - Outcomes and impacts at sector level     
C10: While GoSA employment creation programmes supported by SBS have yielded 
considerable achievements, these are, to a certain extent, offset by persistent structural 
bottlenecks 
EQ4, EQ5, 
EQ6 
R9 
C11: SBS operations have supported the GoSA in the implementation of crucial reform 
processes in the water and sanitation sector leading to significant development results. 
More recently, the declining intensity and quality of the SA-EU dialogue in the sector has 
limited exchanges on potential solutions to address important persistent bottlenecks 
EQ2, EQ5, 
EQ7 
R9 
C12: By building on existing policy partnerships in the Governance Sector, SBS has 
supported a successful DoJCD innovative programme to improve access to justice in the 
poor areas, and the institutionalisation of the Legislative Sector within crucial areas for 
South Africa’s process toward a stable and inclusive constitutional democracy 
EQ5, EQ8  R9 
Cluster 4 - Other key issues regarding the implementation of the SBS modality in 
South Africa 
   
C13: SBS has contributed to policy experiences that have shown how CSOs are 
essential actors in reaching socially excluded groups 
EQ5, EQ7, 
EQ8 
R10 
C14: SBS has endeavoured to extend its support to local institutions with different 
modalities and results 
EQ5  R11 
C15: The good quality of PFM acted as an enabling factor for SBS, rather than an SBS  EQ4   104 
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Conclusion  Based on 
EQs 
Leads to 
Recom. 
objective; at the same time, SBS contributed to reinforce PFM systems, namely at 
sectoral level 
C16: With SBS funds, predictability of aid has markedly improved compared to other 
forms of aid. However, and despite the rather low proportion of SBS in the overall GoSA 
public expenditures, delays in payment of some tranches have had negative 
consequences on the implementation of specific SBS-supported programmes 
EQ3, EQ4  R13 
6.1  Cluster 1 - Development co-operation: priorities and modalities 
Conclusion  1:  EU-SA  development  co-operation  has  deep  historical  roots  and  reflects  the 
government priorities and the key objectives of the EU-SA partnership. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1, EQ2 and EQ5 
Development co-operation between the EU and SA is built on a deep and solid history of relationships 
since the days of apartheid, which ensures reciprocal trust and commitment. During the apartheid, the 
ANC, the democratic movements and CSOs found the EU to be an important partner in their political 
and civil battles. Since the official abolition of apartheid, the co-operation has continued to focus on the 
main development challenges: employment and equitable growth, democracy and human rights, basic 
services  to  fight  poverty  and  inequality.  Over  time,  the  co-operation  has  continued  to  develop,  by 
strengthening government ownership through the introduction of BS and by expanding the scope of co-
operation through the establishment of the TDCA and Strategic Partnership. The EU-SA development 
co-operation  priorities  have  fully  reflected  the  GoSA  priorities  as  established  in  the  post-apartheid 
economic strategies and the 2004-09 MTSF and 2009-14 MTSF. 
Conclusion  2:  Budget  Support  has  become  the  key  modality  of  this  co-operation  and  has 
significantly evolved over time. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4 and EQ5 
BS was introduced in the early 2000s, to respond to a strong demand from both EU and SA partners. It 
rapidly became the most important modality of the EU-SA development co-operation, covering 72% of 
the total EU portfolio over the period 2000-11 with peaks of more than 90% in recent years. GoSA saw 
in BS a way to increase its ownership of ODA. The EU, as stressed in the CSP (2003), saw in BS also a 
way to “strengthen policy dialogue” and the EU value added in development co-operation. 
The first designs of SBS closely resembled the design of a standard ‘project’, and presented great 
variations from one SBS operation to another. After the first experiences in the period 2000-2003 and 
the development of key reference documents on the EU side (e.g. ‘2002 EU Guide to the programming 
and  implementation  of  budget  support  in  third  countries’)  and  on  the  GoSA  side  (e.g.  ‘2003  Policy 
Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the Management of ODA’), the design of SBS operations 
evolved towards a greater emphasis on mutual accountability on the results (KPIs). In recent years, the 
design has converged towards a standard format, with a duration of three or four years maximum and a 
similar tranche release structure (‘three fixed + two variable’ tranches) across sectors. In addition, some 
of the recent programmes attempt to expand the strategic dialogue, including a better integration with 
the opportunities provided by the SP (e.g. PrimCare). 
Conclusion 3: Budget Support has been designed and implemented with significant flexibility. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1 and EQ5 
Flexibility in the approach adopted by the parties in the design of SBS operations reflects the efforts 
made to ensure relevance and alignment to GoSA needs and priorities. This is evident when looking at 
the  different  mix  of  inputs  of  SBS  operations  (which  were  generally  determined  by  sector  specific 
considerations) and at the number of riders (amendments were made in relation to 13 of the 16 SBS 
operations).  While  some  of  these  riders  were  linked  to  over-ambitious  targets  and/or  delays  in 
implementation, in eight cases adjustments were made to the performance assessment matrix, with a 
view to enhance alignment to changing national institutional and policy frameworks. 
Despite convergence in the format of SBS operations, significant differences across sectors remain and 
are particularly evident when looking at the mix of inputs of SBS operations. While, in most operations, 
no complementary component to support the participation of non-state actors was included in the SBS 
package (e.g. in MSB III, the responsibility for the inclusion of CSOs in the water and sanitation sector 
was entirely left to GoSA), some SBS operations include specific envelopes to directly support CSOs 105 
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(e.g. Access to Justice). Similarly, while responsibility for capacity building and capacity development 
(CB/CD) was entirely transferred to GoSA for most SBS operations, a few still include a strong CB/CD 
internal  component  (e.g.  PrimCare)  and/or  combine  SBS  with  specific  CB/CD  complementary 
programmes (see also conclusion 5).  
The  choices  made  in  terms  of  mix  of  inputs  were  generally  determined  by  specific  aspects  of  the 
sectors’ environment (e.g. active role played by certain sector actors, proneness of the line department 
to  CSO  participation,  existing  space  for  exchange  of  know-how,  etc.),  rather  than  by  attempts  to 
challenge the existing context. 
Conclusion 4: Budget Support in South Africa has developed as a specific typology. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4 and EQ5 
The  specific  features  of  BS  in  SA  allow  focusing  on  policy  innovations  deeply  owned  by  the 
Government with the support of CSOs, to which the EU partner may contribute providing funds to ease 
policy experimentation, and also help expanding the knowledge base, through an enhanced exchange 
of policy experiences and knowhow. The latter contribution particularly regards the experience of the 
second half of the period, through the integration with the TDCA and SP. 
The specific focus of BS on well identifiable themes and policy challenges (specific experimental policy 
programmes) responds to a basic requirement of GoSA on external aid management but does not imply 
the traceability of funds. The Performance Assessment Frameworks of the programmes do not include 
‘intrusive’ references to the use of the resources but rely on the use of general and sectoral process / 
outcome indicators as disbursement triggers. Such specific focus, however, allows BS to enhance its 
value  added,  despite  its  relatively  small  financial  weight  compared  to  the  overall  SA  discretionary 
spending. Indeed, the financial resources mobilised are able to create real opportunities for the relevant 
government  departments  and  their  CSOs  partners.  In  addition,  the  focus  of  BS  enhances  the 
development of a strategic dialogue and knowledge sharing initiatives as the dialogue and exchange 
would otherwise become very general or overambitious and would thus lose their relevance. 
In most cases, the sustainability of the supported actions has been ensured both through a significant 
participation of the GoSA in the financing, and through the mainstreaming into the budget of successful 
pilots (e.g. IPA, Access to Justice, MSB, RCF, LSPSP, etc.). Mainstreaming has taken place thanks to 
specific mechanisms and procedures embedded within the GoSA budget preparation process. 
Conclusion 5: SBS has shown strong comparative advantages vis-à-vis other modalities and 
significant capacities of complementarity. 
This conclusion is based on EQ4 and EQ5. 
SBS has shown a strong comparative advantage toward alternative delivery modalities – namely, in the 
following areas: 
  ownership and reinforcing government internal processes; 
  flexibility and diversification in the use of resources; 
  appropriateness  to  address  complex  policy  experimentation  in  institutional  sensitive 
environments. 
SBS  has  enhanced  the  opportunities  to  launch  innovative/new  policies  originating  from  within  the 
relevant institutions, opportunities that could otherwise have been missed. In addition, the comparison 
with  previous  or  potential  projects  demonstrates  that  the  level  of  ownership  −  and,  hence,  the 
adaptation, co-ordination and alignment − ensured by BS would not be attainable through alternative, 
more traditional instruments. Only in few cases, a project or a ‘facility’ could have obtained comparable 
results. 
In addition, in some cases, SBS has provided the opportunity for positive combinations with projects or 
facilities,  namely  to  enhance  capacity  development,  as  for  example:  the  contribution  of  the  TDCA 
Facility to PrimCare in the Health Sector, and the support project to a number of NGOs to complement 
the Access to Justice programme. 
6.2  Cluster 2 - Value added of the EU-SA development co-operation 
This  cluster  focuses  on  the  value  added  of  the  EU-SA  development  co-operation.  The  Strategic 
Partnership stresses that “in view of the special circumstances in South Africa, the real value added by 
ODA is not only the finance itself, but what comes from it − namely, best practice, innovation, risk-
taking, pilot programmes, systems development, capacity building and, above all, skills and knowledge” 
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Conclusion  6:  SBS  funds  have  created  strong  opportunities  to  test  policy  and  institutional 
processes through innovative and risk-taking initiatives. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ3, EQ4 and EQ5. 
The creation of financial opportunities to enhance a nationally-owned process of policy innovation in the 
targeted sectors is the most original and successful contribution of SBS. 
Overall,  the  financial  weight  of  SBS  funds  is  relatively  low  when  compared  to  GoSA  additional 
allocations across sectors for the whole period considered. It represents an average of 1%. However, it 
is estimated, that within targeted sectors, funds transferred have increased GoSA’s fiscal space through 
the provision of more significant additional resources. SBS funds represented approximately 8% and 
7%  respectively  of  the  additional  funds  made  available  within  the  private  sector  development/ 
employment sector and the governance sector in the period 2000-2011.Through the provision of these 
additional resources, SBS operations have enabled line departments to finance innovative policies and 
programmes that had not yet found an allocation in the national budget.  
More specifically - and in line with the mandated function for development aid as defined by GoSA’s 
ODA  guidelines  -  SBS  has,  in  most  cases,  successfully  supported  policy  innovation  and  piloting, 
including: 
  the testing of innovative models for service delivery in the health sector (e.g. outreach teams 
and mobile clinics),  
  the piloting of innovative institutional and policy frameworks (e.g. in the Water Sector) and of 
new forms of area-based governance and management (e.g. in the Urban Renewal Sector),  
  the launching of new mechanisms to deepen and broaden engagement with civil society actors 
(e.g. in the Justice and Water Sectors),  
  the launching, testing and subsequent mainstreaming of pilot initiatives and mechanisms (e.g. 
in the Water Sector, in the area of Science and Technology, and in the private sector in relation 
to the funding windows for SMEs provided through the IDC).  
In all cases, SBS has been instrumental in facilitating access by the departments to funds for innovative 
programmes, conceived within the departments and owned by the relevant institutions - a result that 
could not have been achieved through the use of alternative aid modalities. 
Conclusion 7: In the absence of a mutually agreed definition of policy dialogue, the dialogue has 
mostly focused on programme management issues and has only more recently expanded at the 
broader level of the Strategic Partnership to generate exchange of experiences and know-how. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1, EQ2 and EQ5. 
As knowledge sharing should be a key feature of the EU value added, policy dialogue is particularly 
important. Despite this and despite the multiple references to policy dialogue in the EU-SA strategic and 
programming  documents  since  2000,  the  evaluation  has  highlighted  the  absence  of  a  codified  and 
shared definition of policy dialogue. A specific definitional framework was therefore agreed upon in this 
evaluation  based  on:  i)  the  specific  policy  dialogue  directly  linked  to  BS  operations,  as  a  basic 
component of the SBS package; ii) the dialogue opportunities provided by the strategic partnership to 
exchange  experiences  and  know-how  on  strategic  development  issues  of  common  interest;  iii)  the 
combination of both (see also section 4.2 "EQ2 (Step 1) - Policy Dialogue, TA and H&A", p.19). 
At  SBS  operation  level,  policy  dialogue  has  helped  to  identify  the  specific  sector  policy  support 
programmes,  to  define  the  performance  assessment  framework  of  the  FAs,  and  to  assess  the 
achievement  of  targets  set  for  the  KPIs.  This  operation-level  policy  dialogue  has  been  particularly 
important and has expanded to strategic themes providing a strong contribution to successful SBS in 
the Governance Sector and partly in the Water Sector, where it built on long experience of collaboration 
and trust between GoSA and the EU. 
However,  in  most  cases,  the  operation-level  policy  dialogue  has  remained  focused  on  ensuring  an 
appropriate  management  of  the  supported  programmes.  The  potential  of  the  broader  opportunities 
offered by the elaborated dialogue framework of the EU-SA TDCA and Strategic Partnership was not 
exploited, especially before 2008, because of the lack of a clear and shared view by the parties on how 
to address and combine them in the BS framework, also in light of the lack of procedures and expertise. 
As of 2008, following the JAP, these opportunities have started to be better used (e.g. PrimCare, IPA, 
LSPSP) with significant results, and SBS effects have been strengthened. It should be acknowledged 
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Conclusion 8: Capacity Building and Capacity Development inputs strongly relied on existing 
national capacities and mainly focused on managerial and technical issues. They were rarely 
used for exchange of experience and know-how between the parties, according to the TDCA/SP 
framework, although the few cases where this happened showed a considerable value added. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ1, EQ2 and EQ5. 
Capacity Building and Capacity Development (CB/CD) features are included in all SBS operations but 
two: Innovation for Poverty Alleviation (2009) and Primary Education Sector Policy Support Programme 
(2010). In most SBS operations, the content or focus of the CB/CD inputs and the ways in which it is 
integrated within the SBS operations strongly varies, leading to conclude that they depend on – and 
respond to – sector / context specific characteristics, rather than to temporal evolutions and broader 
lessons learned.  
In most cases CB/CD has been: 
  aimed  at  facilitating  the  implementation  of  the  SBS  supported  programmes  and  at 
strengthening the capacities of the institution(s) and sector actors involved; 
  managed independently by GoSA and provided by national experts at various levels (scientific, 
managerial,  technical)  or  exceptionally  delegated  to  relevant  NSAs  (e.g.  Access  to  Justice, 
PrimCare);  
  included either as a condition in the performance assessment framework or just mentioned as 
an expected result without condition. 
Only rarely have CB measures been embedded within the SBS operations as one of the key SBS 
components (e.g. RCF I & II, URP Eastern Cape and PrimCare), and only in the case of RCF and 
PrimCare was CB/CD provided to exchange specific know-how based on EU or worldwide practices, 
with the support of international partners (respectively, EIB and advisory services managed by DFID). In 
the Health Sector, complementary Technical Assistance also favoured the establishment of a link with 
what has been called the broader strategic dialogue. It bridged the gap between programme-level and 
strategic-level dialogue and allowed for comparison of experiences and policy models in specific areas 
(e.g. Health Insurance, Regulatory Health), through the use of the opportunities provided by the SP 
(namely, the TDCA Dialogue Facility). 
Conclusion 9: The strategic dialogue and the knowledge sharing processes combined with SBS 
are limited by the absence of specific tools and procedures. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ2 and EQ5. 
Even if the SBS parties would agree to expand the level of dialogue and address relevant knowledge 
sharing  initiatives,  they  would  be  hampered  by  the  lack  of  skills,  procedures  and  tools.  The  most 
suitable tool to address such level of exchange is presently the TDCA Dialogue Facility, but this has still 
a relatively limited scope and is under the Strategic Partnership. The development cooperation partners 
in the EUD and NT do not have a direct access to it. Furthermore, the programme managers in the 
EUD and NT do not have easy access to specialised expertise. On the EU side, access to the sectoral 
DGs  of  the  European  Commission  and  to  the  sectoral  institutions  of  the  EU member  states  is  not 
facilitated by agreed procedures. 
6.3  Cluster 3 - Outcomes and impacts at sector level 
Conclusion 10: While GoSA employment creation programmes supported by SBS have yielded 
considerable  achievements,  these  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  offset  by  persistent  structural 
bottlenecks. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ4, EQ5 & EQ6. 
Despite the high political priority placed on private sector and employment strategies, which have led to 
the creation of two million new jobs over the period and to the significant growth registered in the rate of 
investments,  the  official  unemployment  rate  has  declined  only  marginally  and  remains  high  at 
approximately 25%.  
SBS funds have contributed helping GoSA to:  
  address complementary areas in the main sector policy framework (through SWEEEP); 
  launch a new and promising programme focusing on innovation for poverty reduction (IPA); 
  test new lending products to address market failures in the financing of SMMEs and/or risky 
projects (RCF); and  108 
Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa 
Final report - Volume 1 - 2013 - Particip GmbH 
  strengthen its employment creation programmes (ECF).  
Beyond the funds, other SBS inputs have been deployed as follows:  
  dialogue in the case of IPA, with a number of implications – partly still to be developed – in 
terms of strategic exchange on Science & Technology, and systematisation and extension of 
lessons learned;  
  CB/CD inputs, based on exchange of know-how between SA and EU have been used in the 
RCF, through the EIB involvement. 
GoSA  policies  and  programmes  supported  through  SBS  have  only  partially  tackled  some  of  the 
bottlenecks  that  constrain  economic  growth.  Jobs  have  been  created  (primarily  through  enhanced 
public  interventions),  skills  enhanced,  new  lending  products  developed,  and  some  innovative 
approaches  that  might  be  appropriated  by  a  dynamic  private  sector  (namely  SMMEs  and  rural 
enterprises)  have  been  tested  with  success.  Despite  this,  the  persistence  of  some  structural 
bottlenecks – including inadequate skills profiles, institutional and regulatory framework of the labour 
market, difficult environment for SMMEs – is a factor, aggravated by the financial crisis, which affects 
the decline in country’s competitiveness, the overall limited economic growth, and in particular to the 
declining contribution of SMMEs to the South African economy. 
SBS has not addressed such policy domains, not even through expanding the dialogue component to 
general  strategic  areas,  such  as  the  understanding  and  comparison  of  worldwide  alternative  policy 
experiences to enhance employment (labour market, VET and SMMEs support policies). It is felt that, 
especially in the case of the recent ECF, an opportunity could be missed, considering that the relevant 
areas of collaboration and exchange of experiences between EU and SA potentially exist (SP dialogue).  
Conclusion  11:  SBS  operations  have  supported  the  GoSA  in  the  implementation  of  crucial 
reform processes in the water and sanitation sector leading to significant development results. 
More recently, the declining intensity and quality of the SA-EU dialogue in the sector has limited 
exchanges on potential solutions to address important persisting bottlenecks.  
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ2, EQ5 & EQ7. 
Over the last decade, important reforms took place in the Water Sector. Guided by the development of 
two new sector policies – the Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS) in 2003, and the Water 
for Growth and Development Framework (WfGD) in 2009 – these reforms took into account important 
transformation processes in terms of local governance and evolution in the national financial framework.  
SBS funds and dialogue – based on previous experience of collaboration – have combined at the right 
time to help the government design and implement a new institutional approach in the sector, with a 
focus  on  the  poorest  provinces  and  the  recognition  of  the  progress  made  in  the  establishment  of 
democratic  local  governments.  SBS-supported  initiatives  have  contributed  to  testing  a  new  sectoral 
strategic framework based on the transfer of responsibilities to the local government level and a new 
leading role of DWA. This process was accompanied by several CB/CD activities, also financed through 
SBS. SBS has supported the various phases of the GoSA programme over a decade, extending and 
consolidating the results gained in previous phases. 
The  implementation  of  the  SBS-supported  GoSA  programme,  combined  with  significant  public 
investment in infrastructure, has allowed the achievement of important results in terms of access to 
water and sanitation in the poorer provinces. 
However,  other  objectives  of  the  programme  -  such  as  the  involvement  of  CSOs  -  have  been 
overlooked. Over time, new challenges have also arisen in the  sector, such as: the weakness of a 
shared vision at sector level, due to the multiplication of the local responsibilities; the complexity of 
maintaining the infrastructure developed and ensuring efficient management of water and sanitation 
services. The new challenges are likely to offset the development results achieved during the important 
reform process of the last decade. 
While  the  EU  funds  remained  significant,  the  level  of  dialogue  has  fallen  in  recent  years.  The 
impoverishment of the dialogue has hampered the possibility for GoSA and the EU to exchange ideas 
on ways to address the new bottlenecks and potentially to identify solutions that could be supported by 
the EU. 109 
Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa 
Final report - Volume 1 - 2013 - Particip GmbH 
Conclusion 12: By building on existing policy partnerships in the Governance Sector, SBS has 
supported a successful DoJCD innovative programme to improve access to justice in the poor 
areas,  and  the  institutionalisation  of  the  Legislative  Sector  within  crucial  areas  for  South 
Africa’s process toward a stable and inclusive constitutional democracy.   
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ5 & EQ8. 
Over  the  years,  the  EU  has  established  a  firm  partnership  with  state  institutions  in  the  justice  and 
legislative sectors and with a variety of strategically important non-state actors in multiple sectors, which 
has  allowed  the  EU  and  its  government  partners  (DoJCD  and  SALS/LSS)  to  implement  two  SBS 
relevant and effective operations. The dialogue and financial inputs of these two operations, building on 
the  existing  policy  commitments  in  the  two  governance  sectors,  helped  shape  and  support  two 
important government programmes.  
In  the  case  of  the  Justice  Sector,  this  involved  innovative  approaches  of  DoJCD  to  strategic 
partnerships with key civil society actors to extend access to justice, sensitise on constitutional rights, 
and  create  policy  feedback mechanisms  for  new  cycles  of  policy  innovation.  In  the  implementation 
process,  a  network  of  intermediate  service  delivery  actors  has  been  enabled  in  the  poorest  areas, 
justice services have been expanded to marginalised groups, and more citizens are aware of their 
constitutional rights. In addition, the ‘state-civil society partnership approach’ has in the course of this 
process gained in relevance as DoJCD obtained stronger roles within the Justice, Conflict Prevention 
and Security cluster - which convenes different departments and the President’s office. This was also 
reflected in the upgrading of the unit within DoJCD steering this state-civil society partnership. 
In  the  case  of  the  legislative  sector,  the  pitfalls  of  fragmenting  Parliament  and  the  nine  Provincial 
Legislatures  have  been  avoided,  and  the  LSPSP  was  viewed  positively  for  its  contributions  to  the 
institutionalisation of the Legislative Sector. Consistent dialogue, combined with appropriate financial 
support, strengthened key stakeholders and sector actors in their efforts aimed at harmonising sector 
systems and procedures, at strengthening key functions (e.g. financial, managerial, human resources, 
etc.), and at developing capacities in vital areas such as research, public outreach and international co-
operation. Linkages with other state institutions and statutory bodies (such as the Auditor General of 
South Africa, the Financial and Fiscal Commission, the Presidency, etc.), as well as targeted demand-
side  pressures  from  civil  society,  further  influence  and  shape  this  transformation  process  and  may 
contribute to  improved sector performance.  However, it is necessary  to take into account the huge 
challenges facing the young and insufficiently institutionalised Legislative Sector, as well as the political 
disincentives that result from the party-list electoral system on members of the Legislative Sector. Even 
in a more institutionalised sector, these factors might work against rhetorically agreed outcomes, such 
as the exercise of effective checks and balance functions over the executive, energetic representation 
of  citizens/constituencies,  or  quality  law-making  practices  based  on  deliberations  and  public 
participation. Some components of the SBS specifically contribute to mitigate these risks, namely the 
inter-parliamentary dialogue which is supported with the EU and other parliaments - although the limits 
of external leverage have to be acknowledged. 
6.4  Cluster 4 - Other key issues on the implementation of the SBS modality  
Conclusion  13:  SBS  has  contributed  to  policy  experiences  that  have  shown  how  CSOs  are 
essential actors in reaching socially excluded groups. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ5, EQ7 & EQ8. 
Some SBS operations have supported GoSA programmes with a significant involvement of non-sate 
actors, using various modalities: 
  In Access to Justice, the CSOs are in charge of the whole service delivery action under the 
leadership of the DoJCD, which finances, plans and monitors their action. In addition the EU 
directly finances a complementary project through some specialised NGOs. The GoSA-CSO 
partnership is the core of the Access to Justice programme. Its success provides an important 
lesson in view of similar institutional arrangements at national, regional and international level. 
  In Masibambane (Water and Sanitation Sector), CSOs are identified as key partners of the 
local  governments  for  programme  implementation,  but  their  actual  involvement  has  been 
overlooked.  This  is  probably  a  reason  to  explain  the  problems  identified  in  relation  to  the 
sustainability of the achievements (poor maintenance). 
  In  PrimCare  (Health  Sector),  CSOs  are  key  service  deliverers  and  represent  a  substantial 
component of the innovative intervention model put in place. Although it may be too early for a 
comprehensive judgement, the intervention seems successful. 110 
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In all three cases mentioned, SBS has contributed to policy experiences that have shown how CSOs 
are essential actors in reaching the most marginalised groups, and built local networks for sustainable 
service delivery with them. In the case of Water, there has been a negative lesson learned, as a result 
of CSO involvement being overlooked. 
The use of SBS instead of alternative modalities, has allowed GoSA to test out the partnership with 
CSOs  as  its  own  policy  and  build  on  its  own  experience.  In  one  case,  EU-funded  actions 
complementary to SBS have been put in place, with success (Access to Justice). 
Conclusion 14: SBS has endeavoured to extend its support to local institutions with different 
modalities and results. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ5. 
SBS has endeavoured to support both national Government institutions with their CSOs partners and 
Local Governments with local level CSOs. Local partners have been supported in most sectors, namely 
in  Water,  Governance,  Health  and  decentralised  Urban  Development,  either  through  specific  BS 
components  or  through  complementary  GoSA  actions.  In  the  Water  Sector,  MSB  I  supported  the 
implementation of a comprehensive pilot experience whereby lessons learnt from working with local 
government (LG) contributed to the development of the Strategic Framework for Water Services, which 
took into account LG transformation and to the strengthening of Water Service Authorities and Water 
Service  Providers  to  establish  their  water  governance  functions.  In  the  Justice  sector,  the  targeted 
engagement strategy with civil society has also created a demand-side pressure on public authorities at 
all  levels  for  openness,  while,  in  the  Legislative  sector,  SBS  has  supported  the  strengthening  of 
linkages  between  the  National  Parliament  and  Provincial  Legislatures.  In  the  Health  sector,  SBS-
supported programmes have contributed to the successful experimentation of new initiatives and ways 
of delivering services at local level, including support to the development of human resources at various 
levels of the sector institutional environment. In eThekwini, the local authorities have been effectively 
supported  through  an  innovative  urban  management  approach,  which  has  not  worked  for  different 
reasons in the case of URP Eastern Cape. 
There  are  few  cases  (e.g.  the  Financial  Management  Improvement  Programme,  the  very  peculiar 
support to independent national NGOs in the Access to Justice or the particular arrangement to ensure 
CB/CD support by NGOs in PrimCare), where BS has been complemented through specific EU-funded 
CB/CD initiatives in favour of Local authorities. 
In  all  cases  but  one,  support  to  Local  authorities  has  been  run  under  the  responsibility  of  national 
institutions. In the case of Urban Development, instead, BS has supported programmes run by Local 
Governments. Here also, however, it’s not a proper case of BS to local institutions, as the resources 
have  been  provided  to  test  a  new  national  approach  to  local  development,  under  the  guidance  of 
national institutions. 
Conclusion 15: The good quality of PFM acted as an enabling factor for SBS, rather than an SBS 
objective; at the same time, SBS contributed to reinforce PFM systems, namely at sectoral level. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ4. 
Overall, the EU is by far the biggest contributor to the RDP Fund − that is, the modality established by 
the GoSA to manage ODA that donors agree to put under government control. Although yearly ratios 
fluctuate, the shift of the EU towards an increased use of the SBS modality is reflected in a growing 
average of EU funds disbursed through this channel (from a low of 46% in 2000 to highs well above 60% 
for the great majority of the following years). In contrast, this share has been much lower for the total aid 
received by South Africa in the same period (about 20%).  
All RDP funds are budgeted for and reported on by GoSA in a fairly comprehensive and transparent 
manner,  and  it  can  be  concluded  that  SBS  has  thus  contributed  to  increasing  the  amount  of  aid 
integrated in the budgeting process and aligned to the government systems (SBS is in fact ‘on plan’, ‘on 
budget’, ‘on-Treasury’, ‘on account’, ‘on procurement’, ‘on report’ and ‘on audit’). This is not always the 
case with regard to other donor funds that are managed by the donors and not necessarily reported on 
(by donors), giving rise to what has been termed the ‘invisibility’ of aid in South African processes. 
Contrary  to  evaluations  carried  out  in  other  countries  (e.g.  Mali,  Tunisia,  Zambia),  this  evaluation 
concludes  that  SBS  operations  have  not  provided  important  contributions  to  the  substantial  PFM 
reforms introduced in South Africa after the end of the apartheid, although these have been supported 
since  the  late  1990s  by  the  EU  through  the  implementation  of  successive  Financial  Management 
Improvement  Programmes.  The  significant  success  of  South  Africa  in  achieving  the  objectives  of 
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increased levels of transparency and participation are primarily linked to the strong drive and efforts put 
in place by GoSA. In some cases, SBS operations did indeed include one or more conditions related to 
improvements in PFM, and links between SBS operations and PFM improvements at sector level can 
be  drawn  in  the  Legislative,  Justice  and  Water  Sectors.  However,  no  complementary  CB/CD  was 
provided to this end (with the exception of the Water Sector), and nor were improvements in overall 
PFM explicitly included as expected key results of the SBS operations.  
Conclusion 16: With SBS funds, predictability of aid has markedly improved compared to other 
forms of aid. However, and despite the rather low proportion of SBS in the overall GoSA public 
expenditures,  delays  in  payment  of  some  tranches  have  had  negative  consequences  on  the 
implementation of specific SBS-supported programmes. 
This conclusion is based mainly on EQ3 and EQ4. 
Over time, predictability of commitments of EU-SBS funds over a multi-year framework has increased 
and is significantly higher than that recorded for other forms of aid. Specifically: 
  Timeliness in the submission of SBS forecasts is high. 
  Rates of disbursement are close to 100% and, on average, 95% of the total volume of SBS 
forecasted amounts has been disbursed within the planned fiscal year.  
Despite this, and despite the fact that SBS funds represent a very small share of GoSA additional 
expenditure, the significant delays encountered in the payment of specific tranches have had important 
consequences  on  the  implementation  of  some  SBS  supported  programmes  and  even  on  the 
sustainability of the development actions. Indeed, the specific way in which GoSA uses budget support 
funds (the transfers to line departments that are expected to be covered by SBS take place only if SBS 
funds  have  been  actually  received  on  the  RDP  Fund  account)  emphasises  the  consequences  of 
disbursement delays in relation to budget implementation and project financing. The delays, however, 
are often the combined result of multiple causes. Among these:  delays in the submission of payment 
files  by  the  Line  Departments  to  the  NT  and/or  from  the  NT  to  the  EUD;  delays  in  actual 
payment/processing of request by the EU; lack of compliance with established conditions for payment 
or differing views on the achievement of predefined targets; and delays in the transfer of funds from the 
RDP Fund to line department accounts.  
Delays  in  tranche  payments  related  to  the  MSB III  SBS  operation  (Water  Sector)  were  reflected  in 
delays in payments to participating CSOs, leading in some cases to unsustainable financial difficulties. 
These delays have undermined trust and relationships between CSOs and other MSB Water Sector 
stakeholders, and proved to be a fatal blow for CSO participation in the programme. 
Repeated  delays  in  the  crediting  of  funds  to  the  Municipalities’  accounts,  in  the  case  of  the  URP 
Eastern Cape, did not allow their integration in the annual IDP/Budget process, leading to a  lack of 
commitment, low spending, and further delays.   112 
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7  Recommendations 
The  following  key  recommendations  emerge  from  the  conclusions.  Like  the  conclusions  in  the 
preceding section, the recommendations are also presented in clusters, namely: 
Recommendations 1 to 4  Development co-operation: priorities and modalities 
Recommendations 5 to 8  Value added of the EU-SA development co-operation 
Recommendations 9  Sectoral issues 
Recommendations 10 to 13  Other key issues 
 
The linkages between EQs (findings), conclusions and recommendations are illustrated in the following 
figure. 
Figure 15  Major links between EQs, conclusions and recommendations  
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7.1  Cluster 1 - Development co-operation: priorities and modalities 
Recommendation 1: Priorities.  
Development co-operation should continue to be recognised as a key element of the EU-SA 
partnership and remain focussed on national developmental needs; at the same time, 
approaches should be developed and relevant experience and possible lessons identified for 
replication at regional and international level. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 1. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/DEVCO, EUD. 
It is recommended that development co-operation should be kept focused on national developmental 
needs,– namely, building a prosperous and inclusive democracy
147 – as these will remain for decades 
a key challenge for government and civil society in South Africa: 
  The South Africa National Development Plan presents a variety of key challenges on which 
thematic and sectoral partnerships should be built, with deep roots at country level
148 and 
involving  a  wide  range  of  key  national  stakeholders  (GoSA  departments,  CSOs,  Local 
governments, social actors, etc.). A shift toward a more international ground, if combined with 
a reduction of the national focus, would exclude a large number of SA actors by narrowing the 
partnership to limited groups, such as foreign policy actors, bodies/ agencies with international 
experience and academia. 
  The success in building a prosperous and inclusive democracy is a condition for South Africa 
to play a leading role at regional and international level. Therefore, supporting South Africa’s 
efforts to identify winning approaches and models for national development is the best way to 
preserve and reinforce its stabilisation and development role in Africa and worldwide. 
  Sustainable and equitable development in South Africa and in the region is an area of strong 
tradition  and  almost  complete  coincidence  of  interests  between  EU  and  SA,  beyond  any 
generic  ideological  distinction.  In  other  important  matters  regarding  trade,  international 
settlements, etc. there are diversities and divergences, as the two partners belong to different 
geopolitical  groupings.  Keeping  and  deepening  the  base  of  convergence  on  national  and 
regional development would benefit the partnership also in the other areas. 
  Finally, keeping the focus on national development will allow to preserve and reinforce the 
present emphasis on policy processes and innovations of the public institutions (central and 
decentralised  governments,  Parliaments,  other  specialised  ones)  with  their  civil  society 
partners. Often, policy support projects are based outside the government institutions, while 
the SBS have given opportunities to creative and innovative public bodies to test the ideas 
that were generated through their own experience, with the NT ensuring the link between their 
proposals and the national priorities. This has been an important value added of the SBS that 
should be kept in the future. 
 
Recommendation 2: Budget support modality. 
Budget support should be maintained as the key financing modality, to guarantee government 
ownership and strong links with the stakeholders involved in policy making and 
implementation. At the same time, enhanced dialogue and CB/CD components should be 
strengthened also through complementary actions to better reflect the value added of the SA-
EU co-operation. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/DEVCO, EUD. 
Budget support should remain the key financing modality of the development co-operation, with the 
integration  of  expanded  strategic  dialogue  and  new  capacity  development  components  including 
                                                       
147  “Sustained  growth  and  reduced  inequality”,  “greater  opportunities  for  all”,  “national  consensus”,  “a  capable 
state”… National Development Plan / Vision 2030, pages 2, 90, and others. 
148 It has been said that the development cooperation between SA, as a MIC, and EU has three main dimensions: 
national, regional and international (Siân Herbert - ODI - The future of EU aid in middle-income countries: the case 
of  South  Africa,  2013).  According  to  this  study,  a  more  ‘traditional  approach’  would  emphasise  the  national 
argument, while the stakeholders seem to stress the opportunities of focusing on the international argument. Such 
new  focus  would  pave  the  way  to  a  more  strategic  cooperation  seeking  for  synergies  and  joint  action  at 
international level. 114 
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through enhanced complementary actions. 
Strengthening the link with the actual policy processes will facilitate the complementarity of BS with 
other modalities of development cooperation, including specific capacity development initiatives and 
exchanges. This applies to both existing projects and facilities (e.g. PSPPD, TDCA Dialogue Facility), 
and to new initiatives that might be launched in the future. Such initiatives, without a relation to BS and 
the actual supported policy processes, would easily become rather academic and isolated exercises. 
At the same time, the complementarity with BS may reinforce their concreteness and continuity and 
help  the  partners  identify  new  themes  and  approaches  to  inform  policy  research  and  debate  on 
development  matters  in  the  respective  countries  and  eventually  inspire  joint  action  at  regional/ 
international level.  
 
Recommendation 3: Future budget support. 
BS operations should continue to support creative and innovative public institutions with an 
established tradition of co-operation with the EU, one of the key success factors to date, and 
should possibly involve new development partners. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 4, 5 and 6. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS and EUD. 
The implementation and management of future BS operations should draw on the lessons of past and 
on-going SBS with a view to build on the strengths and minimise the weaknesses. In particular, the 
formulation, implementation and management of future BS operations should ensure that:  
  the most positive features of the SBS experience are not lost, namely that BS remains an 
opportunity for creative and innovative public institutions and their partners in the civil society 
with an established tradition of co-operation with EU;  
  strategic dialogue in combination with sectoral policy support is expanded and strengthened, 
including  through  the  set-up  of  complementary  envelops  to  finance  specific  CD  initiatives 
aimed at facilitating the exchange of high-level know-how on policy experimentation. 
In the shorter-term, linkages with existing facilities  and structures (e.g. the TDCA -Facility and the 
PSPPD) should be strengthened, namely:  
  support  for  capacity  development  to  engage  in  strategic  policy  dialogue  and  leading  to 
increased institutional capacity provided in the framework of the Dialogue Facility should be 
better linked to planned and on-going BS operations; and 
  research  and  evaluations  on  policy  interventions  which  address  poverty  and  inequality, 
promoted by the PSPPD should be used also to feed the strategic policy dialogue and identify 
areas of particular interest for future BS support. 
The successful experience so far should help expand the collaboration to other development partners. 
In this respect,  the EU should seek  stronger complementarity and harmonisation of  developmental 
actions including joint financing  both with regards to EU member states and to other development 
partners. 
 
Recommendation 4: Budget support specific typology. 
The specific typology of SBS in SA should be considered as an option for cooperation with 
MICs, in specific cases. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 4. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  DEVCO. 
The  specific  typology  of  SBS  tested  and  fine-tuned  in  SA  should  be  viewed  as  an  option  for 
cooperation also with other MICs, as it ensures complete government ownership of the policies and 
programmes supported whilst – at the same time - it allows ample space for expanding the knowledge 
sharing processes between the partners. 
This typology seems particularly suited to those middle-income countries like SA, with which the EU 
has a strong partnership but has not established any association agreement, which would allow more 
in depth political and policy debate on the domestic policies interested by the partnership. 
BS would be used to support specific policies and programmes owned by the recipient Government 
with a focus on shared policy objectives and innovative / risk-taking components: 
  the strong Government ownership and the relatively minimal financial weight of BS on the 115 
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overall discretionary expenditure would minimise any negative tied-aid effect; while 
  the focus on key thematic areas and programmes, within broader sector policies, would allow 
to  better  exploit  the  value  added  of  the  EU  cooperation,  and  would  enable  significant 
qualitative contributions in terms of knowledge sharing to expand the knowledge base of both 
partners. 
In  such  countries,  governments  may  decide  to  utilise  the  BS  funds  for  specific  programmes  and 
actions  where,  at  the  same  time,  performance  indicators  and  policy  dialogue  cover  sector  wide 
performance and, as in the SA case, ‘intrusive’ references to the use of resources and the traceability 
of funds are excluded
149. 
The sustainability of the supported actions should be ensured through a primary role of the recipient 
governments in the provision of the relevant financial and technical resources and the mainstreaming 
of experimentations, if successful, as happens in the case of South Africa. 
7.2  Cluster 2 - Value Added of the EU-SA development co-operation 
Recommendation 5: Policy dialogue. 
‘Programme-level’ policy dialogue should be combined with a broader ‘strategic dialogue’ 
according to the Strategic Partnership, based on peer-to-peer exchange of knowledge on key 
development issues. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 7, 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, Line Departments, DEVCO/EEAS 
and EUD. 
According to the Budget Support Guidelines (EC-DEVCO, 2012), policy dialogue includes two distinct 
features: 
  First, “it provides a framework to take stock of  the respective commitments and to assess 
progress on both sides”. 
  Second, “it can be used as a forward-looking tool”. 
In South Africa, the second feature should be better developed and integrated with the first one. Such 
a ‘forward-looking’ or strategic approach should fit the dialogue framework promoted by the TDCA and 
the  Strategic  Partnership  and  be  intended  as:  “exchanging  experiences  and  information  on  the 
worldwide  best  practices,  models  and  approaches  regarding  the  policies  supported,  so  that  the 
partners can learn from each other and eventually strengthen the respective knowledge base and 
capacity”
150. Such dialogue should support a true knowledge sharing process between the partners on 
the relevant development matters. 
Any  interpretation  of  this  dimension  of  dialogue  as  an  attempt  to  influence  the  design  and 
implementation of development policies in SA should be avoided. Policy dialogue should rather strive 
to broaden the scope of the co-operation on individual programmes and provide: 
  the South African side – namely the government departments and their policy partners – with 
elements  to  better  position  their  experience  in  the  context  of  international  practices  and 
thinking; and  
  the EU – including Member States – with the opportunity to strengthen their knowledge on 
development, based on an open exchange and comparison between their own experience 
and that of South Africa. 
When considering a policy support programme (PSP – either an ongoing or a future one), the two 
parties  should  ask  themselves  how  their  partnership  may  contribute  to  expand  the  respective 
knowledge  base  around  the  issues  at  stake.  With  the  help  of  the  existing  resources  (e.g.  TDCA 
facility)  and  possibly  new  tools,  knowledge  sharing  initiatives  should  be  conceived,  launched  and 
followed up to complement the PSP all along its implementation.  
In addition, new forms of co-operation could arise from this exchange, such as sectoral partnerships 
(e.g. inter-institutional twinning, at national or local level, etc.) and / or joint actions and programmes at 
national, regional and international levels. New expertise and tools should be developed for that, as 
recommended below. 
                                                       
149 See also ‘Specificities of budget support in South Africa’ section 2.3 of Annex 3 in Volume III. 
150 See also footnote 33. 116 
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Recommendation 6: Capacity development. 
Continue mobilising expertise for institutional strengthening and Capacity Building / Capacity 
Development (CB/CD), but expand CB/CD initiatives to support advanced policy exchange and 
knowledge sharing, according to the Strategic Partnership. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS, EUD, Programmes’ 
stakeholders. 
The use of expertise, under various forms, to strengthen the institutions involved in the implementation 
of the SBS supported programmes has shown to be effective and deeply  owned by the  SA side. 
Therefore, it should be continued. 
However,  when  designing  BS  operations,  the  CB/CD  component  should  be  expanded  to  include 
initiatives that allow the advanced policy exchanges and knowledge sharing processes mentioned in 
Recommendation 5. Such ‘extended CB/CD’ is possible, either by including within the BS package 
additional specific CB/CD components to respond to such need, or through the establishment of ad 
hoc complementary CB/CD actions be they financed by the EU or by other development partners. 
Such components and/or complementary actions may include, for instance: (i) workshops on relevant 
intervention  models  tested  worldwide;  (ii)  inter-institutional  meetings  and  specific  co-operation 
between SA and peer institutions from EU and/or other countries; (iii) study tours from SA to visit 
relevant peer institutions; (iv) accompanying studies and related analyses; etc. 
The subjects addressed by such ‘extended CB/CD’ are to be related to the policies and programmes 
supported by BS, but should not directly affect their implementation. For instance: when supporting 
national  primary  health  care  policies,  an  enhanced  understanding  of  the  health  insurance  models 
tested  worldwide  may  help,  as  shown  in  practice;  when  supporting  employment  policies,  a  better 
understanding of the labour market reforms undertaken in other relevant countries may help; when 
supporting the participative maintenance of the social infrastructure (e.g. water), increased knowledge 
of how this has been addressed elsewhere may help; etc. 
When planning a BS operation, specific knowledge sharing initiatives should be identified and the 
related  resources  allocated,  or  the  contribution  of  complementary  programmes  (namely  the  TDCA 
Dialogue Facility) required. In all the cases, however, the TDCA Dialogue Facility should include a 
specific  component  to  support  ‘extended  CB/CD’  in  the  development  cooperation  programmes, 
namely BS. 
In an adapted form, this recommendation is replicable in other partner countries receiving EU BS. 
 
Recommendation 7: New exchange tools. 
Create tools in the framework of the Strategic Partnership and the existing dialogue 
architecture to foster enhanced forms of knowledge sharing. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  EUD, NT and DEVCO/EEAS. 
The development of strategic dialogue and the integration of what has been called above ‘extended 
CB/CD’  (for  knowledge  sharing)  with  budget  support,  either  as  a  component  or  a  complement, 
requires a better use of the complex dialogue structure established by the TDCA and the Strategic 
Partnership and the set-up of specific tools: 
  Instruments such as the TDCA Dialogue Facility could be used for this purpose provided that 
specific mandates, scopes and organisational arrangements are established to respond in a 
flexible and timely way to the demands arising from the design and implementation of the BS 
operations. 
  The twinning (especially twinning light) tool should be made available to South Africa, allowing 
for short- and medium-term inter-institutional partnerships between SA and EU institutions, 
which can originate from initial exchanges of experience in the framework of thematic 
meetings. 
  Specific facilities might be created. It would be difficult to imagine a specialised sector facility, 
given the range of themes addressed. A specific facility should be multi-sectoral, and should 
be able to tap into the expertise of the EU and the Member States (including public sector 
expertise), but also of other MICs. A specialised section of the existing TDCA Dialogue facility 117 
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would fit the purpose. 
  Horizontal programmes (like the regional ones in Latin America or Asia, for social cohesion, 
private enterprises, etc.) should be considered as well.  
At the same time, lessons learnt from SBS operations at policy level should inform the agenda of the 
dialogue  fora  and  feed  wider  policy  thinking  and  dialogue  for  national  and  international  learning 
thereby opening up new areas of dialogue. 
In an adapted form, this recommendation is replicable in other partner countries receiving EU BS. 
Finally, some of such tools (exchange facilities and specialised networks) are relatively common in 
other geographic areas, but not in Africa. The partnership with SA may be an important starting base 
to build such tools in view of using them in the EU-SA exchange and gradually extend their use to the 
other Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Recommendation 8: Regional and international level. 
Extend lessons from development co-operation at national level to regional and international 
level. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 1, 6, 7 and 8. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EEAS/ DEVCO and EUD. 
As stressed in Recommendation 1, the co-operation on national development issues is a base to 
expand on the regional and international dimension of the SA-EU partnership. 
SA and EU are global players, with strong common interests particularly in the development area. 
According to the Strategic Partnership, SA and EU commit themselves to “struggle against poverty 
and under-development, racism and xenophobia” to closer co-operation in “science and technology, 
innovation for development”. EU supports “South Africa's commitment to the African Agenda, including 
the African Union and NEPAD. Both partners are also committed to ensuring that the interests of 
developing and emerging countries are addressed. Both partners agree that the Strategic Partnership 
will be supportive of regional integration in SADC and the proposed Joint EU-Africa Strategy” (JAP, 
2007). 
Integrating policy exchanges on international  experience  within bilateral  budget support  operations 
would help strengthen the national approaches and build references that can be used at regional and 
international level. This would feed the partnership for international development, which is identified as 
a key area by the SA-EU Strategic Partnership. 
Regional  and  international  initiatives  may  be  launched  or  supported  as  an  extension  of  the 
development partnership within the country. This is particularly evident in the area of Innovation for 
Poverty Alleviation, but the same may apply to Health, Water and other sectors being at the centre of 
the  SA-EU  national  cooperation  programme.  In  many  cases,  the  ‘extended  CD’  components  that 
should complement or be integrated within the BS packages (as recommended above) may/should be 
expanded to include regional and international partners. 
7.3  Cluster 3 - Sectoral issues 
Recommendation 9: Sectoral priorities. 
Keep the sectoral and thematic focus for BS operations, according to the SA demand, but open 
up dialogue and expand knowledge sharing to address relevant strategic themes. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 10, 11 and 12. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EUD, relevant SA stakeholders. 
The specific modalities to link BS operations to particular policy programmes have been considered 
appropriate and should be maintained in the future (Recommendations 2, 3 and 4). While this does 
not allow to recommend possible future sectoral priorities, which will depend upon the government 
demand, in the framework of the general priorities agreed upon between the partners; it is possible, 
however, to highlight, in the sectors covered so far, the areas that might or should be addressed by 
specific policy dialogue, CB/CD initiatives and other knowledge sharing support to fill the gaps that 
have been identified in the evaluation: 
  In  the  Employment  Sector,  the  institutional  framework  of  the  labour  market  and  the  skills 
profile of the labour force, as well as the SMMEs support policies are areas in which the EU 
Member States – from the oldest to the newest ones – have a rich and diversified experience 118 
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which  might  be  jointly  addressed  to  build  significant  development  lessons.  Other 
complementary initiatives could be considered, such as institutional twinning.  
  In  the  area  of  S&T,  a  regional  /  continental  network  including  African  and  EU  specialised 
institutions could be promoted to exchange relevant experiences and assist implementation in 
different countries. 
  In  the  Water  Sector,  opening  up  a  dialogue  on  possible  CSOs  involvement  in  social 
infrastructure maintenance, including examples from other development countries, could help 
addressing the policy implications of the obstacles met so far and possibly open the way to 
further co-operation, such as complementary CB/CD initiatives. 
  In  the  Governance  Sector,  both  supported  programmes  through  their  positive  experience 
could  feed  a  fruitful  dialogue  on  the  lessons  learned,  with  possible  extension  at  national, 
regional and continental level. 
  In the Health Sector, the integration between the SBS operation and the knowledge sharing 
initiatives at the level of the TDCA Facility on the health insurance models and other strategic 
themes should continue. 
  There are also other areas where a strategic exchange, not necessarily linked to an ongoing 
BS operation, could see the ground for further action, as on the theme of inequality. A joint 
forum  (instead  of  one-off  initiatives)  on  fighting  inequality  could  address  different  themes, 
ranging  from  the  EU  experience  with  the  regional  cohesion  policies  to  the  recent  policy 
experience in other high inequality countries, such as Brazil, etc. 
7.4  Cluster 4 - Other key issues for development co-operation 
Recommendation 10: Civil society. 
Further expand the involvement of civil society actors. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 13. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO/EEAS, EUD and CSOs. 
According  to  Conclusion  11,  the  involvement  of  CSOs  allows  to  ensure  an  inclusive  approach  to 
service delivery as well as an adequate level of advocacy and watch-dogging vis-à-vis the government 
action. Therefore it is recommended that: 
  in terms of service delivery, experience gained in the Health and Justice sectors should be 
used to identify areas in other sectors where such a participative approach could be adopted 
successfully, e.g. in the Water sector; 
  in terms of watch-dogging, complementary initiatives should be supported, in the governance 
sector – as already happens in the Justice sector – and in other areas where this may be 
appropriate. 
In addition, the attention to civil society should be also extended to new actors, such as Trade Unions, 
judges, press, representatives of the entrepreneurs, to favour their participation in high level dialogue 
and exchange of experiences, namely with their peers in the EU, through the different opportunities 
provided by the SP. Through the TDCA Dialogue Facility and/or other tools (e.g. twinning), specific 
initiatives involving SA and EU partners could be supported in order to facilitate the establishment of 
stronger relationships between peer actors of the civil society. 
 
Recommendation 11: Local institutions. 
Integrate BS with complementary CB/CD support to Local Authorities to ensure their full 
participation in development actions. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 14. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, EUD and CSOs. 
When the dialogue  identifies the need to  provide specific support to local  actors to enhance their 
participation in the supported programmes, complementary CB/CD actions should be put in place, 
either through specific SBS components / arrangements, or through separate support funded by the 
EU or by other development partners. The second approach should be preferred when specific gaps 
are identified that may be overcome through intensive, short-term CB/CD support provided either at 
provincial  or  municipal  level.  The  first  one  should  be  preferred  when  longer  term  institutional  and 
policy relations between national and provincial/local level institutions need to be addressed. 
In any case, considering the persistent weakness of municipal authorities, especially in poorer areas, 119 
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as well as their focus on implementation and lack of mandate on policy formulation and testing, it is 
not recommended to implement BS at the municipal level, unless it is a limited and closely monitored 
trial undertaken in the framework of the piloting of centrally driven innovative policies. A different case 
is represented by the provinces, where BS support may be considered, provided adequate CB/CD 
support is ensured. 
 
Recommendation 12: Other EU actors. 
Increase access to - and involvement of - the whole range of EU institutional actors. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusions 6, 7 and 8. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  EUDs, EEAS, DEVCO, other DGs. 
To feed the knowledge sharing processes that have been identified as the main outcomes of the SA-
EU development cooperation (JAP 2007), it is necessary to draw on the EU experience in the different 
sectors and on that of different EU member states. This means that not only specific tools must be 
available (see Cluster 2), but access to relevant information and resources must be ensured. 
In most sectors, SA is interested in the EU and EU member states experience and accumulated know-
how, and ways to ensure easy access to such experience and know-how need to be favoured. Those 
EU institutions which are supposed to own and catalyse a synthesis of this experience and know-how, 
such as the EU sectoral DGs, should be mobilised – under the coordination of DG DEVCO/EEAS - to 
facilitate such access and, when needed, provide information and help to approach relevant member 
states. 
In order to enable EUDs to access and involve  EU DGs such as DG EMPL (Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion), DG REGIO (Regional Policy), DG SANCO (Health and Consumers), DG RTD 
(Research and Innovation) and others, as well as on the experience of the EU member states and the 
EU worldwide partners, specific modalities and tools must be established, namely organisational and 
logistic arrangements should be ensured at country level, through existing and/or new facilities. 
In  an  adapted  form,  this  recommendation  is  also  applicable  to  the  cooperation  with  other  partner 
countries. 
 
Recommendation 13: Predictability.  
Enhance predictability of the flow of budget support funds. 
This recommendation is mainly based on: 
  Conclusion 16. 
This recommendation is mainly addressed to: 
  NT, DEVCO, EUD. 
Considering  the  effects  of  the  disbursement  delays  on  the  operations  of  the  GoSA  programmes 
supported by BS, specific agreements and arrangements should be established to avoid this typical 
project-type bottleneck.  
On the EU side, a few arrangements should be adopted to reduce the actual delays in disbursement, 
such as the reduction in the number and simplification of KPIs used as disbursement triggers, so as to 
facilitate the disbursement assessments and negotiations.  
On  the  SA  side,  improvements  should  regard  the  submission  of  payment  files  by  the  Line 
Departments to the NT and/or from the NT to the EUD. According to the SA stakeholders, however, 
the persistence of the present SA rule of establishing a direct dependency between BS disbursement 
and  the  budget  of  the  GoSA  supported  programme  would  continue  creating  problems  during 
implementation, with possible negative consequences on the sustainability of the action. That said, 
this rule is not a matter of discussion between SA and EU and this is why the present recommendation 
cannot enter into detailed proposals, apart from encouraging the adoption of any practical solution to 
the evident bottlenecks created. 
 